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ABSTRACT
AN ALTER KÄMPFER AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE HOLOCAUST:
OTTO OHLENDORF BETWEEN CAREERISM AND NAZI FUNDAMENTALISM
Jennifer B. Capani
On April 7th, 1951, Holocaust perpetrator Otto Ohlendorf’s death sentence
was carried out according to the ruling of the United States Military Courts in
Nuremberg. In The United States vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et. al., leaders of the
Einsatzgruppen, mobile killing units, were tried for war crimes which led to the
deaths of millions of Jews and partisans. Under Ohlendorf’s leadership of
Einsatzgruppen D, more than 90,000 people were liquidated in the Ukraine. After
this assignment, Ohlendorf resumed his positions head of Domestic Security in the
Reich Security Main Office. As the war ended, he surrendered, and revealed the full
scope of Einsatzgruppen activity, which eventually led to the second set of
Nuremberg Trials. Outside of the Holocaust and the trial, little has been written on
Ohlendorf. His academic career and ideology are insufficiently analyzed.
This dissertation analyzes Ohlendorf’s life, career, and National Socialist
ideology. The key factor in exploring his motivations is to fuse together careerism
and ideology through his elite status as an Alter Kämpfer, “old fighter” and Nazi
party member before 1933. From this designation, Ohlendorf enjoyed privileged
employment, promotions, and a high level of trust within the party. Further
explored is the placement of Ohlendorf into the historiographical debate, and how
his ideology, career, trial, and death connected to his position as an Alter Kämpfer.
Ultimately, analyzing the historiography reveals how memory has been fashioned in
such ubiquitous topics as World War II, Nazi Germany, and the Holocaust.

ii

To my father
William C. Volk, Jr.
for bringing history to me, and me to history.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I was first acquainted with the name Otto Ohlendorf when conducting
secondary research in a graduate seminar for my Master’s degree. It has been
fifteen years since that seminar and as much as explored other areas of research, my
doctoral research resumed by revisiting my initial study of Ohlendorf. I tried to
escape from this project, and am so glad to have stuck with it. But this project is not
all mine for which to take credit. Firstly, thank you to the unwavering support and
expertise of my advisor, Dr. Dolores L. Augustine. Without her constant
encouragement and precision editing, I would not have had the strength to write
this essay. Thank you for believing in this project, and for believing in me.
My gratitude goes to the St. John’s University History Department,
specifically my committee members, Dr. Philip Misevich and Dr. Konrad
Tuchscherer, to Dr. Timothy “The Wizard” Milford and Dr. Tracey-Anne Cooper for
reading early sections and providing significant feedback, to Dr. Nerina Rustomji for
motivating and encouraging me, even when I had little confidence to finish the
program, and to Mrs. Fran Balla, without whom the department would not function
and whose constant warmth, humor, and expertise made this process a little less
painful.
I must thank all of the archivists and institutions who helped me locate and
make sense of documents, and to everyone who read any drafts of this paper, at any
phase, particularly Heather Palladino. To my friends and student colleagues, thanks
for making me feel this project was feasible, even for a Wookie. To Marty “Crabs”
Johnson for making yourself at my disposal for printing and shipping. Special thanks

iv

go to Anita and her family for letting me stay at your house countless times so I
could break up the more than five hour each way commute, and for taking care of
my toddler while I was in meetings and classes. A huge thank you goes to the
makers of microwave popcorn for providing me with hassle-free sustenance during
long writing hauls.
To my Mom, Jayne, no thank you is adequate, but the fact that you now
appreciate history and want to learn more makes me so proud, and thanks to my
sisters, Nicholle and Laurie, for always making fun of everything, including me. All
three of you keep me grounded. To my grandfather, John B. Post (and all of the
veterans in my family) for heroically serving our country in WWII, and for showing
us all how to live a humble, grateful, life of service.
The person to whom this is dedicated, my father William C. Volk (“whitey”),
first introduced me to history, WWII, the Nazis, the Holocaust, etc. I miss sitting
down watching documentaries with you, telling you about my travels, seeing you get
enraged over contemporary politics, and the best gift of all was how you and Mom
got to experience history with me coming to visit me in Germany, especially going to
Auschwitz. This is for you.
Lastly, there are no thanks sufficient for the sacrifices made by my husband,
David. Your constant encouragement and patience have made this whole thing
possible. Without you, this project may never have happened and although our long
journey together, beginning as high school sweethearts, has been unconventional, I
would not trade it for a second. Your support, strength of character, kindness, and
humor are what keep me going. Finally, to our hilarious, stubborn, intelligent, sassy,

v

sweet daughter, Yvonne, you are our entire world and hope that when you, and your
sibling-to-be, grow up you are, above all else, passionate and kind.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1:

Chapter 2:

Chapter 3:

Chapter 4:

Introduction

1

Biographical Sketch

5

Searching for Clues to Ohlendorf’s Motivations

9

Examining the Sources

14

Chapter Organization

17

Ohlendorf and the Historiographical Debates

24

Historiography of Ohlendorf

28

Themes

32

The Intentionalist/Functionalist Debate

48

Conclusion and Final Thoughts

65

Otto Ohlendorf: The Nazi Careerist and Disappointed
Ideologue

70

National Socialist Beginnings

72

Education and Early Careerism (1923-1936)

76

Sicherheitsdienst (SD)

86

Ohlendorf’s Economy

91

Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)

99

The Reports: Meldungen aus dem Reich

104

The End of the Reich

112

Conclusion

117

The Einsatzgruppen: Otto Ohlendorf’s “Unexpected”
Career Path

121

vii

Chapter 5:

Chapter 6:

Bibliography

The Transfer

123

Einsatzgruppen: Inception and Directives

136

Process and Procedure

147

Einsatzgruppe D: Committing Genocide in the Holocaust

152

Women and Children

158

Conclusion

163

“Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” on Trial

166

Background

171

Reliable Testimony: An Oxymoron

175

Defense Strategy and Motivation

177

The Number: 90,000

183

Führerbefehl and Conscience

187

Sentencing

192

On Death Row

195

Conclusion

200

Conclusion

204

211

1

Chapter I:
Introduction
Otto Ohlendorf, was part of a select group of elitist Nazi party members, the
Alte Kämpfer (or “old fighters”), where special privileges, including employment and
promotions, were given to the first 100,000 NSDAP (Nazi party) members. These
men, including Ohlendorf, were recognized as the earliest and most devoted party
members, having joined prior to Hitler’s election to the Chancellorship in 1933.
Ohlendorf was party number 6531. The Alte Kämpfer were awarded with these
three particular decorations to distinguish them from new party members. These
awards included the Ehrenwinkel für Alte Kämpfer (silver chevron, worn on the right
arm of the uniform), the Goldenes Partiabzeichen (Golden Badge of Honor, a circular
two-toned medal given by Hitler to indicate outstanding contributions to the party)
and the Medialle zur Erinnerung an den 9. November 1923 (or the Blood Order
Medal, given only to participants in the 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch).1 Ohlendorf
was given the first two awards and he is seen in Illustration 1, wearing the Golden
Badge of Honor, below his left pocket button.
These awards were worn particularly on official uniforms but the Golden
Badge was a pin that could be removed and put on a suit for everyone to see. These
were indicators of prestige and benefit flowed from being recognized as a veteran of
the struggle. Ohlendorf’s career was certainly privileged: He was continually
promoted until he reached the highest strata possible in the Nazi party. But Alter

1

Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage, An Illustrated Dictionary of the Third Reich (Jefferson, North
Carolina: McFarland, 2014), 7, 8.
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Kämpfer was not just an honorific, it was a lifestyle and was a consistent reminder of
why he joined the party. He was a devoted National Socialist and careerist who was
successful at every phase of his career, including when he led the murder of 90,000
Jews and partisans with the Einsatzgruppen.2 Key to understanding how
Ohlendorf’s career and ideology fit together is by analyzing his identity as an Alter
Kämpfer.3

2

Alter Kämpfer will be referenced throughout the dissertation. There is no definitive
source on this subject but for some general information see Dietrich Orlow, The Nazi Party,
1919-1945: A Complete History (New York: Enigma, 2010), Randall Bytwerk, "Und Ihr habt doch
gesiegt: Rhetorical functions of a Nazi holiday." ETC: A Review of General Semantics (1979): 134146, Christoph Schmidt, "Zu den Motiven ‘alter Kämpfer’in der NSDAP," in Detlev Peukert and
Jürgen Reulecke, eds., Die Reihen fast geschlossen. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags unterm
Nationalsozialismus (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1981), Ted Harrison, "" Alter Kämpfer" im
Widerstand. Graf Helldorff, die NS-Bewegung und die Opposition gegen Hitler," Vierteljahrshefte
für Zeitgeschichte (1997): 385-423, Martin Kipp, "Privilegien für „alte Kämpfer “–Zur Geschichte
der SA-Berufsschulen," in Manfred Heinemann, hg., Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich.
Teil 1: Kindergarten, Schule, Jugend, Berufserziehung. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 289–300, Winfried
Süß, Der" Volkskörper" im Krieg: Gesundheitspolitik, Gesundheitsverhältnisse und Krankenmord
im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland 1939-1945 (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), Carl
Friedrich Graumann, Psychologie im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin and Heidelberg: SpringerVerlag, 1985), Ulrich Herbert, Hitler's foreign workers: enforced foreign labor in Germany under
the Third Reich (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
3

It is important to note that in Ohlendorf’s “Personal Bericht” and many other official
files from the Bundesarchiv, indicate that he was given the Alte Kämpfer awards. His resumés
included these accolades. Some of the references are Berlin Bundesarchiv, Nachlaβ, PersonalAkte, Ohlendorf, Otto, SS-Nr. 880 (microfilm) pages 862, 866, 870, 889, 943, and in RG 361,
2527, document number 126144 “Parteistatistische Erhebung 1939.” There are many more, but
this is an example of the frequency of reference of his Alter Kämpfer status.

3

4

Illustration I. Otto Ohlendorf in 1943.
There is no real biography written of Otto Ohlendorf. In 1951, he was
executed by hanging at Landsberg prison in Germany, after being tried for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. He lived imprisoned for three years after he
was sentenced and filed appeals to his sentence. He accepted his sentence in that he
took responsibility for the murder of 90,000 people, but never admitted guilt, in any

4

Illustration I: Otto Ohlendorf, “Porträt Otto Ohlendorf in Uniform als SS-Brigadeführer,”
November 19, 1943, Bundesarchiv, Berlin (accessed August, 2017)

http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/archives/barchpic/search/_1504768780/?switch_lang
=de. Note this is the original file citation but it is watermarked. For the purposes of this
dissertation, this photo was acquired from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Ohlendorf#/media/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183J08517,_Otto_Ohlendorf.jpg which cites the precise information from the Bundesarchiv.
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form. To him, and the dozens of other perpetrators tried in several sets of
Nuremberg trials, his actions were completely justified. Murdering the Jews and
partisans of Europe was in self-defense of Germany where, to Ohlendorf, they held
back the progress of the Aryan race and their elimination was necessary. Ohlendorf
was not alone in this defense, nor did he demonstrate any remorse. Why should he?
In his mind, and in the mind of many a Nazi perpetrator, the Jews were the enemy of
Germany. Among several other issues, this dissertation attempts to further analyze
the transition Ohlendorf made from that of a highly professional policy-maker to the
leader of a unit that perpetrated massive pogroms against Jews and partisans in
Crimea, demonstrating the links between these two phases of his career.
Ohlendorf exemplified the ideal Nazi: the highly educated career professional
who thrived in Nazi Germany through merit-based promotions. Ohlendorf’s career
was defined by his expertise in economics, law and the political economy. He headed
trade organizations and worked for the Ministry of Economics. For all intents and
purposes, Ohlendorf embodied everything the Nazi party wanted: He was
intelligent, devoted to the party, devoted to Germany and his family, and most
significantly, devoted to National Socialist ideology. However, part of his life and
career haunted Ohlendorf after he surrendered to the Allies. He hoped to convince
his captors he was useful to them for his insider knowledge of the Nazi system and
the Third Reich. Instead, it became known to the Allies that he was transferred to
lead Einsatzgruppe D. Under his command, 90,000 Jews and partisans were
murdered en masse in the Soviet Union. This part of his career defined his entire
career and how he is most remembered in history.

5

For decades following the end of the Second World War, historians have
focused their research and analysis on several aspects of Ohlendorf’s life: his career
as an economist, his role as a perpetrator in the Holocaust, and the trial. In recent
years, there has been a shift in what aspects of Ohlendorf’s life are researched,
including a study of Einsatzgruppe D, itself. However, what is missing is a
comprehensive look at the entirety of Ohlendorf’s life and career. What can be
learned from a study like this is how Ohlendorf demonstrated dissent within the
party, what his personal views were regarding anti-Semitism, on what grounds he
claimed that his interpretation of National Socialist ideology was pure, and how this
reflected fragmentation of beliefs within the party itself. His work reflects a
particular kind of radicalism, whereby he initiated policy and solutions based on
activist politics, often at odds with officials in his own party. A comprehensive study
of Ohlendorf’s life and career will allow us to better understand his place in history,
not only in the context of his trial and culpability, but of the history of Nazi Germany
and the Holocaust. This is the goal of this thesis.
Biographical Sketch
On February 4th, 1907, Otto Ohlendorf was born in Hoheneggelsen, near
Hannover. His family owned a farm and he was the second of four children; two
brothers and one sister. Influenced by his older brother, Ohlendorf became
interested in politics at an early age. He was SS (Schutzstaffel) member number 880
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and Nazi Party member number 6531.5 This made him a member of the elite class
of Nazi party members called the Alter Kämpfer, or “old fighter.” He joined the party
in 1925, at the age of eighteen, and the SS a year later. The timing of his Nazi party
membership would benefit him throughout his career as the “Alter Kämpfer”
enjoyed special privileges of employment and promotion.6 He was expected to
become a farmer but instead earned a degree in jurisprudence and began graduate
work in the field of political economy. In 1931, he was awarded a scholarship for a
student exchange to the University of Pavia, Italy where he became an expert on
Fascism, learned to despise it, therefore solidifying his commitment to National
Socialist ideology. In 1934, Ohlendorf married Käthe Wolpers, they had five
children together and were a typical family devoted to National Socialism.
Upon his return to Germany, he practiced law in the district and regional
courts and was recruited by Prof. Dr. Jens Jessen, head of the University of Kiel’s
Institute for World Economics and Maritime Trade, to teach economics and build up
the new department of economics. After less than a year, Ohlendorf and Jessen were
driven out because of their radical economic theories, which were critical of the Nazi
Party. Ohlendorf followed Jessen to Berlin, where their new academic stint was
short-lived, for similar reasons. In 1936, when Ohlendorf’s time in academia was
over, he applied for and was employed by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) (which in 1939

5

For his membership numbers, they are listed on the cover of all documents in the
German Federal Archives. One such document set is “Personalnachweis” in Bundesarchiv Berlin
Nachlaβ Ohlendorf, Otto, Personal-Akte, SS-nr. 880, 862, microfilm.
6

Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria, 19331945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) index, xiii. In later sections of this thesis, Alter Kämpfer
will be addressed more thoroughly.
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became the RSHA {Reichsicherheitshauptamt, or Reich Security Main Office}, in
charge of domestic intelligence). Here, he used spies to acquire information for
public opinion reports. These reports cited many aspects of the Reich including the
economy, public attitudes toward a variety of issues, and the Nazi party itself. He
gained a reputation for conducting thorough research on the Reich and wrote
weekly reports on the collected data, which often reflected on particulars of German
life negatively. Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer SS, openly criticized Ohlendorf’s
negativity and dismissed the reports.
Despite the grudge against Ohlendorf held by Himmler and Reinhard
Heydrich, head of the RSHA, Ohlendorf continued to thrive in his career. This is,
without question, because he was an Alter Kämpfer whose loyalty to the party was
unassailable, overriding any squabbles he had with other party members. Also, the
elite Alte Kämpfer club warranted privilege throughout his, and other members’,
careers. In 1941, in an alleged attempt to punish Ohlendorf for insubordination, he
was ultimately transferred to the eastern front to lead Einsatzgruppe D. Despite
twice refusing the position, Ohlendorf conceded, and as leader of Einsatzgruppe D,
he excelled with the same kind of dedication as in any other part of his career,
compiling reports in similar form and tone as in other areas of his career. He was
driven by his commitment to National Socialist ideology and the Nazi party, but in
this case, was not conducting public opinion polls, writing economic policy or doing
anything academic. Ohlendorf’s group of five hundred men were wrangling up
innocent people and murdering them, execution style.

8

Following his time as head of an Einsatzgruppe, Ohlendorf resumed his role
in the RSHA and assumed additional roles in the Ministry of Economics and trade
groups. As the end of the war became inevitable, Ohlendorf’s pragmatic nature
tended to accept the outcome and devise a post-war economic recovery plan. One of
the last Nazis to remain at the headquarters in Berlin, Ohlendorf fled to Flensburg
with the provisional government that was set up to run in lieu of Hitler (and upon
his suicide). On May 23rd, 1945, he surrendered himself to the Allies, thinking his
expertise on the inner-working of the government would prove useful and that he
might still be offered a position in whatever transitional government would be set
up to rebuild Germany. He was grossly mistaken and his actions with the
Einsatzgruppen were exposed as criminal genocide.
Thanks to Ohlendorf’s apparent candor, frankness and willingness to offer
information to the Allies, a second set of Nuremberg Trials was set up solely to deal
with the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, in Case 9, The United States of America v.
Otto Ohlendorf, et al. Ohlendorf was the lead defendant in a trial to determine war
crimes and crimes against humanity. A trained lawyer himself, Ohlendorf plead not
guilty and defended his actions by invoking the Führerbefehl (under order of the
Führer), saying he was given orders to follow. After three years in captivity,
thousands of hours of interviews, interrogations and testimony given, pleas,
affidavits and sworn statements made, Ohlendorf was charged with three counts of
war crimes and sentenced to death by hanging.
He filed appeals and mobilized a group of supporters, and although most of
the original sentences of the twenty-four accused in his trial were commuted, or at
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least shortened, Ohlendorf was hanged on June 8th, 1951. He was forty-three years
old and left a wife with five young children behind. Upon his death, Ohlendorf never
wavered in his devotion to National Socialism and never expressed remorse for the
crimes he committed, as he did not see the murder of innocent people as a crime. A
comprehensive analysis of his life and career begins here and will highlight underresearched aspects. Shown are patterns of behavior befitting a true loyalist Alter
Kämpfer, with ultimate careerist drive, and a consistency in ideology throughout
Nazi Germany.
Searching for Clues to Ohlendorf’s Motivations
Historians have long studied Nazi Germany, World War II, the Holocaust, the
Nuremberg Trials, perpetrator motivations, the Einsatzgruppen, the Nazi economy,
and many other topics related to this dissertation. The utopian quest to find a
singular document, the key that answered all questions concerning Ohlendorf’s
motivations, remorse, trial strategy, etc., one that focused on Ohlendorf’s thoughtprocess at various phases of his life, simply failed. A document like this may have
been destroyed or never existed at all. Therefore, this dissertation builds on the
work of other historians, hoping to make a modest contribution to a vast field. My
work has been influenced by numerous papers, articles, books, authors, websites,
etc., and remains incomplete. In the future, I hope to acquire full access to more
archival materials. For a more detailed analysis of source materials, please see the
historiography section of this dissertation.

10

There have been considerable shifts in views on the place of the Holocaust in
history. Doris Bergen’s War and Genocide is significant because it forces readers to
fuse together and think critically about historical context.7 In this case, the Second
World War and the Holocaust were inseparable occurrences and to analyze the
Holocaust as a singular event does not provide the appropriate framework for
topical analysis. This is a significant study demonstrative of new trends in the field.
Along with Bergen’s book, Daniel Blatman, in The Death Marches, has
recently contributed to historiography by forcing historians to rethink the phases of
the Holocaust, placing the death marches not as an epilogue to the events of the
Holocaust, but as the final phase of it.8 An undetermined number of people perished
in these marches and Blatman emphasizes the role of locals in perpetrating
genocide. Focusing on case studies like Majdanek, Blatman argues that the
Holocaust was more improvised and scattered than previously thought.
Arguably the book that most influenced my research is Catherine Epstein’s
Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western Poland.9Epstein’s ability to

7

Doris Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust (Lanham, M.D.:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016) and Doris Bergen, The Holocaust: A Concise History (Plymouth,
U.K.: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., 2009).
8

Daniel Blatman, The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). For more on the Death Marches see Elie
Wiesel, Night (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), Joseph Freeman and Donald Schwartz, The Road
to Hell: Recollections of the Nazi Death March (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1998), Andrzej
Strzelecki, The Evacuation, Dismantling and Liberation of KL Auschwitz (Oświęcim, Poland:
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, 2001), and Michael R. Marrus, ed., The End of the Holocaust
(Westport, CT: Meckler, 1989).
9

Catherine Epstein, Model Nazi: Arthur Grieser and the Occupation of Western Poland
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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fuse together a complete account of Greiser’s career with significant issues in the
study of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust is a model to historians of the Holocaust. I
am grateful that the general historiography has shifted back into a biographical
mode. Nazi Germany was not the well-oiled machine previously thought. It was
multi-dimensional and had real human beings making decisions relevant to
humanity. This is why we study both Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. The
incomprehensibly horrific decision to murder 6,000,000, one third of all the Jews of
Europe was not a crime conducted by mindless fools. The Holocaust was
perpetuated by the Ohlendorfs of Germany.
On the subject of anti-Semitism, countless studies, articles and books have
been written. Even from an early age, school-aged children now read good general
studies that analyze the history of the persecution of Jews. The best known are Elie
Wiesel’s Night and the Diary of Anne Frank.10 These books raise important
questions of how to define and contextualize persecution and the Holocaust. Other
general studies of anti-Semitism have been useful to this paper and include Robert

10

Anne Frank, Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1952)
and Elie Wiesel, Night (New York: Avon Books, 1969). Other relevant books by and about Wiesel
are Ellen Normal Stern, Elie Wiesel: A Voice for Humanity (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication
Society, 1996), Thomas J. Vinciguerra, ed., Conversations with Elie Wiesel (New York: Schocken
Books, 2001), Harry J. Cargas, ed., Responses to Elie Wiesel: Critical Essay by Major Jewish and
Christian Scholars (New York: Persea Books, 1978) and Harry J. Cargas, ed., Telling the Tale: A
Tribute to Elie Wiesel on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday (St. Louis: Time Being Books, 1993),
Wiesel, A Beggar in Jerusalem: A Novel (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), Wiesel, Night, Dawn,
The Accident: A Trilogy (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004). For more on Anne Frank and related
works see Miep Gies, Anne Frank Remembered: The Story of the Woman Who Helped to Hide
the Frank Family (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), Jennifer Hansen, ed., Anne Frank (San
Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2003), and Carol Ann Lee, Roses from the Earth: The Biography of
Anne Frank (London: Viking, 1999).
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Wistrich’s Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred, Shmuel Almog’s Antisemitism Through
the Ages, Richard Levy’s Antisemitism in the Modern World and many more.11 These
kinds of works show the origins of anti-Semitism, how hatred was bred and
persecution conducted over centuries. Important to the study of Ohlendorf is
analyzing the origins and evolution of anti-Semitism culminating in the Holocaust.
The Holocaust is the ultimate example of the long-ingrained cultural,
religious and societal persecution of the Jewish population of Europe. Numerous
studies have been conducted concerning the Nazis’ ideological anti-Semitism.
Taking racial hatred and transforming it into the systematic destruction of the Jews
was the brainchild of Nazi Germany. The actions of the Nazis in successfully
murdering two-thirds of Europe’s Jews have been critically analyzed by historians
and scholars from a variety of disciplines including economics, psychology, and
sociology. In addition, studies of racial supremacy and eugenics dominate the
literature. It is well-known that the Nazis were notorious for conducting
experiments on Jews and unwanted persons: especially Dr. Josef Mengele at
Auschwitz.12 Some of the authors writing on these topics include Yehuda Bauer,

11

Shmuel Almog, ed., Antisemitism Through the Ages (Oxford: Pergammon Press, 1998),
Antisemitism in the Modern World: An Anthology of Texts (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1990),
and Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991).
Among these mentioned, for more general books on anti-Semitism see Ron Rosenbaum, ed.,
Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism (New York: Random House, 2004),
David I. Kertzer, ed., Old Demons, New Debates: Anti-Semitism in the West (Teaneck, NJ: Holmes
and Meier Publishers, 2005), Michael Fineberg, Shimon Samuels, and Mark Weitzman, eds.,
Antisemitism: The Generic Hatred: Essay in Memory of Simon Wiesenthal (London: Vallentine
Mitchell, 2007), and Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer, Antisemitism: Myth and Hate
from Antiquity to the Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
12

There are many books on Auschwitz, Mengele, Eugenics and Nazi medical
experiments. For medical experiments see Götz Aly, Peter Chroust, and Christian Pross,
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Hannah Arendt, Israel Gutman, Raul Hilberg, Saul Friedländer, Richard Breitman,
Omer Bartov, Alan Bullock, George Mosse, Michael R. Marrus, Helmut Krausnick,
Jackson Spielvogel, Hilary Earl, Michael Wildt, Adam Tooze, Götz Aly, Daniel J.
Goldhagen, and Christopher Browning.13 This list of authors is incredibly brief but

Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994), Ernst Klee, Auschwitz, die NS-Medizin und ihre Opfer (Frankfurt am
Main: S. Fischer, 1997), Benno Müller-Hill, Murderous Science: Elimination by Scientific Selection
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each of their works, plus the writings of countless others, has directly influenced
this thesis.
Central to this dissertation are three themes. Firstly, this thesis is an analysis
of motivation. The key to understanding the connection between Ohlendorf’s
National Socialist ideology and careerism is exploring his identity as an Alter
Kämpfer. Without this important bridge between ideology and career, the
explanation of why he was so dedicated and why his career was so privileged
remains superficial and speculative. The second theme addresses historiographical
themes of intentionalism and functionalism. Analyzing Ohlendorf within the context
of how historians have viewed the implementation of the Holocaust shows how
scholars have shifted the bulk of responsibility from either Hitler or Germany as a
whole, to a newer melding of the two positions together. In other words, the
polarizing debate over blame for genocide has morphed into a combination of both
intent and function together. The final theme addresses Ohlendorf’s level and blame
and guilt within the context of the SS-Einsatzgruppen Nuremberg Trials. This theme
unpacks some critical issues concerning his own defense strategy. But here, the key
to better understanding Ohlendorf’s defense, career, ideology, motivation and
actions are best seen through his identity as an Alter Kämpfer.
Examining the Sources
In general, the most influential set of documents on Ohlendorf is the
transcript from the trial. It not only includes Ohlendorf’s own words in the
testimony, affidavits, and archival footage, which is incredibly useful to understand

15

tone and emotion from the documents, but also shows how the prosecution, judges
and fellow defendants reacted to Ohlendorf. I have relied on the transcripts, films,
etc. but did so aware of the inherent bias present in court testimony, especially
testimony where the outcome was the possibility of the death penalty. There are
problems that will be addressed later in this paper concerning the trial. However,
this part of the source material cannot and should not be ignored. Much can be
inferred from carefully listening to courtroom dialogue. Testimony from the trial,
coupled with other statements on or by Ohlendorf from different periods of his life
provides a better understanding of the context of and reasoning behind his
testimony.
Most of the transcripts are available in published books, like John
Mendelsohn’s Trials of War Criminals, and are on good credible websites like the
Yale University Lillian Goldman Law Library’s “The Avalon Project, “which cataloged
the International Military Tribunal records.14 In addition, primary research for this
dissertation was conducted at the Bundesarchiv Berlin, the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, the National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD and in Washington, D.C.
Another important set of sources from the Einsatzgruppen Trial are memoirs
from Chief Judge Michael Musmanno, and Prosecutors Telford Taylor and Whitney
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Harris, and Benjamin Ferencz, who is still alive today and remains vocal in
interviews, lectures, public appearances, and on his website. Memoirs from
Ohlendorf’s contemporaries are also useful, describing Ohlendorf’s character and
chronicling his conversations and viewpoints. Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal
physician and masseur, is an example of an insider who knew and frequently
conversed with Ohlendorf. Not forgetting the inherent bias in a memoir, Kersten’s
book is telling of the relationship between Ohlendorf and Himmler. Kersten
portrays Ohlendorf as misguided Nazi ideologue with whom Himmler found fault
thanks to Ohlendorf’s notoriously stubborn, know-it-all personality.
I found significant material at the Federal German Archive (Bundesarchiv) in
Berlin, including Ohlendorf’s personnel files, birth record, assorted papers such as
awards, official documents from the Economics Ministry, the war department,
census materials, and medical forms. Useful materials like his promotion sheets,
performance evaluations, personally drafted versions of his resumé, and transfer
requests were all read, translated and utilized for this thesis. All translations of
primary sources were completed by this author, with frequent questions,
consultations and cross-checking by my advisor. This archival trip also proved
fruitful in obtaining general personnel files, original SS and Nazi party membership
forms, medals, awards, and honors received, letters written by Jessen on
Ohlendorf’s behalf, documents in his own handwriting, and many other documents
in the hundreds, some on microfilm, others available in the original and
photocopied. The documents acquired here are the foundation of research for this
entire dissertation.
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Through correspondence with archivists at the IFZ-München (Institut für
Zeitgeschichte, or Institute for Contemporary History), I was able to order a number
of documents from there. In particular, a letter from Käthe Ohlendorf to David
Irving is used extensively throughout the entirety of this dissertation. However,
although many of her husband’s personal papers, letters, etc. were bequeathed to
the IFZ after her death in 1983, there is no index to the entire collection. Searching
the collection for specific documents is challenging, and I was unable to visit the
archive. Until the materials are properly catalogued and linked to their online
database, searching by document title is the best option. Nevertheless, the staff
were helpful and continue to assist with questions concerning their collection of
Ohlendorf materials.
Published primary sources like The Einsatzgruppen Reports and Meldungen
aus dem Reich were tremendously helpful, translated to English and easily
navigable. Robert Gellately’s edited book, based on Dr. Leon Goldensohn’s
interviews of Ohlendorf in prison, was particularly significant to this study,
especially the probing questions concerning Ohlendorf’s family and opinion of antiSemitism. His assessment of Ohlendorf’s character is in line with my own findings
regarding traits present from the beginning to the end of his life.
Chapter Organization
Throughout this paper certain themes arise involving Ohlendorf, culpability,
Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. Particularly addressed are themes of guilt, justice,
motivation, and anti-Semitism, to name a few. Other subtler topics in the greater
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historiography are extensively analyzed here. These include careerism, activism,
academics, Nazi economics, religion, persecution, and, most significantly, National
Socialist ideology. A key component to this study is to use certain under-researched
aspects of Ohlendorf’s life to fill the historiographical gaps. Ultimately, what I have
found is that Ohlendorf’s life and career were not only reflective of his identity as an
ideal Nazi careerist, but that as an Alter Kämpfer, his devotion to National Socialism
was exponentially more fervent than that of average party members.
This dissertation is comprised of four major parts, an introduction and
conclusion, and is chronologically organized. The following chapter is a
historiographical analysis. Aside from what is mentioned here in the introduction,
this section of the paper focuses on what has been written about Ohlendorf and
what directly pertains to him. Analyzed here are the gaps in historiography where
Ohlendorf’s life and career have either been studied or where there is a need for
further study. Questions that are raised in this chapter include: how participation in
the Holocaust fits into the broader biography of the perpetrator; where in the
historiography are there gaps in Ohlendorf’s life; what historians say about
perpetrator intent and motivation; how Ohlendorf’s life and career have been
interpreted; and how a comprehensive study of Ohlendorf can contribute to a
greater understanding of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. This chapter also
addresses the important intentionalist/functionalist debate in historiography which
concerns when, how and from whom the Holocaust was planned, implemented, and
carried out.
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Chapter three is an analysis of Ohlendorf’s early life and career and how it
was driven by his dedication to National Socialist ideology. Chronicling Ohlendorf’s
life and career, some of the main parts discussed are his upbringing and education,
the solidification of his commitment to National Socialism, his Alter Kämpfer loyalty
and dedication, his law career, his period in academia, career change to the SD
(Sicherheitsdienst) which morphed into the RSHA (Reichsicherheitshauptamt), and
then there is a break in the chronology: Ohlendorf’s transfer to the Einsatzgruppen.
It was necessary to create a continuous career flow for Ohlendorf and to do so,
removing the Einsatzgruppen section created its own chapter. Although I argue this
part of his career was crucial to his meteoric ascension up the party ranks,
Ohlendorf himself described it as a blemish on his record, which is why it is
separate. This is most likely because it was the only part of his career in which he
was held accountable for genocide. Lastly discussed is his post-Einsatzgruppen
career in the Reich until the surrender.
What this section does is point to important aspects National Socialist
ideology, Ohlendorf’s professional successes as a result of his transfer to the
Einsatzgruppen in the Ukraine, and his alleged reluctance to be transferred. Also
analyzed are Ohlendorf’s view of the middle class (Mittelstand), where he broke
away from the party by taking the interest of the middle-class very seriously as
central to German society, a position that clashed with the realities of the Nazi
system. This is an indicator of his different interpretation of National Socialist
ideology. He had a sort of populist vision for German society that focused on
majority rule and disdain for minorities. In other words, the people should have a
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direct say in how the country was run. Significantly, Ohlendorf demonstrated
opposition to his fellow Nazis, especially Himmler, in a very indirect way: through
the details of the public opinion reports and by secretly designing a post-war
economic recovery plan with a new government. The larger implications of this
show that he was not necessarily ideologically aligned with the Nazi party platform,
that he lost faith in the success of the Nazi regime, and that despite his arrogance to
challenge Himmler on many issues his status as an Alter Kämpfer prevented his
reprimand. The most important question addressed in this chapter deals with
Ohlendorf’s personality. If he and Himmler had such a personal feud, why was he
never fired? Instead, Ohlendorf’s career thrived. He was an important figure in the
Reich and the quintessential example of his generation of highly educated activist
reformers whom the Nazis employed. Ohlendorf shared many characteristics with
highly educated men of his generation who became leaders of RSHA sections or
were sent to the front to serve as Einsatzgruppen commanders and deputies.
Chapter four deals solely with the Einsatzgruppen. Discussed here are the
motivations and reasons surrounding Ohlendorf’s transfer to a leadership position
with Einsatzgruppe D. While on trial, Ohlendorf continually stated he was opposed
to the transfer and that Himmler was treating him unfairly. This cannot really be
proven without a doubt, although it can be assumed there is some truth to his
objections. Notions of Blutkitt (blood cement), or implicating officials in the crimes
of the Nazis by inducing them to participate, underlay attempts to manipulate men
like Ohlendorf into accepting that enacting mass murder was part of the Nazi career
path. Ohlendorf was responsible for the murder of more than 90,000 innocent
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people. How does a man go from being an academic who criticized the Reich for not
being more purist in ideology to become a mass murderer? Although Ohlendorf was
allegedly hesitant to accept this position, he performed his duties with the same
fervor, efficiency, and distinction as his Reich desk job. Interesting to this section,
despite enacting mass murder, Ohlendorf was sure to take care of his “soldiers” and
ensure that their mental health was his priority. In other words, the psychological
effect of performing murder was the chief concern of Ohlendorf, and he made sure
to testify to this. He was never sorry for these tasks or for this career path.
Chapter five begins with Ohlendorf’s surrender, leading to the trial. This
section deals with the issues surrounding how Ohlendorf became the lead witness in
the second set of Nuremberg trials, also known as the Einsatzgruppen Trials or Case
9: The United States of American v. Otto Ohlendorf, et al. When Ohlendorf was
captured, he thought his captors wanted inside information on the Reich that he
could provide. What he did not expect was that, true to his personality, known for
frankness and insufferable honesty, he would divulge so much information that
eventually it came out that he was an Einsatzgruppen leader. When pressed and
interrogated, Ohlendorf, matter-of-factly, admitted involvement in the mass murder
of 90,000 Jews and partisans. In addition to the trial, Ohlendorf’s appeals process is
briefly mentioned, along with the idea that he should be tried as part of the
Wehrmacht, and not as a war criminal. During the trial, he used this as a defense
strategy, but this argument has some validity because the Einsatzgruppen were
mobile killing units, sent in after the invasion of Russia, and were attached to army
divisions. Justice is a significant part of the discussion. Hilary Earl criticized the
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process by and in which many of the Nuremberg perpetrators were tried. Ohlendorf
was sentenced to death and his sentence was upheld until after his execution in
1951. Most other perpetrators on trial had their sentences commuted. The politics
of the Cold War helped influence the decision of the court to uphold Ohlendorf’s
death by hanging.
This dissertation details the life and career of Otto Ohlendorf with the goal of
beginning a more comprehensive biography than previously compiled. It is just a
beginning because much more research needs to be conducted in order to create the
best working biography possible. Why is studying Ohlendorf important? It
demonstrates not only usual trends in the scholarship of Nazi Germany and the
Holocaust such as perpetrator motivation, but his life also shows a high level of
dedication to National Socialism as an ideology. He became an alleged “unwilling”
perpetrator with the Einsatzgruppen, but nevertheless performed his tasks and was
able tried to justify the murder of more than 90,000 people, as a loyalist Alter
Kämpfer. How could a person of apparently intellect become a mass murderer?
Outside of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf contributed much to
securing the future of German recovery and success by advocating for middle class
reform. He was a reformer and outspoken, probably insufferable, critic of the Nazi
party and really thought he could fix the problem by addressing issues that were
significant to the German public.
Unfortunately, Ohlendorf’s idealistic, purist views of National Socialism were
a disappointment. He realized he could affect little in terms of party politics. In fact,
he, and others of his generation of Nazi officials-turned-mass murderers, began their
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careers as activist reformers. Whatever good he did for the German economy is
negated in history because he chose to accept being transferred to the
Einsatzgruppen and chose to implement the murderous racial policies of the Third
Reich. Without excusing these atrocities in any way, this paper intends to
incorporate more than the heinous parts of his life and career into a singular
narrative, one that places National Socialist devotion at the center of Ohlendorf’s
life, death and career.
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Chapter 2:
Ohlendorf and Historiographical Debates

Introduction
There are many difficulties in writing a comprehensive analysis of Otto
Ohlendorf’s life, and few attempts have been made. This chapter provides an
overview of what others have written about Ohlendorf’s career outside of the
Nuremberg Einsatzgruppen trial. Looking at his life in its entirety shows how
significant National Socialist ideology was in his career. At each point in his career,
Ohlendorf strove to outperform his colleagues, and at times, held them directly
accountable to the Nazi belief system. The most condemnable phase in Ohlendorf’s
activist career was his tenure with the Einsatzgruppen, during which, under his
command, 90,000 Jews and partisans were murdered. Even when he directly
commanded genocide, he performed with the same dedication to National Socialist
ideology as in all other phases of his career. Ohlendorf certainly did not foresee
having to pay for these horrendous crimes with his life. Even then, though with
alleged reluctance, he performed his duties with complete fidelity to National
Socialism. His activities as Einsatzgruppen commander have yielded the greatest
volume of analysis on Ohlendorf, and rightfully so. However, certain points in his
career have been under-analyzed. Searching for a more comprehensive study of
Ohlendorf’s career, as a whole, demonstrates that there is a need for the
historiography to better tie his Holocaust perpetration to his work in academia, in
the running of the national economy, and as head of AMT III in the RSHA
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(Reichsicherheitshauptamt, or Reich Security Main Office). There is no disconnect
between the phases of his career, and analyzing them together demonstrates that
the one most significant aspect of his life that transcended his career, personality
and life is his devotion to National Socialism. He was, without question, and
certainly in his mind, the keeper of the Holy Grail of Nazi ideology.
There are three parts to this chapter. Presented firstly is an analysis of Otto
Ohlendorf in a historiographical context. The various parts of his life and career
together gives us something new: insight on the influence of being an Alter Kämpfer,
how careerism drove Ohlendorf to become responsible for genocide, and how he
questioned the conduct of the Nazi party and the ideology of National Socialism.
The analysis follows particular phases in his life and career. Most of these phases
have been under-researched, with the exception of the Nuremberg Trials. The
objective is to look at Ohlendorf’s life in a more complete way, seeing what parts of
his career demand further exploration by scholars and why. Particular questions
arise in the historiography, mostly concerning gaps in scholarship: Why has no one
written a real, complete biography of Ohlendorf? Are there inadequate, inaccessible
or possibly destroyed primary sources that cannot be looked at? What can be
learned from his academic career? How does that apply to intellectual trends in the
Reich? Why is there so little written about the public opinion reports? Is what
historians know about Ohlendorf too much based of what he said at Nuremberg and
in captivity? Is it meaningful to look merely at the deeds of a perpetrator rather
than the whole picture and life of a person? These, and other questions, are what
drive the themes of this dissertation: to address the incompleteness of a
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historiography of Ohlendorf and to place a study of his life and career into the scope
of the so-called “intentionalist/functionalist debate.”
The second part addresses the historian Daniel J. Goldhagen and the
intentionalist/functionalist debates. These important historiographical debates
sparked a feud in the field of Nazi Germany and Holocaust studies in which
historians took sides over to specific issues: whether the Germans who committed
Holocaust atrocities were “ordinary” or if they were “willing executioners.” Another
key issue is the question as to whether a Führerbefehl, or Führer Order, existed: that
is, a direct order, coming from Hitler, to murder the Jews. Historians disagree about
its issuance and timing, implementation, directives, and, for some, whether it existed
at all. Because these issues dominate the historiography, this analysis attempts to
summarize and highlight particular points and relate them to Ohlendorf, asking
important questions regarding improvised Einsatzgruppen killings, motivations, and
intent. What I am looking for are places, and directives, where Ohlendorf, and the
other Einsatzgruppen leaders, used improvisational tactics to conduct mass murder.
They were not given a handbook as to how to murder en masse. There were general
methods followed but Ohlendorf had to adapt to a variety of conditions, including
changing local police forces, population numbers, location of the executions, etc.
Shown in this section is how his Einsatzgruppen acted independently, without
specific directives, regarding how genocide was carried out; especially Ohlendorf’s
objection to the use of gas vans as an execution tool.
Ironically as an undergraduate, Goldhagen wrote a significant study of
Ohlendorf’s life and more than a decade later penned Hitler’s Willing Executioners, a
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critically acclaimed, but also reviled, book.15 Goldhagen’s work has been widely
condemned by historians as ahistorical. One of his central ideas is that over
centuries, Germany bred a specific kind of “eliminationist anti-Semitism” that
eventually led to their willingness to participate in the Holocaust.16 Fitting an
Ohlendorf-specific historiography into the existing general debate demonstrates
how a participant in genocide committed crimes because of his careerist nature,
dedication to National Socialist ideology, and how important was the loyalty of a
Nazi Alter Kämpfer. Although he was unquestionably anti-Semitic, Ohlendorf’s
professional goal was not to become a direct perpetrator of genocide. But he
became exactly that, and his privileged Alter Kämpfer status bound him to the party
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with loyalty. His reluctance to participate in the killings themselves demonstrates a
commitment to what he thought was the correct version of National Socialist
ideology: one where he should not have to be a killer to be a successful Nazi.
Therefore, he was not born and bred an “eliminationist anti-Semite.” There is a
difference.
Trying to build a foundation from which to study Ohlendorf’s life and career
proves difficult as the source material available is barely adequate. If a historian can
access all of the known surviving documents related to Ohlendorf professional and
personal life, perhaps then every question can be answered. The resources accessed
for the writing of this paper are nonetheless sufficient to draw particular
conclusions about Ohlendorf’s general thoughts, ideas and perceptions of Nazi
Germany and the Holocaust. I will attempt to fill the gaps in the historiography on
Ohlendorf in this thesis. Finally, looking at Ohlendorf and the general questions of
the historiographical debates points to the need for more individual case-studies to
add to the discussion of perpetrator motivations, lives, careers, and their individual
roles in Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.
Historiography of Ohlendorf
Deficiencies in scholarship are seen in the literature concerning various
phases of Ohlendorf’s career. Firstly, his early years in academia, when he earned a
degree in jurisprudence, studied Fascism at the University of Pavia, and returned to
the district court in Hildesheim where he was a practicing lawyer, are an
underexplored area. This part of Ohlendorf’s career led him to Jens Jessen, Nazi
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academic and future member of the resistance, and two separate university jobs, in
which he lectured and devised policies regarding middle class economics.17 Little
has been written about this early phase and if more primary source materials were
available, they might be able to address significant issues concerning his criticism of
Hitler’s economic policies, his desire to create a National Socialist utopia, and how
Fascism played a tremendous role in Ohlendorf’s belief system. Unfortunately for
Ohlendorf and the world, his career in academia was cut short.
The next phase of his life is in the RSHA, where he was head of AMT III (SDInland). Here he set out to “remold the SD into the organization he had thought he
was joining; he almost singlehandedly built the SD into an efficient and
comprehensive information gathering organization.”18 He did exactly that, at the
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behest of Himmler. Ohlendorf’s “opinion reports” were designed to gather
information on various aspects of German life and report back to the Reich to offer
criticism and ways in which to fix problems in Germany, with particular care given
to economics. This phase lasted, on and off, until June 1941, when he was
transferred to the Einsatzgruppen because of alleged ideological feuds with Himmler
and Heydrich.
The Einsatzgruppen phase has been recently explored by scholars of history,
sociology, and the Holocaust. Ohlendorf’s careerist nature led him to order and
oversee the efficient extermination of 90,000 Jews and partisans. Although he
claimed to have been forcibly transferred, stating many times at the trial that he
disapproved of these actions, he met his task with the same brutal efficiency as in
any other phase of his career. Most of the scholarship dealing with Ohlendorf and
the Einsatzgruppen tries to answer the question as to how an academic, a man of
intellect, could condone the murder of 90,000 innocent civilians.
After his year in the Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf returned to the RSHA and
again excelled at his career. He was successful in creating economic plans for the
phase after Nazi victory, was promoted several times, and finally asked to join the
Dönitz cabinet in Flensburg.19 Here, he surrendered to the Allies, thinking he would
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be given clemency because of his work in intelligence in the Reich. The information
he provided to the British was enough to call a set of Nuremberg war crimes trials
called the Einsatzgruppen case.
Clearly, the trial period has been the most studied of all the phases of
Ohlendorf’s life, leaving his professional successes to fade with history. The
testimony Ohlendorf gave in captivity and at the trial serves as the most easily
accessible and largest quantity of primary source documentation on Ohlendorf’s life,
imprisonment, and death. Throughout each phase of his career, the same drive and
motivation is always present. Ultimately, his devotion to National Socialist
principles led him to command mass murder. Ironically to him, these actions would
lead to his own hanging. It is important to remain aware of the achievements and
gaps in the historiography while seeking a better understanding of World War II,
Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, how the Nazi party operated, the lack of
uniformity in National Socialist ideology, the privileged position of Alte Kämpfer, the
role of the Einsatzgruppen in the Holocaust, and Ohlendorf’s contribution.
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Themes
There is little written about Ohlendorf’s early life, aside from his affidavits
and testimony. Some scholars have been able to piece together facts about
Ohlendorf’s upbringing and early party involvement but there is no monograph on
his life. Hilary Earl’s work on the Einsatzgruppen trials has produced some of the
most comprehensive surveys of his life and work, with emphasis on the trial.20 In
her works she points out that his personality shaped the nature of the trial and that
as key defendant, he revealed how Nazi ideology was manifested in the activities of
the Einsatzgruppen. Her studies are significant and important in analyzing the
motivations of war criminals and the ways that National Socialists framed their
justification for conducting genocide. This thesis aligns with Earl’s conclusions that
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actions, activity in the Einsatzgruppen, and through testimony and trial records, makes
important connections about how Ohlendorf’s Nazi ideology never waned from his early life to
his death.
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Ohlendorf’s trial testimony provided important insights into his transformation
from National Socialist ideologue to mass murderer and this reveals how the Nazis
manipulated even the most intelligent Germans into “effective instruments” of
genocidal policy.21
Dr. Leon Goldensohn’s post-war interviews with Ohlendorf serve to fill in
some gaps in his upbringing, National Socialist ideology, and anti-Semitic beliefs.22
He served as prison psychiatrist at Landsberg and used a gentle approach to try and
understand the “pathology” of the Nazi war criminals and was interested in
analyzing their “depravities.”23 Noting that the persons interviewed were either on
trial, about to be, or had been already sentenced, Goldensohn attempted to coax
Nazis like Ohlendorf to reveal character traits, details that he used to write
character assessments. About Ohlendorf he made the general observation that “he
tends to speak precisely, but his manner is of a man who is expected to be insulted
at any moment and is being defensive about it.”24 He delved into Ohlendorf’s
upbringing, family, education, views on anti-Semitism, and religion. The importance
of this work is that it is a biographical sketch of Ohlendorf, including his own words
as analyzed from a psychological and moral standpoint.
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Another valuable work on Ohlendorf’s early life is from an unpublished
honors thesis written by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen.25 Prior to his monumental study
of perpetrator motivations, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Goldhagen’s thesis, “The
‘Humanist,’” draws on significant trends in Ohlendorf life. He includes a biography,
analysis of motivation and Nazi ideology, and Ohlendorf’s weltanschauung (or world
view). The evidence he utilized is the most noteworthy part of his paper, drawing
on the interviews, private letters and documents provided by Ohlendorf’s widow,
Käthe Ohlendorf. In addition to archive research, Goldhagen’s father Erich
personally interviewed Mrs. Ohlendorf and acquired privileged primary source
documentation, most of which were her husband’s papers.26 Daniel Goldhagen’s
thesis serves as a significant study on Ohlendorf’s life, National Socialist philosophy,
and anti-Semitic ideology.
Cited in the vast majority of works written about any phase in Ohlendorf’s
life and career is Heinz Höhne’s Order of Death’s Head.27 Höhne, like Goldhagen’s
father, conducted interviews and acquired copies of personal documents, including
private letters, from Mrs. Ohlendorf. He was a German historian specializing in the

25

Daniel J. Goldhagen, “The ‘Humanist’ as a Mass Murderer: The Mind and Deeds
of SS General Otto Ohlendorf,” Unpublished Honors Thesis (Cambridge: Harvard University,
1982).
26

Erich Goldhagen’s correspondence with Mrs. Ohlendorf is documented in Käthe
Ohlendorf Letter to David Irving, March, 30, 1979. Institute für Zeitgeschichte München, 252356-1. He was a Ukrainian Jewish Holocaust survivor and professor at Harvard University.
Daniel Goldhagen’s primary source work for the thesis is based from his father’s privileged
acquisition of primary materials, copied by Ohlendorf’s widow.
27

Heinz Höhne, The Order of Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s S.S., trans. By Richard
Barry (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970).

35

Schutzstaffel (SS), of which Ohlendorf was a member. His book analyzed not only
trial documents, but also these personal documents and reveals that the SS was not
an organization that ran with military precision. In fact, he discussed Ohlendorf’s
life and career in the SS as problematic, pointing out that his utopian visions of the
party were “shattered” when he joined their ranks and that he concluded that their
version of National Socialism was faulty.28 Höhne was sympathetic to Ohlendorf,
pointing out that at each phase of his Nazi career, he was constantly disappointed,
especially in his feud with SS-Reichsführer Himmler. Höhne’s work is frequently
referenced in works on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust for analyzing people like
Ohlendorf who, he argued, ended up buying into a flawed ideology.
There is a consensus in describing Ohlendorf as straightforward, contentious
when questioned, careerist, professional, intellectual, and a Nazi ideologue. The
common thread in all of the secondary literature on Ohlendorf is the question of
how someone with apparent intellect became a mass murderer. This dissertation
cannot definitively answer the question, but his intellectual prowess is beyond
question. However, utilizing his loyalty and Alter Kämpfer status as a thread
connecting all phases of his life and career brings a better understanding of why he
participated in genocide. Further analyzing Ohlendorf’s early life may shed more
light on his anti-Semitic tendencies, elucidating whether he was a violently antiSemitic from his upbringing as Goldhagen asserts. The scholarship has most
recently turned to analyzing Ohlendorf in the context of his generation of Nazis.
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In his early life, Ohlendorf was not self-grooming for a career in the Nazi
government. Ohlendorf was an academic who studied Fascism in Italy and assumed
important roles at the University of Kiel and in the establishment of the Center for
Applied Economics in Berlin. He was associated with Dr. Jens Jessen, most known
for his association with Operation Valkyrie, and together they attempted to create a
National Center for Economics. There is little written about Ohlendorf as an
academic and what has been done is basically chronicling his career, derived from
his own statements in captivity. He was associated with economic theories that
were not in line with Nazi economic policy. Earl touches upon this part of
Ohlendorf’s life, and Höhne mentioned how Jessen helped with Ohlendorf’s
academic career and induced him to join the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).29 However,
there needs to be a major undertaking that analyzes Ohlendorf in the larger realm of
academics in the early Third Reich. Much has been written about the persecution of
academics and 1944 some of them plotted against the Reich in Operation Valkyrie.30
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There are associations with academics, opposition to the Nazi party and involvement
in Operation Valkyrie. In Nazi Germany, academics were often censored for speaking out against
leaders and Nazi ideology. In some cases, traditional humanities and social sciences subjects
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more information on academics and Valkyrie see Pierre Galante, and Eugene Silianoff, Operation
Valkyrie: The German Generals' Plot Against Hitler (New York and Toronto: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2002), John P. Crank, and Lee R. Rehm, "Reciprocity Between Organizations and
Institutional Environments: a study of Operation Valkyrie," Journal of Criminal Justice 22, no. 5
(1994): 393-406, Robert Weldon Whalen, Assassinating Hitler: Ethics and Resistance in Nazi
Germany (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1993), Jo Fox, "Resistance and the
Third Reich," Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2 (2004): 271-283, Hans D.
Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
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In these works, nearly nothing is written of Ohlendorf, nor have his lectures or
speeches while in academia been studied in any depth. Conceivably, if documents
exist, they may reveal whether Ohlendorf was directly associated with any antiThird Reich rhetoric.
Already written are a wealth of analyses concerning the economics of Nazi
Germany. Götz Aly’s Hitler’s Beneficiaries, is an excellent study of how the Nazi
economy was run. He argues that the Holocaust and the war together fueled the
German economy through the war years.31 He delves into important connections
between the Volksgemeinschaft ideology, Nazi philosophy and anti-Semitism, the
economy and ultimately, the collapse of Nazi Germany. Aly’s focus is on the Nazi
campaign of theft. The Holocaust and German occupation of land, which provided
money, slave labor, booty, and plunder of valuables and property through taxation.
This increased German wealth and stimulated the German economy.
In addition, Adam Tooze’s Wages of Destruction also offers insight into the
Nazi economy by arguing that Germany made itself into an industrial power, only to
be challenged by the United States during the war, and did so by involving largescale corporations in the plan to invade the Soviet Union.32Ironically, expanding the
war into the Soviet Union for raw materials cost Germany the war, not because they
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were lacking in manpower, but because their lack of raw materials meant that they
could not sustain the Eastern Front.33 Germany underestimated the strength of
Soviet resistance to their invasion and could not produce enough munitions to fight
longer. Also, these two works critically analyze the role of corporations not only in
Nazi economic policy, but in their philosophy of expansion, shedding new light onto
a badly functioning Nazi government: one where corruption was rampant. In
Tooze’s estimation, racial policy was inseparable from the goals of World War II
German aggression.
Ohlendorf, however, is scarcely written about as an economic functionary.
Ludolf Herbst’s Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft (The Total War and
Order of the Economy) offers a broad analysis of the war and Germany’s post-war
economic plans.34 Included here is one of the few analyses that discussed
Ohlendorf’s economic plans, noting that he and Speer had major ideological
differences concerning production and cooperation with big businesses. In addition,
Herbst argued that the Nazis had no clear economic goal for the public could
support.35 In Der Totale Krieg¸ Herbst provided a brief analysis of Ohlendorf’s life
and analyzed his work on the political economy, something scarcely studied since.
This work, along with Hanno Sowade’s “Otto Ohlendorf: Non-Conformist,” focused
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on Ohlendorf’s criticism of the Nazi economy and his espousal, from early in his
academic career, of a strategy of economic growth centered around small and
medium-sized enterprises.36
Hanno Sowade took much of Herbst’s work on Ohlendorf and the economy
and placed it in the context of his early academic efforts, arguing that Ohlendorf won
the support of trade unions and the middle class by openly favoring the “lofty
promises the regime had made to the middle class when it seized power,” promises
that the Nazi regime had reneged on.37 According to Sowade, the primary
beneficiaries of Nazi policies were war manufacturers like Daimler-Benz.38
Ohlendorf continually criticized corporate self-interest and recommended
reforming the distribution of consumer goods, thus promoting prosperity for the
Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community).39 It was well-known to Ohlendorf that
people like Hermann Göring were conspicuously profiting from rebuilding the
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economy, reaping growing profits during the war, and taking bribes from certain
corporations to increase their personal wealth.40
Where the scholarship has most recently trended is in studying Ohlendorf’s
generation of Nazis. In addition to Goldhagen, Earl, and Höhne, Michael Wildt’s An
Uncompromising Generation details how Ohlendorf and his contemporaries in the
RSHA were defined by the Great War: they lived through defeat, humiliation,
Weimar, and post-war economic ruin. Thus, the time period of his upbringing
defined his career and willingness to submit to a Nazi belief system.41 Germany’s
circumstances bred a culture of vengeance intent on overthrowing the Treaty of
Versailles. Ohlendorf and his contemporaries joined the party and found positions
in the Nazi government in order to be a direct part of policymaking and change for
Germany. Wildt’s Generation shows an important comprehensive approach to
studying Ohlendorf as part of a whole group of like-minded Nazi intellectuals.
Rather than attempting to point to Ohlendorf as a singular agent of Nazi crimes,
analyzing the environment in which he and his contemporaries were raised and
their belief system demonstrates how Nazi culture, ideology and practice were
fueled by Germany’s defeat in the Great War.
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Like Wildt, Christian Ingrao’s Believe and Destroy gives more of an in-depth
analysis of the generational challenges facing Ohlendorf, and the Einsatzgruppen
leaders, studying eighty German educated people who mostly ended up serving in
the Reich and became perpetrators in the Holocaust.42 Similar to Wildt, Ingrao
reinterprets the motivations of the Einsatzgruppen in light of how men like
Ohlendorf were raised, educated, and their career paths, saying he has “tried to
understand how these men came to believe [sic], and how their beliefs led them to
destroy [sic].”43 He and Wildt, together, provide analytical data that shows most of
the SS, SD, RSHA, and Einsatzgruppen leaders were somehow molded into
perpetrators of the Holocaust by so deeply believing in Nazi ideology. Ingrao’s book
shows that Nazi activism was a result of the conditions under which Ohlendorf, and
others, were raised and educated, and argues that this activism gave the
perpetrators of the Holocaust a “soothing system of beliefs.”44 Where Ingrao goes
beyond Wildt’s analytical scope is in part three of his book. He critically analyzes
justifications for war and genocide by tying together Ohlendorf’s National Socialist
ideology and how that manifested in the murder of 90,000 people. This thesis
attempts to contextualize some of the same major themes undertaken by Ingrao and
Wildt and apply them, in a larger scope, to Ohlendorf’s life, career, and belief system.
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Arthur L. Smith explored another under-researched aspect of Ohlendorf’s
life: the Meldungen (public opinion reports).45 A major part of Ohlendorf’s career in
the SD, then in the RSHA, was to collect intelligence reports and conduct public
opinion polls on a variety of issues in Germany. The Meldungen aus dem Reich, as
they are called, were carefully conducted surveys of regular German people’s
opinions on propaganda, economics, war, newspapers, general sentiments, and a
myriad of other aspects of everyday life in Germany.46 These reports were created
by Ohlendorf, with a hand-picked, large staff. Data was collected by informants, who
had Reich security clearances, and statistics were compiled and sent to Ohlendorf’s
superior, namely Himmler. Smith argued that these reports contained important
information vital to the survival of the Reich. Often, Ohlendorf was chastised
because the reports were negative and criticized many aspects of Hitler and the
Reich. Ohlendorf’s reputation for thorough and honest work upset Himmler to the
point where he refused to allow Hitler to see the reports and disbanded the
Meldungen completely by 20 July 1944, the day of Operation Valkyrie.47 There is
certainly a need for more study to be conducted on the impact and results of
Ohlendorf’s reports.
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Much more on the reports and Smith’s study is offered in the early life and career
section of this essay.
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Ohlendorf’s time with the Einsatzgruppen has been widely studied, but
mostly in general terms. Richard Rhodes’s Masters of Death is an excellent study of
the development and function of the Einsatzgruppen and how they were generally
made up of “ordinary” Germans who enacted mass murder.48 By “ordinary,” Rhodes
does not mean average citizens forced to participate in murder, but rather recruits
whose occupational and economic background was “ordinary,” rather than that of
trained, highly specialized killers. He argues that local groups were instrumental in
exterminating the Jews and that the genocidal actions on the Eastern Front
facilitated the creation of extermination camps.49 Another book significant to the
study of Ohlendorf in the Einsatzgruppen is the Einsatzgruppen Reports, or
Operational Situational Reports, USSR.50 These reports were dispatched from the
Einsatzgruppen back to Berlin with details concerning the date, place, division,
number of people executed with a breakdown according to gender, race, religion,
ethnicity, and sometimes age. Compiled in this work are not only statistics from
Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppen (and the other divisions as well), but the editors offer
commentary on discrepancies and accuracy of figures reported. These reports were
the basis for the Einsatzgruppen trial.
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In addition to Ingrao, Höhne, and Earl’s extensive work on piecing together
Ohlendorf’s life in general, there are significant sections of their books that focus on
Ohlendorf’s role in carrying out the executions. A recurring theme in these studies
concerns the issue of Ohlendorf’s transfer. According to his Nuremberg testimony,
he twice refused to be transferred to the front but capitulated because of personal
pressure from Heydrich and Himmler. Also addressed are issues concerning the
process by which an educated person like Ohlendorf became a mass murderer.
Wildt and Ingrao analyze this extensively, discussing the culture of Nazi activism in
Ohlendorf’s generation of Nazi officials.
There are numerous volumes and articles written about the Einsatzgruppen,
too many to mention them all, and others are specifically referred to in other
sections of this dissertation. In addition to what has already been referenced,
Roland Headland’s Messages of Murder further addresses key issues with the reports
in a significant study of the Einsatzgruppen.51 French MacLean’s The Field Men,
offers an excellent analysis of the Einsatzgruppen and demonstrates a thorough
statistical analysis of the Einsatzkommandos and their work in the Soviet Union.52
Many different studies have shown novel analyses of perpetrators, directives, and
the activities of the Einsatzgruppen. The only thing lacking is a complete biography
of Ohlendorf.
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Andrej Angrick recently published the first work that examines, in its
entirety and completely, the activities of Einsatzgruppe D and its leader, Otto
Ohlendorf.53 So far, his book stands alone as the foundational study of the Holocaust
in the Ukraine and explores Ohlendorf’s role in the indoctrination of his “soldiers,”
which centered on the proposition that the survival of Germany was dependent on
the extermination of men, women, and children. Additionally, he argues that there
was a communication breakdown between the Einsatzgruppen and the Reich and
that most of the killings they performed were improvised. All of the work Angrick
has painstakingly compiled is of the utmost significance to this study and future
studies regarding perpetration, the Holocaust, Nazi policies and bureaucracy, and
Ohlendorf.54 His study reveals that “ordinary Germans” became perpetrators in the
Holocaust through improvisational killings. This confirms what has been written
about the atrocities committed in other Einsatzgruppen, for instance Einsatzgruppe
C’s massacre at Babi Yar.55
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The historiography of Ohlendorf and the trial is almost as extensive as the
work done on the Einsatzgruppen’s reign of terror. Telford Taylor, Chief prosecutor
at the first set of Nuremberg trials, Benjamin Ferencz, Chief prosecutor at the
Einsatzgruppen Trial, and Chief Justice of the Einsatzgruppen Trial, Michael
Musmanno, have all written excellent analyses of trial procedures, defense
strategies, contemporary issues in law and justice, and about the character of
Ohlendorf.56 Much of the literature trends with Earl who, in her analysis of the
Ohlendorf case, has reevaluated the procedures and process of the trial and
conviction of the Einsatzgruppen perpetrators, finding that this trial was both too
reliant on Ohlendorf’s so-called “truth telling” and on the political climate of the
Cold War. Earl addresses important questions relating to U.S.- German relations in
the post-war era, with particular emphasis on how the impending Cold War
impacted the outcome of the trials. She analyzes how sentences were carried out,
commuted, overturned, and how some of the convicted were altogether freed of
responsibility because there was a strong German contingent in society who backed
the perpetrators. Thus, the American captors and adjutants were pressured into
both being lenient and strict with their punishment. Part of the legacy of
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Nuremberg is that it imposed death sentences on men like Ohlendorf to set an
historical precedent for the illegality of genocide. Finally, she discusses a major
tension between history and law. Chief Justice Musmanno sought to gain “truth” in
history from the trial, over which he presided. The organizers and planners of the
Einsatzgruppen trial named “historical truth” as a specific goal of the entire trial, a
fact Earl unabashedly rejects.57Finding out the “truth” from reports can be
successful, but coupled with the biased testimony of condemned men ready to lie to
preserve their lives is questionable.
As demonstrated above, there also needs to be more analysis of how
Ohlendorf served as an economic functionary. He fought for middle class oriented
economics, against the corporate will of the Reich (where big businesses hugely
profited from the Nazi regime while the middle class was cast aside), and more
attention should be paid to his policy proposals. Maybe this gap exists because the
documents are either gone or unobtainable. A better understanding of Ohlendorf’s
economic theories will show a greater continuity in his life and career and will help
provide a clearer definition of his personal National Socialist ideology.
Although there are studies of academia and academics during the Nazi era,
they tend to focus on subversion of policy or, in the case of Jessen, how the Reich
was met with intellectual resistance. Dissociating Ohlendorf from his crimes is
impossible, and would be inexcusable. However, notwithstanding his time in the
Einsatzgruppen, his career was based on challenging what he thought were corrupt
acts and institutions in Germany. In his own mind, he certainly was an activist, and
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so were his generation of Nazi officials. His connection to activism, especially to
Jessen and other academics, is an area of Ohlendorf’s life that needs further
research. Piecing together a biography of Ohlendorf may help address some of the
gaps and issues in the historiography. The next section examines the so-called
intentionalist/functionalist debate, which looks at the actions of perpetrators like
Ohlendorf, in part, in terms of the existence, or lack thereof, of the Führer’s
extermination order.
The Intentionalist/Functionalist Debate
In the 1980s, the historiography of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust changed
as the focus shifted to whether or not there was a predetermined order or plan to
murder the Jews of Europe. The intentionalist viewpoint asserts that Hitler planned
the Holocaust while the bureaucracy carried it out. In Ohlendorf’s Nuremberg
testimony, he claimed to be a mere functionary of Hitler, who led Einsatzgruppe D in
exterminating Jews and partisans, located at the extreme end of the southern front
in Ukraine and Crimea. All of this fell under the purview of a specific Hitler order.
However, many historians have maintained that the Holocaust unfolded out of
conditions on the ground. This would mean that leaders such as Ohlendorf did not
just carry out policies, but in fact designed them.
At the Einsatzgruppen Trials, prosecutor Colonel John Amen asked Ohlendorf
“in what respects, if any, were the official duties of the Einsatz groups concerned
with Jews and Communist commissars?” Ohlendorf replied “the instructions were
that in the Russian operational areas of the Einsatzgruppen the Jews, as well as the
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Soviet political commissars, were to be liquidated.”58 Questioned by the prosecutor,
Ohlendorf asserted that the liquidation order came from Hitler, who gave the order
to Himmler to put in place, although it is known Ohlendorf falsified this fact.
However, he also asserted that the eleventh Army was not made aware of the details
of the liquidation orders. If the Wehrmacht was not aware of how the mobile killing
units operated, despite the attachment of Einsatzgruppe D to the Eleventh Army,
then this demonstrates a communication breakdown. Either there was a disjointed
formal plan for killing the Jews, one side blatantly lied, or both sides were misled.
But, if there was a communication breakdown and the plan for killing was
disjointed, this could also mean the initiative went over to forces on the ground.
This could mean that the Holocaust was the result of a cultural consensus.
In the 1990s, historians were practically forced to publicly confirm or deny
the thesis that the Holocaust was solely the product of Hitler’s will, and to answer
the question as to whether there were other factors contributing to the
implementation and success of the Holocaust. Predating the debate, historian Tim
Mason, who coined the terms intentionalist and functionalist, warned other scholars
of the responsibility of every historian to report as objectively as possible on the
Holocaust.59 Mason cautioned historians against leaning to a particular side in the
Holocaust debate. However, his words were ignored.
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In “Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the
Interpretation of National Socialism”, Mason rejected previous works that overemphasized Hitler’s role in the Holocaust with little importance given to the
functionality of the collective Germany and individual Germans. Although his
argument was functionalist, he was successful in objectively outlining analytical
flaws on both sides of the historical analysis. He pointed out that intentionalists
view functionalism as apologetic to National Socialism. Mason further asserted that
a major pitfall of the intentionalist position is that they concentrated too much on
individual capacity for “evil” and murder, rather than how the bureaucracy and the
public perpetuated the Holocaust. His disdain for bias is clear when he declares “if
historians do have a public responsibility, if hating is part of their method and
warning part of their task, it is necessary that they should hate precisely.”60 Despite
Mason’s words of warning, Goldhagen began another important historiographical
debate.
In 1996, Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust began the debate over how to appropriately study the perpetration of the
Holocaust.61 Among many significant theories in his book, the core of his argument
centers on a historically ingrained “eliminationist anti-Semitism” that motivated
ordinary German enlistees to willingly commit mass murder.62 He attempts to
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dispel what he calls “myths” including that the German people were unaware of the
Holocaust as it happened but argues that regular Germans willingly participated in
mass murder.63 Most importantly, Goldhagen argues that the Nazi brand of antiSemitism is unique in world history because German culture inculcated Germans
with a commitment to genocide. He not only subscribes to an intentionalist
perspective that views the Holocaust as formally planned, but stakes out an extreme
intentional viewpoint according to which all of Germany was anti-Semitic, leading to
their mobilization and participation in the Holocaust. According to Goldhagen, “the
German perpetrators, namely those who themselves killed Jews or helped to kill
them, willingly did so because they shared a Hitlerian view of Jews, and therefore
believed the extermination to be just and necessary.”64
For Goldhagen, Nazis leaders like Ohlendorf were all part of the grand
eliminationist anti-Semitic ideological scheme. When Ohlendorf was in Landsberg
prison, Dr. Leon Goldensohn, an American physician and psychiatrist, asked
Ohlendorf about his assignment to the Einsatzgruppen. He spoke of the liquidation
orders not in terms of anti-Semitism but “rather the Jews in Russia were said to be
the main carrier of Bolshevism there. It was against my will that I was ordered to an
Einsatzgruppe in Russia.”65 However, his alleged unwillingness to be on the Eastern
Front, at all, is expressed here. This is contrary to Goldhagen’s intentionalist
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scheme. But Goldhagen points out that Ohlendorf, an intellectual and “an unusually
decent man, even…an idealist within the Nazi movement…believed in its vision of a
harmonious utopia.”66 In the next few sentences he argues that Ohlendorf was
ultimately one of the “demonological” visionaries who accepted genocide as the
solution to the Jewish problem.67 This is the epitome of the Jekyll and Hyde
caricature that Judge Michael Musmanno painted of Ohlendorf, although calling
Ohlendorf a “demonological visionary” is problematic and assumptive.68 Goldhagen
raises useful questions, but does not take into account the individualistic and
impromptu nature of mass murder. At least, not in the Ohlendorf case. He was not
an eliminationist anti-Semite, born into a several centuries old culture of pent-up
hatred for the Jews that culminated in his willingness to enact mass murder. The
truth is, Ohlendorf was an anti-Semite, National Socialist ideologue, and proponent
of the genocide. But Musmanno’s reference to Jekyll and Hyde characterized
Ohlendorf from a superficial standpoint. Further analysis does not reveal two
entirely different Ohlendorfs: there was only one with a consistent dedication to
Nazi ideology.
Radical intentionalist views are not alone relegated to Goldhagen. Holocaust
historian Lucy Dawidowicz argued that the origins of the Holocaust must be traced
back to November 11, 1918, the exact time when the Great War ended. According to
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Dawidowicz, this was the precise moment the Holocaust was born into Adolf Hitler’s
mind.69 Her controversial arguments stem from the standpoint that there is no
connection between perpetrator and victim in the Holocaust. In reality, there is a
connection between the “ordinary” perpetration and victimization where, for
instance, the local authorities were responsible for rounding up and at least helping
execute the Jews of their hometowns. For her, the master plan of the Holocaust was
Hitler’s alone, and those who enacted the anti-Semitic policies bought into Nazi
indoctrination. She also believed that functionalists, who did not trace the origins of
the Holocaust in the same way, were guilty of ignoring their responsibility to
historical truth.70 Although her thesis was significant at the time of its publication,
her viewpoint has now been dissolved into a larger argument that includes more
dimensions to historical studies.
Published in 1992, Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men is based on
courtroom testimony of survivors who perpetrated the atrocities of Reserve Police
Battalion 101 in Poland.71 Browning argues these were “ordinary” Germans, from
all levels of society, who were thrust into a brutal war and forced to partake in mass
murder. His conclusions, based on the Milgram experiments, emphasized that the
soldiers who actually committed the atrocities did so out of peer pressure more
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than any anti-Semitic bloodlust.72 In Browning’s argument, he stated “according to
Goldhagen, one question historians like myself should not pose and need not answer
is how ordinary Germans overcame reluctance and inhibition to become
professional killers.”73 Browning does recognize that some of the perpetrators
performed their tasks with “gusto” but doubts that the average soldier or conscript
volunteered for service to murder based on the deep-seeded “lethal and
demonological anti-Semitism” Goldhagen describes.74 His views on functionalism
are moderate and he does not dismiss the role of Hitler in the Holocaust but, rather,
offers an explanation based on a combination of ideology and governmental
structure, which allowed atrocities to be committed on such a vast scale.
As Raul Hilberg declared, “ordinary men were to perform extraordinary
tasks.”75 But countering Goldhagen’s definition of “ordinary” and bolstering
Browning’s definition of “ordinary”, John P. Sabini and Maury Silver point out that if
the so-called willing executioners were interchangeable machine-like perpetrators
who were driven to kill by an intense anti-Semitic cause, then why did the nature of
murder change? In “Destroying the Innocent with a Clear Conscience: A
Sociopsychology of the Holocaust”, they describe the evolution of camps and murder
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to include things like gas chambers and vans.76 These tools of execution distanced
the executioner from the killings due to “…psychological limitation of even the best
trained and best selected SS men, the most rabid anti-Semites…”77 In Ohlendorf’s
testimony at Nuremberg, he repeatedly claimed that his soldiers were suffering
from battle fatigue and was concerned for the emotional strain that execution-style
killings has on perpetrator and victim alike. So, he initially embraced the gas vans,
to lessen the burden of mass murder on his soldiers. When questioned of their
utility at Nuremberg, Ohlendorf responded:
On the one hand, the aim was that the individual leaders and men should be able to carry out
the executions in a military manner acting on orders and should not have to make a decision
of their own; it was, to all intents and purposes, an order which they were to carry out. On
the other hand, it was known to me that through the emotional excitement of the executions
ill treatment could not be avoided, since the victims discovered too soon that they were to be
executed and could not therefore endure prolonged nervous strain. And it seemed
intolerable to me that individual leaders and men should in consequence be forced to kill a
large number of people on their own decision. 78

The creation of gas vans demonstrates how the use of improvisation on the
battlefield was necessary to carry out the mass killings. It also shows that
“ordinary” German soldiers may not have been fervent enough in their anti-Semitic
beliefs to handle the pressure of execution-style killings. The fact that Ohlendorf
was able to make a judgment call indicates he had a degree of independent ability
with how Einsatzgruppe D carried out mass murder.
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A discussion of functionalist theory is not possible without referring to Hans
Mommsen. In From Weimar to Auschwitz, he stressed the so-called machine of
government in implementing the Holocaust, meaning that the economy,
manufacturing, the military, and all parts of the government cooperated in
implementing one particular initiative. But there was a shift in power structure
when the end of the war became inevitable. Initiatives and directives were less
centralized.79 In other words, although there was a central government in Germany,
much of how the Holocaust and the war was carried out, was not determined by the
central government, but by the Einsatzgruppen, the Wehrmacht, and the provisional
occupied government officials. He developed a concept of “deliberate dictatorial
will,” meaning that the Führer consistently supported and called for enacting the
Final Solution.80 Mommsen argued, however, that ‘will’ was not enough to
implement such a grandiose, murderous policy. For Mommsen, Auschwitz is not
only symbolic of “inconceivable crimes” but also represents the “destruction of
politics” in the Nazi regime.81 Perhaps most importantly, he disputed the idea of
Hitler having built a totalitarian regime, referring to him as a “weak dictator.”
“Hitler's role as a driving force, which with the same inner compulsion drove on to
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self-destruction should not be underestimated.”82 Noteworthy here is that
Mommsen does not dismiss Hitler’s role in promoting or creating the ideology of
anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, but he argues that the Holocaust was not
implemented by Hitler through the totalitarian system.
Concerning Mommsen’s ‘weak dictator’ claim, Ian Kershaw states that “it
must be recognized that the Dictator was only the extreme exponent of a chain of
anti-humanitarian impulses set free by the lapse of all institutional, legal, and moral
barriers, and once set in motion, regenerating themselves in magnified form.”83 In
agreement with Kershaw’s viewpoint about the culpability of Hitler, Mommsen’s
thesis of the “weak dictator” underlines the importance of studying people like
Ohlendorf.84 Without people like Ohlendorf to implement and carry out Hitler’s
murderous policies, the Holocaust might not have been so successful.
Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat co-created the structuralist viewpoint,
according to which internal rivalries, not the Hitler initiative, unleashed the
Holocaust. In Der Staat Hitler, Broszat examines how the Nazi regime was plagued
with power struggles between itself and the traditional German state.85 This friction
fueled the duality Germany faced and instead of the Third Reich being a totalitarian
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regime, it was indeed polycratic, meaning that Nazi Germany was governed by many
contradictory forces, rather than just run by Hitler. Broszat argued that irreparable
fissures in the years after the Versailles Treaty, seen in discontent with Weimar and
an economic depression, led the Nazis to radicalize, and Weimar and its supporters
retaliated, creating an environment of violence. Written as a reaction to Holocaust
denier David Irving’s Hitler’s War, Broszat dismissed Irving’s insistence that Hitler
was unaware of the Holocaust, a thesis based on the lack of a written order.86 In
“Hitler and the Genesis of the Final Solution”, Broszat argued that Hitler provided
the basic ideological principles behind the Holocaust through the concept
Lebensraum, the expanded living space required to repopulate the pure Aryan
race.87 Hitler ordered the deportation, and later extermination, of Jews but gave no
real plan as to how this would be accomplished. As the Eastern Front expanded,
Broszat suggests that the Einsatzgruppen liquidations became “a way out of the
blind alley into which the Nazis had manoeuvred [sic] themselves”.88 Without
functionary perpetrators, such as Ohlendorf, Hitler’s obsession with Lebensraum
and the Jews would have remained just that: an ideology.
A more recent contributor to functionalist thought is Götz Aly, historian of
economics and the Nazi Germany. His arguments are a bottom-up viewpoint on the
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evolution of the Holocaust, wherein he views Hitler as a vague figurehead in the
overall construction, means, and actions of Holocaust perpetrators. Aly’s focus is on
Poland but describes how the soldiers themselves, along with their superiors, were
the driving force behind extermination. In Final Solution: Nazi Population Policy and
the Murder of the European Jews, Aly argues that the RSHA, Gauleiters and other
lower-level officials were constantly trying to amend policies based on economics,
the desire to relocate non-Aryans, and the quest for Lebensraum, rather than a
purist anti-Semitic ideology.89 Critics condemn Aly for not paying enough attention
to anti-Jewish beliefs. For Aly, however, the eternal quest for Lebensraum was what
drove the ethnic cleansings of Eastern Europe. While Goldhagen and Dawidowicz
emphasize anti-Semitism as the driving force behind the Holocaust, Aly’s bottom-up
approach places this ideology second.
In Hitler’s Beneficiaries, Aly argues that German financial policy was shaped
firstly by Lebensraum and then by the enormous financial acquisitions inherited
from the Reich, which basically cleaned out Eastern Europe.90 Never denying
fervent anti-Semitic beliefs which existed as a motivation for plunder, Aly asserts
that the war fattened the German economy in such a way that the majority of
Germans would benefit. And they did.91 Because of the acquisition of money, from
plunder, Germany saw an extremely fast accumulation of wealth. Over-inflation was
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the result of the expedient incorporation of wealth back into the German economy.
Germans did benefit from the war and the Holocaust. Aly’s book represents new
ways in which to analyze the intent and perpetration of the Holocaust.
The previously held view was that the Wannsee Conference was when the
Final Solution was implemented. This view is now historically discredited but
historian Robert Gerwath asserted that Wannsee marked where the plan to
systematically exterminate the Jews became Reich policy.92 The meeting, led by
Reinhard Heydrich, agreed on a plan to execute Hitler’s implicit orders for the
extermination of all Jews as partisans. There was intent for genocide shown early in
the Nazi years with Hitler’s speeches and progressive restrictions on Jews. The
highest Nazi officials attributed the Final Solution to Hitler. However, without a
series of functionaries believing in the cause enough to perpetrate the Holocaust, it
could not have occurred. In Messages of Murder, Ronald Headland suggests that the
extermination process began slowly.93 This was not because of a lack of knowledge,
but because of resource scarcity during the Second World War. He saw the
capability of the Einsatzgruppen as directly proportionate to their manpower.94
Although the group was established in 1939 to kill political partisans in eastern
occupied territories, by the time Ohlendorf took command of Einsatzgruppe D,
manpower had dramatically increased. Prior to the official implementation of the
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Final Solution after Wannsee, Operation Barbarossa demanded the reallocation of
enormous amounts of supplies and soldiers to the eastern front. To combat the
Wehrmacht’s increased mobilization on the Eastern Front, the Einsatzgruppen were
given more directives, and indiscriminate killings of partisans were committed en
masse.
How can surviving documents help to sort out the
intentionalist/functionalist debate? Despite the escalation of Einsatzgruppen force
power in the east and according to the testimony from most Einsatzgruppen Trial
defendants, Heydrich and Himmler gave a certain degree of discreet power to the
leaders of the mobile killing units. Headland argued that the most significant period
for the Einsatzgruppen was between March and June 1941 which was “a direct
reflection of Hitler’s determination to ensure that the upcoming conflict would be an
ideological war of total destruction.”95 However, in the Operational Situational
Reports, detailed reports of Einsatzgruppen activities reported back to the Reich,
there was no specific directive on how to universally deal with Jews and partisans in
the east. The surviving OSRs are correspondences from the Einsatzgruppen to
Berlin, not vice versa.
The reports usually stated casualties by region and ethnicity and have some
sort of justification for the ‘liquidation’ of huge numbers of people. For example,
Operational Situational Report USSR No. 45 from Einsatzgruppe D,
Einsatzkommando 11a stated “up to this point 551 Jews have been liquidated, of
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these 151 for participating in sabotage acts, 400 in reprisal for shooting at German
medical trucks and for lighting signal flares for Red aviators.”96 However, there was
no specific instruction given to the Einsatzgruppen as to how the atrocities were to
be committed, yet Heydrich and Himmler demanded reports back with the utmost
accuracy of detail and causation. The Einsatzgruppen acted in indiscriminate ways,
independent from specific Reich orders. This shows that although there was
certainly a top-down “eliminationist anti-Semitism” in Nazi ideology, a functionalist
view better suits how the Einsatzgruppen actually functioned.
Ohlendorf’s transfer from RSHA AMT III to the Einsatzgruppen was allegedly
due to personal conflict with Himmler and insubordination, and at Nuremberg,
Ohlendorf maintained he had no other choice. It is unclear whether he put up any
resistance, was threatened, or simply willing to go because he was an Alter Kämpfer.
What can be determined from this is that if he felt begrudged for being sent to the
front, it may only have been because he either did not want to be away from his
family, or he knew the guilt of directly participating in genocide could haunt him.
However, he went to the front and because he was a careerist and Alter Kämpfer, his
career was filled with promotions, awards and accolades thereafter. His testimony
faulted Himmler and Hitler for having the Final Solution as their master plan, and he
claimed that he, enacting this plan under orders, was merely a soldier following
orders. Although Ohlendorf is not specifically mentioned, in Interrogations: The
Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, Richard Overy asserted that the Nuremberg defendants
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were wrong to assume Hitler’s orders were intended to exterminate all of the
Jews.97 Yet, reprimands were not given for carrying out more killings than originally
intended. When testifying, Ohlendorf distinguished between motivation for murder
and actually committing the murders. Constantly referring to himself as a soldier,
he described how he led the Einsatzgruppe and led the murder of 90,000 people but
claimed the responsibility should lie with Hitler.98 He acted on orders from Hitler
and Himmler and ultimately the fault was theirs, he asserted.
Like other defendants, Ohlendorf continued to testify that there was intent
and an original liquidation order that came from Hitler, enforced by Himmler. When
the prosecution asked about the order, Ohlendorf responded by recounting his
conversation with Himmler in late summer 1941 at Nikolaev, Ukraine: “He
assembled the leaders and men of the Einsatzkommandos, repeated to them the
liquidation order, and pointed out that the leaders and men who were taking part in
the liquidation bore no personal responsibility for the execution of this order. The
responsibility was his, alone, and the Fuehrer's.”99 Culpability for these atrocities
ultimately lay with Ohlendorf despite his and other defendants’ attempts to distance
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themselves from the Einsatzgruppen’s crimes. Interestingly, throughout his
testimony he continually asserts that he did not necessarily want to partake in mass
murder while simultaneously taking responsibility for it. Unlike Goldhagen’s views
of Ohlendorf, he was most likely driven to kill because he believed that a war against
the Jews was essential to the preservation of Germany, rather than because he was
driven by fervent anti-Semitic ideology.
Trying to bridge the gap between the intentionalist/functionalist debate,
Omer Bartov’s Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories demonstrates
that the solution to fixing the analytical gap lay somewhere in the middle.100 To
Bartov, there is no longer a need to have such mutually exclusive approaches to
studying the Holocaust. Although he is a functionalist-leaning historian, he notes
that the value in analyses like Goldhagen’s is in bringing the debate back to one of
underlying anti-Semitism. For Bartov, anti-Semitism was the driving force behind
the Holocaust. However, he fuses together an argument where ideology, intent and
function all have a place in Holocaust studies.101 Like Bartov, Saul Friedländer has
combined both schools of thought into a more moderate, workable form of historical
analysis. In “The Extermination of the European Jews in Historiography Fifty Years
Later,” Friedländer merges the schools of thought into one greater picture of the
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Reich, with Hitler’s anti-Semitic views in the forefront.102 He suggests that there are
inseparable dichotomies within the Reich deserving of equal attention from
scholars: modernity and myth. To Friedländer, analyzing the historical background
shows the “meeting of logic” regarding modernity in Nazi Germany coexisting with
“irrational thinking” where anti-Jewish feelings were part of the “myth.”103
However, he also stresses that historians cannot sever the ties in these modernmyth relationships, and rather than giving in to a view of this relationship as
antagonistic, historians should view it as symbiotic.104 For example, treating
eugenics and anti-Semitism separately is not an inclusive analysis. The debate over
how to interpret the Holocaust has evolved into more relevant, complex discussions
about interpretation of the Nazi party, its inner-workings, and functionality.
Conclusion and Final Thoughts
Finally, and most significantly, the historiographical analyses of today are
much less polarized. Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands serves as a bridge connecting
intent and function in several ways.105 The so-called bloodlands were the territory,
previously protected by the Soviet Union, first reached by the Einsatzgruppen,
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where large populations of Jews and partisans had not been evacuated. These
people had already been subjugated and persecuted by the Soviets and shipped
inland toward the Molotov-Ribbentrop line. With the Barbarossa invasion, these
populations were left completely exposed to slaughter, hence the term
bloodlands.106 Snyder asserts that this small overlapping zone of disputed territory
was where more than a quarter of Holocaust victims were exterminated.107 He
asserts that the Holocaust was the result of the clash of two empires on their
peripheries. Thus, blame and intent have become more open to interpretation. He
argues that the Holocaust was the ultimate result of this clash and the ensuing
descent into mayhem, which was contingent upon adaptable and ill-defined the
borders and actions. Bloodlands is a very influential, modern interpretation of
genocide that casts away historiographical labels from the past. This is the future of
the historiography: showing the shift from strict definitions of motivation,
perpetration, intent, function, and organizational murder and reworking the
Holocaust into a chaotic, spiraling result of the conflict between two empires.
The struggle to find a unified way of analyzing Nazi Germany and the
Holocaust is considerable because there is no singular cause. Christopher Browning
agrees with Mason, asserting that “Hitler’s participation…was usually indirect”.108

106

Snyder, Bloodlands, 345.

107

Snyder, Bloodlands, 345.

108

Christopher Browning, “Beyond ‘Intentionalism’ and ’Functionalism’: A Reassessment
of Nazi Jewish Policy from 1939 to 1941” in Reevaluating the Third Reich, eds. Thomas Childers
and Jane Caplan (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1993), 211-233.

67

For Browning, intentionalism is based on Hitler’s ultimate plan for mass murder.
Conversely, functionalists maintain that Hitler and the Nazis were not operating
programmatically toward a premeditated goal. Heinz Höhne asserts that if it had
not been for individual initiative from careerists like Ohlendorf, the Nazi
government would have been stagnant and ineffective. Höhne said Ohlendorf tried
to influence the Nazi government and policy with the Sicherheitsdienst (Security
Service, SD) public opinion polls. “The SD would have sunk into complete
insignificance had not Ohlendorf and his people gone on striving to expand their
sphere of activity, frequently in opposition to Himmler’s declared policies.”109 His
viewpoint is not to justify Ohlendorf’s actions within the Nazi regime but to point
out that Hitler and Himmler were unwilling to have themselves or the SS criticized.
Nevertheless, revisiting these debates is necessary when studying the
perpetration of the Holocaust. Furthermore, Ohlendorf’s career can be analyzed in
terms of intentionalism versus functionalism. The point of this analysis is to
demonstrate how categories of individual experiences must be included in any
discussion of Holocaust perpetration. Utilizing general statements about
perpetrators and victims does not accurately explain the motivations of the
Holocaust.
Lastly, this chapter has woven together a brief historiography of Otto
Ohlendorf, showing where certain parts of his life have been scrutinized, and where
there remains a need to further delve into his life and career. His academic career
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needs more focus as Ohlendorf, himself, said his time studying Fascism in Italy is
where his devotion to National Socialism was solidified and he “returned as a fanatic
antifascist.”110 There are numerous books written that address the differences
between Fascism and Nazism, taking into account how Nazis thought the ideologies
differed. But, further study is needed here to determine precisely how National
Socialism and Fascism were defined by National Socialist ideologues like Ohlendorf.
It would show how his belief system was mostly based on independent knowledge
and how he sought to perfect the National Socialist system. Other parts of his career
demonstrate Ohlendorf’s commitment to Nazi ideology. Knowing more about why
he openly criticized Reich policy and what precisely defined his own belief system
will reveal inconsistencies in how Nazis, themselves, defined National Socialist
ideology. Some particular cornerstones of ideology were anti-Semitism, desire for
revenge for the loss of the Great War and treatment at Versailles, equal rights
among Aryans, and the maintenance of a strong centralized German government.
Trying to reveal where Ohlendorf’s ideology broke away from or adhered to the
ideology of the party is a goal of this thesis.
Discussing briefly the intentionalist/functionalist debate in the
historiography of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust demonstrates how polarizing the
study of perpetrator motivations is. There is so much information we still cannot
know: like the existence of the Führer Order, the timing of Einsatzgruppen
directives, personal motivations, etc. This chapter has tried to hash out the debate
by inserting Ohlendorf’s perpetration into the discussion. The conclusions drawn
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here is that Ohlendorf’s life and career were both typical and atypical of his Nazi
contemporaries. He was not only a follower of National Socialism: He attempted to
perfect the doctrine, and the Nazi party valued his loyalty above anything else.
Overall, there are deficiencies in the historiography with regard to Ohlendorf. By
looking at the whole picture of his life, albeit a picture with its own imperfections, a
better understanding of perpetrator motivations can be recognized.
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Chapter 3:
Otto Ohlendorf: The Nazi Careerist and Disappointed Ideologue
Otto Ohlendorf’s adult life in Nazi Germany was a complex mix of trying to
embody his own personal views of National Socialist ideology, while simultaneously
sustaining a thriving career. Although he had notorious feuds with notable figures
such as Himmler and Heydrich, he still managed to successfully maintain an
increasingly powerful position in Nazi service, including promotions to the highest
echelons. This discussion addresses events and experiences that molded
Ohlendorf’s understanding of National Socialism. His often ornery, cantankerous
personality and demand for the highest levels of efficiency troubled Himmler in
particular, especially when Ohlendorf was tasked with the creation of a system of
public opinion reports. How did Ohlendorf maintain a flourishing career in the Nazi
party while openly criticizing it and its members? The answer lies within his
steadfast dedication to National Socialist ideology. He never waned in his beliefs,
nor with his devotion to what he thought an idealized Nazi Germany could and
should be. As the most loyal of the Alter Kämpfer, his behavior was tolerated. This
carried through his entire adult life, career, and through to his death. In his own
mind, he was the truest adherent of National Socialism.
This chapter examines Ohlendorf’s economic philosophy in detail, revealing
its tie to a particular interpretation of Nazi ideology. It asks how and why Ohlendorf
was such a staunch advocate for the Mittelstand (middle class), and why he saw
agriculture as an integral part of the foundations of Nazi society. In the Third Reich,
neither of these groups were fully supported, as the wartime economy gave
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preference to the accumulation of corporate wealth and distribution of material
goods (especially during the war), and did not work well with labor unions.
Ohlendorf strove to champion the underrepresented segments of Nazi society. This
is seen throughout his work in academia, with Reichsgruppe Handel, the National
Trade Union, and the ministry of economics.
In addition to Ohlendorf’s role in the economic realm, this chapter will
address how Nazis of Ohlendorf’s generation of educated academics rose to the top
of the RSHA (Reichsicherheitshauptamt, or Reich Security Main Office). There were
particular roles and ranks through which Ohlendorf and his contemporaries rose as
part of National Socialist indoctrination and in the legacy of the Alter Kämpfer. In
the case of tasks such as leading the Einsatzgruppen, these assignments served to
break leaders away from desk jobs to implement the Holocaust as a twisted way of
proving their dedication to the Nazi party.111 Although Ohlendorf never served in a
police force or military group, being transferred to the Einsatzgruppen boosted his
career, and made him even more important within the Reich, especially in the realm
of economics.
Meanwhile, Himmler and others openly and personally disliked and
distained Ohlendorf. Why was he never fired, replaced, or asked to leave? The
answer lay, at least partly, in the concept of the Alte Kämpfer, and the way in which
preferential treatment was given to Ohlendorf and his compatriots for their
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devotion to the party from the early years. His response to personal criticism was to
make himself as indispensable as possible to the Nazi regime, and he certainly
succeeded. Regarding the public opinion reports, Ohlendorf reported criticism of
the Reich and its leadership, causing friction between Himmler and himself. This
resulted in Himmler allegedly arranging the transfer of Ohlendorf to the
Einsatzgruppen, in order to put a stop to the negative reports. Again, it is
remarkable that Ohlendorf both survived and thrived, despite his criticism of the
Reich. Ohlendorf was a National Socialist fundamentalist who built a life, career,
and name for himself by demonstrating his interpretation of Nazi values and
ideology. He was an outspoken advocate for middle class reform and an activist.
This study begins with Ohlendorf’s academic career, and details how and when his
ideological views of National Socialism were solidified. Next, it surveys his career in
the SD, his promotion to the RSHA, and his extensive influence in the economics
ministry. The transfer to the Einsatzgruppen and his activities there is dealt with in
a separate chapter. Finishing his career track, an analysis of the nature of
Ohlendorf’s work in the Reich, his promotions, and eventual surrender comprise the
conclusion. Ohlendorf’s life and career were driven by his ambitious careerist
nature, but also his dedication to and belief in National Socialism.
National Socialist Beginnings
Otto Ohlendorf began his political career at an early age. In 1923, when he
was eighteen years old, he joined the Nazi party, twice repeating school years
because of his political activity, but eventually earning an Abitur (high school
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diploma).112 According to interviewer Dr. Leon Goldensohn, Ohlendorf claimed his
political views led him to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and against the Guelphs, a
German-Hanoverian pro-Weimar political party. Prior to membership in the SD,
Ohlendorf was part of the Bismarck Youth, a party associated with the DNVP
(German National People’s Party) that was established during Weimar, and opposed
to the Treaty of Versailles and the Weimar Republic.113 Ohlendorf’s affiliation with
the DNVP was heavily influenced by his father.114 For certain, there is no
coincidence that young Ohlendorf switched party alliances two years after the failed
Munich Beer Hall Putsch, the event that put Hitler in jail, and later, in the
spotlight.115 By 1925, Mein Kampf was published, and unquestionably left an
indelible impression on the Nazi organization.
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A crucial part of Ohlendorf’s life and career, and of particular significance in
this dissertation, was his identity as an Alter Kämpfer, a phrase coined with clear
Nazi overtones.116 Because Ohlendorf joined the Nazi party before 1933, and had a
prized membership number (#6531) below 100,000, he and other early recruits
within the first 100,000 joiners were part of an elite club, the Alte Kämpfer. Hitler
awarded not only medals and chevrons, but rewarded these “old fighters” with
preferential treatment in employment, along with consistent promotions within the
party, and favorable government jobs. This was certainly the case of Ohlendorf’s
career. He was promoted annually, once he was established in the RSHA, and
continued to have a thriving, elite career. At the end of the life of the Nazi party’s
power, Ohlendorf was one of the few selected to accompany Dönitz’s ill-fated
government to carry on the Nazi party, even after Germany surrendered.
What is significant about Ohlendorf’s identification as an Alter Kämpfer is
that his worldview has direct similarities to aspects of the 1920 Nazi party platform.
Written in Munich on February 24, 1920, “Das Programm der NSDAP” (The Program
of the National Socialist German Worker’s Party) was drafted and included twentyfive separate goals of the newly established party.117 Looking back through
Ohlendorf’s explicit criticisms of the Nazi party when they ascended to power in
1933, there are certain points of the original party doctrine he fought to uphold.
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Some of these included: requirements for nationalism (that specifically excluded
Jews from becoming German nationals), equal rights and duties of German citizens,
profit sharing in large enterprises, demanding punishment for anyone who would
harm the “common good,” freedom of religion (Christian religion), and most
importantly, the “creation and maintenance of a sound middle class.”118 Throughout
his career, Ohlendorf maintained these values.
According to Michael Wildt, Ohlendorf and his contemporaries, politically
active intellectual and university youths, were drawn into the Nazi party because of
built up resentment from Germany’s defeat in the Great War. Ohlendorf was too
young to enlist, so the postwar years of economic scarcity and political instability
fueled contempt for Weimar and its political institutions.119 Wildt asserts that
Ohlendorf was part of this “Uncompromising Generation.” Seventy-five percent of
the future RSHA leaders were born after 1900 and some, like Ohlendorf, eventually
became Holocaust perpetrators.120
The men of the RSHA were born into social classes “whose values they no
longer accepted” and were raised in the Weimar Republic, and to them, a strange
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entity imposed on the German people by the Western powers.121 The lure of the SD
offered men like Ohlendorf a way to voice and address grievances with the Nazi
government. In the early years, Ohlendorf and his contemporaries thought that if
they worked for the Reich, they could “fix” National Socialism from within, and be a
part of the decision-making process.122 They were critical of the regime because
their generation was convinced that in order for Weimar to topple and a new regime
to be successful, they must play a role in not only the creation of policy, but in
holding the new government responsible to its campaign promises. The economy
was depressed, their parents suffered at the hands of a weak, foreign mandated
government. In its quest for legitimacy, the Third Reich hired intellectuals and
experts like Ohlendorf so as to convince the German people and the world that this
government had infinite capabilities. Although Ohlendorf’s career took shape much
differently than he anticipated, the constants that drove him to the top were his
arrogant, honest character, his immeasurable careerist motivations, and his Alter
Kämpfer self-righteousness.
Education and Early Careerism (1923-1936)
Ohlendorf’s post-secondary education was similar to that of his RSHA
contemporaries, some of whom were his fellow defendants in the 1948
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Einsatzgruppen Trials. They were university-educated intellectuals, experts in a
variety of fields, the backbone of the Nazi bureaucracy, and in charge of
implementing Third Reich policy in Germany. However, according to Hilary Earl,
not all of the 1948 trial defendants were of the same “caliber and degree” as
Ohlendorf, as only 50% of them had completed a university degree.123 Ohlendorf’s
educational track led him to a degree in jurisprudence at the University of Leipzig.
He then studied economics at the University of Göttingen. Although he never
acquired a degree in economics, in the summer of 1931, he was awarded a
scholarship to do a two-semester study abroad, in political economics, to the
University of Pavia, near Milan, Italy.124
In Italy, Ohlendorf studied the Fascist system’s philosophy of international
law, and claimed to have solidified his belief in a purist version of National
Socialism.125 In retrospect, a general study of Fascist and National Socialist
ideologies yields some nuanced differences, but to Ohlendorf, the differences were
very pronounced.126 He said this about studying in Italy: “I returned as a fanatic
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antifascist.”127 He intended to use his experience in Italy as the beginning of his
“lifetime’s work,” as he allegedly desired a university academic career.128 However,
Ohlendorf’s return to Germany meant he proceeded with his legal training and
qualifications. Yet Hanno Sowade argued that in 1933, he was saved by Prof. Dr.
Jens Jessen from an “unwanted career” in law.129 At the time, Jessen was the head of
the Royal Institute for Maritime Transport and World Economics at the University of
Kiel, and was recruiting scholars for the 1934 unveiling of the new Kiel Institute for
World Economics.130 Ohlendorf’s professional drive leaned toward academics, and
even in 1944, late in his RSHA career, he still gave lectures and wanted to teach.
While Ohlendorf’s fanatical anti-fascist philosophy shaped his entire National
Socialist career, he often incurred criticism for his opinions. Although National
Socialism bred a new type of totalitarian regime, it was essentially a fascist state
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with similarities to the Mussolini regime, both of which were derived from state-run
dictatorships. However, Ohlendorf vehemently believed otherwise. During a
conversation with Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal doctor during the war,
Ohlendorf explained his view that fascism and National Socialism were completely
opposed to each other, saying “Fascism began by deifying the state and refusing to
recognize those human communities which were based on nature; but National
Socialism was itself based on those natural communities and on the men who
belonged to them.”131 Clearly, Ohlendorf criticized an important element of Italian
fascism, that Mussolini declared himself the “state” and “godlike”.
Drawing distinctions between the two ideologies, Ohlendorf reflected on how
Himmler and others misinterpreted both ideologies, saying “there are men who
have a great deal to gain from the fascist divinization of the state and who would
like to put the Führer himself in the place of God.”132 He criticized many Nazi
leaders for not understanding his version of purist National Socialist ideology, based
on communal politics, life and economics, calling Göring, a “capitalist “and Ley, a
Bolshevik sympathizer. According to Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal physician
and masseur, Ohlendorf was most concerned with collectivizing the entire German
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community, but not for individual profit, nor for the empowerment of the police
state. He stated that the difference was Germany’s “historic tradition to maintain
small…businesses…free and independent” while fascist economics demands that the
state take control of all business and industry.133
Kersten’s written response to Ohlendorf’s lesson on fascism was one of
shock. “Never before had I received such a lecture on economics and the state. At
the same time, I was astounded at the frankness with which Ohlendorf had
spoken.”134 This statement is not surprising in the least and, in fact, is consistent
with everything written and documented about Ohlendorf’s character. Like
Kersten’s account of Ohlendorf’s fervent anti-fascist sentiment, Dr. Leon
Goldensohn, the psychologist who interviewed the Landsberg prisoners, in The
Nuremberg Interviews asked “how could you be in a fascist party and be a fanatic
antifascist?”135 Ohlendorf replied by saying “It’s regrettable that you think they are
the same. There is much difference. Fascism is a purely state principle…in National
Socialism, it was the opposite. People and humans come first, and the state is
secondary.” Ohlendorf, for all intents and purposes, was the only Nazi who spoke
out as such, and although he hoped others would realize these ideological
distinctions, they did not. True to his belief in Nationalist Socialism, Ohlendorf
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became known as the “Gralshüter des Nationalsozialismus,” or the keeper of the Holy
Grail of National Socialism.136 Despite his zealous loathing of fascism, Ohlendorf’s
return from Italy took his career in a direction different from academia. He became
a licensed lawyer.
Between 1931 and 1932, Ohlendorf composed several requests to the high
court of Germany to suspend his law practicing license for the duration of his time
abroad. Having been sworn in on September 15, 1931, he intended to use his law
degree as a backup career track while pursuing his desire to work in academia.137
After being awarded the study abroad scholarship, his first leave request was
granted in September 1931, and he was reinstated by the
Oberlandesgerichtespräsidenten (regional Court justice) to the courts in August
1932. True to his desire to pursue an academic career, when approached by Jessen
from the University of Kiel to leave the court system in favor of a position in higher
education, Ohlendorf again requested leave in September 1933. It was granted, and
in October 1934, he wrote to the high courts asking for an extension of leave
because he was conducting “great scientific work” at the Kiel Institute.138 This time,
the courts denied his leave with an addendum stating that upon his return to
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service, he would have to restart the application process anew.139 Ohlendorf’s
career in academia was again put on hold.
Upon his return from studying abroad, Ohlendorf was employed as barrister
at the Hanover Amtsgerichte (District Court), and from April 1933- October 1933 in
the Hildesheim Landesgericht (National Court). Following a short-lived law career,
he was recruited by Prof. Dr. Jens Jessen, head of the University of Kiel’s Institut für
Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr (Institute for World Economics and Maritime Traffic)
to establish a department for fascism and National Socialism. Here, Ohlendorf
served as scientific assistant.140 According to the Combined Services Detailed
Interrogations Center (CSDIC, United Kingdom) “Prisoner Interrogations” report,
Ohlendorf stated that he abandoned his academic pursuit of an advanced degree in
economics to join Jessen in Kiel.141 During the trial, he claimed he and Jessen had a
falling out with local party officials over their own economic theories and criticism
of National Socialist policies.142 Interestingly, nowhere is this mentioned except in
the Appendix of the “Prisoner Interrogations” conducted by the CSDIC (UK division).
But in the CSDIC’s timeline of Ohlendorf’s life events, they wrote that he claimed to
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have been “imprisoned” with Jessen, with both forced to resign their positions for
alleged “anti-Bolshevist” beliefs.143 Ohlendorf said he and Jessen were “forced” to
resign their appointments in Kiel and found the same type of opposition at a
different academic venue.144 This indicates that the economic theories they were
supporting and presenting were not in line with Nazi economic policy. It also shows
the totalitarian nature of the regime, even in the beginning years, by revealing this
type of academic censorship applied to Ohlendorf and Jessen.
In November 1934, Ohlendorf and Jessen were invited to transform the trade
college, Handelhochschule Berlin, into a university for applied economics,
Wirtschaftshochschule. The next month, Ohlendorf was named director of the
Institute for Applied Economics, but by January 1935, he was the director of the
Department of Applied Sciences.145 Jessen and Ohlendorf’s master plan was to
create a National Socialist University of Economics; they failed because their
economic theories and teachings were too radical even for the Nazi party. Under
Jessen’s tutelage, Ohlendorf’s time in academia offered the opportunity to put
economic theory into action, developing what Earl called a “highly personal theory
of economics.”146 They sought economic reform through “middle-class oriented”
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economic ideology. Research and public opinion were to be instrumental in spurring
economic growth.147 Conflict with local party officials caused Ohlendorf to realize
his career in academia was over.148 The only place an Alter Kämpfer could thrive
was in the Nazi party and/or Nazi government. He reactivated his membership in
the SS (Schutzstaffel, or protection squadron), applied to the SD, and persuaded
Jessen to take a position there too. Ohlendorf’s potential career with the Reich was
not likely because of his continual insistence on his own philosophy, even if
independent from party politics.149
Ohlendorf’s relationship with Jessen soured after he decided to revisit his
party affiliation, with encouragement from Jessen.150 Since Ohlendorf went to the
SD and likely feared his academic career would not come to fruition, he further
indoctrinated himself in Nazi ideology and policy, something Jessen most likely saw
as a betrayal. Jessen became an increasingly controversial character in Nazi politics,
being among the few individuals in academia to continue criticizing National
Socialism up through 1944, even when he worked in the Army General Staff.
151Staying

in Berlin, Jessen became part of the resistance movement, and was
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involved in the 20 July, 1944 unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler’s life:
Operation Valkyrie.152 On November 30, 1944, Jessen was hanged for treason, along
with 100 others on the periphery of association with the Wolfsschanze (Wolf’s Lair)
plot. At this time, Ohlendorf was not only RSHA Amt III leader, but also
undersecretary to the Minister of Economics. He had enough influence, especially
after his time served with the Einsatzgruppen, to have bargained for Jessen’s life, but
he “did not move a finger.”153 Had Ohlendorf done so, his loyalties would have been
questioned, and his career finished, likely suffering the same fate as Jessen. Heinz
Höhne pointed out that Ohlendorf had a “sleepless night” when Jessen was hanged,
and made a “conscience-stricken promise henceforth to share his salary with the
Jessen family.”154 Ohlendorf and Jessen shared the same economic ideology and, like
Jessen, Ohlendorf found many aspects of the Third Reich problematic. His
relationship with Jessen was raised in cross-examination at the Nuremberg trials; in
a New York Times article, he was questioned about the “German economist” who
was “considered friendly” until 1938, and was a “suspect” in the 20 July plot to
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assassinate Hitler.155 However, Ohlendorf betrayed his friend, continued to pursue
his career, and died a war criminal, while Jessen died a martyr of German resistance.
Sicherheitsdienst (SD)
In May 1936, Ohlendorf was offered a position in the SD (Sicherheitsdienst),
which, in 1939, became RSHA Amt III (SD-Inland), in charge of the domestic
intelligence service. At this point, he already had a record of distinguished service in
National Socialism.156 In 1936, the same year that Ohlendorf joined the SD, Himmler
became the Chief of German Police, and Heydrich, the Chief of the Gestapo.
Ohlendorf saw the SD-Inland as “purely an intelligence agency” that was meant to
assess the “mood and attitude” of the people. What drew him to the SD was, in his
words, that it was “the only authority offering criticism within the Reich and
reporting facts from an objective point of view to top levels.”157 In a totalitarian
state, reporting on public opinion is controlled, but the Nazi dictatorship
demonstrated a great deal of interest in what ordinary German citizens thought of
the regime. Ohlendorf developed the public opinion service to gather “useful”
intelligence on enemies in the Reich.158
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Ohlendorf was hired to build up the SD’s security service. At the time, he was
recruited by Reinhard Höhn, a law professor at the University of Berlin, who felt the
SD “needed critical intellects like his.”159 Höhn also tried to attract Jessen into
service in the SD, and though Jessen did not officially join, other intellectuals like
Franz Six did.160 Under Höhn’s supervision, Ohlendorf became director of the
Ableitung II (the Economic Division) where data was collected, analyzed and
reported. Next, he became section leader of the Central Division (Zentralableitung),
where he established an agency for collecting intelligence on critical comments.161
The reports were designed to give feedback to Nazi leaders regarding their policies,
leadership, and elements of propaganda. However, this was all done by having
agents secretly observe regular people’s actions and conversations. Ohlendorf saw
this as not only an opportunity to analyze the growth of the Nazi regime, but to also
influence his own research agenda; implementing his own economic theories. Both
Ohlendorf and Höhn established the Lebensgebietarbeit, “systematic observation of
social spheres” and its significance escalated with the creation of the 1939 RSHA.162
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They both agreed that the SD was their vehicle to influence the development of
National Socialism.163
However, throughout Ohlendorf’s affidavits and testimony, he consistently
complained that Himmler and other Nazi leaders were displeased with the Reich
reports he compiled. For instance, Ohlendorf criticized the rearmament of Germany
because it drew economic resources away from independent production in favor of
big business, saying it caused “unparalleled strains” on the economy.164 Ohlendorf
composed the Meldungen aus dem Reich up through his return from his
Einsatzgruppe duties. But in 1936, at the beginning of his career in the Reich, he was
already notorious for being an opinionated, outspoken intellectual, a
characterization that followed him throughout his life and career. He was avidly
insistent on instilling purist Nazi philosophy through his loyalties as an Alter
Kämpfer, promoting the Reich, and demonstrating areas in need of improvement,
that he was viewed as an egotistical know-it-all who, as a British interrogator said,
“has a host of ideas on every subject”.165
When Ohlendorf became an official in the SD in 1936, he had at his disposal a
“wide variety” of confiscated materials, reflecting “group attitudes” within Germany
and toward National Socialism and Hitler, which became the basis of the public
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opinion reports.166 Ohlendorf was approved to hire a staff of twenty-four experts to
compose, distribute, and analyze surveys of the German people from the beginning
of WWII.167 Confidential agents were directed to poll certain segments of the
population, compile their statistics, and report back to Ohlendorf. Drafts of
questionnaire poll results were given to Himmler, Ley, and other high-ranking
officials. The reports were often negative, pessimistic, and critical about Reich
economic policy and its future standing, which did nothing to endear them to
Himmler and others in power. Ohlendorf said of the SD, “the first disappointment
was to find that there was no such thing as an SD information organization.”168
Although the SD was an important professional move for Ohlendorf, at the time he
was disenchanted and vocal about it. In this way, he brought attention to himself,
and was regarded as problematic by Nazi administrators. In addition, Heinz Höhne
argued that the Nazi party “bosses did not find the SD men particularly
impressive.”169 Ohlendorf’s reputation for frankness of character and stubborn
behavior marked him, despite his impressive and self-driven Alter Kämpfer career,
complete with prestigious decorations and promotions.
Hilary Earl asserts that Ohlendorf’s unorthodox style was appreciated in the
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post-Depression years, while Sowade argued that he attracted the “enmity” of
several Nazi officials for his reports. Both agree that he incurred the most wrath
specifically concerning the Four Year Plan, a proposal to stimulate the economy
through an increase of corporate jobs.170 This led to amassed individual wealth and
did not help the middle class. Unfortunately for Ohlendorf, his stubborn, unfiltered
criticism of Nazi economic policy left him disenfranchised and “out in the cold.”171
He requested to leave the SD to work in the economic sector, but Heydrich denied
the request, and Ohlendorf’s work in the SD was reduced to “honorary duties.”172
Ohlendorf’s wife, Käthe, referred to this as a “temporary halt” in his career, as her
husband repeatedly tried to either transfer, or leave the SD. However, Himmler and
Heydrich refused; Mrs. Ohlendorf said he continued to serve as a volunteer in the
afternoons.173 However, Ohlendorf admitted in testimony that he had “long
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negotiations” with Heydrich, who eventually allowed reassignment to Reichsgruppe
Handel (Reich Commerce Group) in 1938.174 After joining the National Trade Group,
Ohlendorf devised his small and medium-sized business economic stimulus plan,
and although his ideas were in opposition to Party economics, he was promoted to
Chief Secretary by 1939.175 Despite his criticism of other party members and their
interpretation of Nazi philosophy, he was indeed needed in the Reich because of his
expertise on economic policy. Whatever grievances Heydrich and Himmler had with
Ohlendorf, ultimately, they recognized his value in instituting economic policies.
From here on, his career prospered through promotions.
Ohlendorf’s Economy
How did Ohlendorf become known as an expert in economics? The
connection between expertise in law and economics in his professional career is
puzzling, at least initially. He received his advanced degree in jurisprudence, but
was recruited first to Kiel and then to Berlin to build institutes for economics.
Academics like Ohlendorf often chose economics as a related subject of study
associated with law.176 Christian Ingrao argues that economics provided an
“intellectual bridge” between academics and activism; and here Ohlendorf, and
other Nazi academics, became activists.177 From this perspective, it is
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understandable that the Reich recognized Ohlendorf as an economics expert.
Coupled with his work at the economic institutes in Berlin and Kiel, Ohlendorf was
viewed as a specialized kind of expert, useful to the Nazi party. By 1943, Ohlendorf
assumed his previous role as leader of RSHA AMT III (Reich Security Main Office,
Division Three), and was the second in command in the Ministry of Economics. He
had succeeded in making himself indispensable to the Reich.
Nazi philosophy and policies dictated every aspect of the Nazi state, including
the economy. After the depression, the first step toward German economic recovery
was to broaden economic growth through technological innovation, in order to
stimulate the accumulation of physical and human capital.178 Creating jobs by
employing the state-sponsored workforce of “semi-skilled” laborers, specifically
metalworkers, would increase production and German labor as it was “rhetorically
revalorized”.179 For Adam Tooze, Hitler’s aggression and overarching plan for war
and genocide was absolutely unsustainable from the beginning. Nevertheless, Nazi
leadership proceeded with the war and the Holocaust not only because of Nazi
motivations and drive to do so. Their economy was based on the principles of
rearmament, and heavily relied on big business corporations to utilize mass
production. An important fusion of Nazi philosophy with economics has concrete
manifestations in the creation of the so-called Volksgemeinschaft, a community of
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the people who sacrificed personal interests for that of the greater good of Germany
and the Aryan race.
The Mittelstand, or small business section, of Nazi Germany rapidly became
disenfranchised. With the rise of the Nazi party and their eventual takeover of the
German government, an “amalgamation” of economic and military spheres created a
new class of elites, one which left the middle class by the wayside.180 The middle
class, from which Ohlendorf came, was thwarted by the need for rearmament;
independent craftsmen and small-scale manufacturers were restricted by state run
corporations.181 As industries increased production, employment opportunities
increased, and many small farmers and artisans relocated to industrial towns to
pursue employment. The Reich propaganda machine attempted to blur the lines
between white and blue-collar work in the “blood and soil” (blut und boden)
campaign.182 The phrase, coined by R. Walther Darré, had not only venerated the
farmers, but also attributed to them a status higher than that of the middle or
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working class, a concept rooted in eugenics and racial theory. Prior to Hitler’s
ascendancy to Germany’s chancellorship in 1933, the ideas of “blood and soil” were
ingrained in the agrarian, rural communities of Germany. However, as the Nazis
rose to power, they fashioned the “blood and soil” campaign into an immense
propaganda measure, targeting the whole of Germany and the creation of the
Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s community. The idea of the Volksgemeinschaft was
one of the most important components of Nazi ideology and economics.
In general terms, Ohlendorf fought for a Nazi-run, state controlled system of
economics that would most benefit the middle class, Mittelstand. The term was
coined during the Stresseman era, and is literally translated “middle estate,”
referring to owners of small and medium-sized businesses, clerks, and white-collar
workers, describing the middle layer of Weimar society.183 By the time the Nazis
came to power however, this group of people and small-scale farmers were fused
together into the Mittelstand. In The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, Jeremy Noakes
argued that the classification of Mittelstand was “archaic status evaluation” that
denoted economic status rather than class.184 According to Ludolf Herbst, Ohlendorf
was one of the “most prominent advocates” of Nazi middle-class policy.185 He was a
National Socialist of the “purest waters,” because he understood the importance of
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the middle class in the success of National Socialist ideology.186 When Ohlendorf
was associated with Jessen and the economic sphere, they both argued for a Nazi
economic theory based on a domestic market provided by the middle class and
products.187
Ohlendorf’s time in the academic realm offered him the opportunity to
combine his interests in practical economic theory with that of National
Socialism.188 As an academic and a contributor to Reichsgruppe Handel, Ohlendorf
consistently lobbied against state ownership of corporations, which contributed to
the closing of small businesses.189 He believed that if the government spent beyond
its means to have state mandated control of big business, as fascist Italy did, there
would be an end to entrepreneurship, and the Görings of Germany would
accumulate too much power through corporate wealth.190 In one sense, he
advocated for a free market, one with a thriving national economy and strong small
business sector. This is not to be confused with a true market economy with free
trade. The economy would be controlled by the Nazi party, yet regulated in a more
equitable fashion, with protections for the small business sector. In promoting
these ideas, Ohlendorf challenged how big businesses acquired wealth, and

186

Herbst, Der Totale Krieg, 276. The original text is “Nationalsozialisten reinsten

Wassers.”
187

Ingrao, Believe and Destroy, 39.

188

Herbst, Der Totale Krieg, 183.

189

Herbst, Der Totale Krieg, 228 and Earl, “Criminal Biographies,” 174.

190

Earl, “Criminal Biographies,” 174-175.

96

advocated for domestic and maritime trade and the middle class, who would be the
greatest beneficiaries of the measures he supported. To Ohlendorf, this was
completely aligned with National Socialist ideology and unequivocally antiBolshevik, even though the Bolsheviks held the working class in greater esteem than
any other social class. It was also anti-fascist, which to Ohlendorf was an unjust,
dictatorial, state-run system that ignored the rights and needs of the people,
centering the system around the state. He was completely opposed to the
“Bürokratisierung der Wirstschaft” (bureaucratization of the economy), which in fact
did take place, because of the war.191 To Ohlendorf, adding more control and more
people to regulate the economy was the opposite of a Nazi economy. However, in its
need to quickly acquire and accumulate war materials, the Nazi government did not
share Ohlendorf’s economic theories.
At the beginning of Ohlendorf’s career in economics, he aspired to create a
National Socialist University of Economics. Near the end of the war, Ohlendorf again
spoke of how to properly integrate economics, trade, academia, and National
Socialism under one inseparable entity.192 He sought to create a national archive of
economics; by gathering intelligence reports from multiple sources, he hoped to
generate a centralized plan for the national economy. His goal was to essentially
design a database for Nazi economic policy that incorporated expert information
from many subject areas, to be used in the future, specifically in the post-war era.193
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Ohlendorf, sharing Hitler’s view, always thought of Germany in a romantic,
glorified, and utopian way, according to Herbst. He wanted Germany to be an
agrarian-based Reich.194 This dove-tailed with his ties to the Anthroposophical
society, and his support of organic, biodynamic farming.195 The theories of
biodynamic farming, developed by the founder of the Anthroposophical society,
Rudolf Steiner, combined organic farming techniques with esoteric principles.
Having been raised on a farm may have ingrained in Ohlendorf the philosophy of
“green,” organic farming. Despite the fact that, early on, the Nazis banned all sorts of
organizations, including religious groups and those not aligned with National
Socialist ideology, the Anthroposophical society was not banned until later.
Ohlendorf believed that aspects of the society’s theories, such as biodynamics, were
applicable to German agriculture and society, and were in line with Nazi philosophy.
This would create an unequivocal bond between the Aryan race, the soil, and what
Germany was consuming.196 However, because of the ties between biodynamics and
Anthroposophy, Himmler and other Reich leaders rejected its tenets. The Nazi party
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wanted to avoid being internationally affiliated with farming techniques that arose
from what they saw as a cult society.
Biodynamics was part of a backlash against technology in agriculture, an area
in which Ohlendorf took issue with National Socialist ideology. For supporters of
biodynamics, the use of innovative technology was good for the German economy.
But using technology in this process and industrializing it would further taint the
soil. The Nazi economy was geared to the promotion of big industry rather than the
protection of small-scale experiments, such as biodynamic farming. What Ohlendorf
supported, “handicraft livelihoods of the Mittelstand, “could not survive in an
economy based heavily on the accumulation of war materials.197 He sought to
protect the small producers, but could not do so because of his “adherence to the
mystical biodynamic farming practices of Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophy.”198
Anthroposophy became a hindrance for him as the Nazi party not only continued to
distance itself from Steiner’s beliefs, but also pressured Ohlendorf to dissociate
himself from the group. If he had not agreed to quiet his association with
Anthroposophy, he might have jeopardized his career.
Ohlendorf was unimpressed with the manner in which the Nazis practiced
their economic strategies, and disapproved of their dismissal of practical
biodynamic farming. He constantly had to explain his relationship with the
Anthroposophical society, defending elements of their philosophy, such as
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biodynamics, to the Reich. His views were overruled, and German rearmament
became completely industrialized. However, Germany did not have sufficient funds
to sustain a war, genocide, and the Third Reich’s thousand-year reign. In a different
place and time, Ohlendorf’s conviction that the economy should be slowly built at a
grass-roots level, might have proven to be right. But again, the Nazi party’s power
prevailed, and Ohlendorf, at least temporarily, submitted to the war machine-driven
economy.
Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)
As the outbreak of World War II approached, Heydrich reconsidered
Ohlendorf’s role in the Nazi government. The RSHA was redesigned to incorporate
elements of the already existing SD, SS, Gestapo, and other independent Nazi
government organizations into one larger Reich Security Main Office. Prior to the
establishment of the RSHA, the SS and SD, under Himmler’s order and direction,
were the primary agencies conducting intelligence in the Reich. As the war drew
near, and Germany had blatantly violated rearmaments provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles, it was believed that wartime success would be dependent on
consolidating intelligence and police groups under a single governmental agency. As
leader of the newly-formed RSHA, Heydrich carefully selected appointees to head
the divisions. When it came to filling the AMT III directorship, he reluctantly turned
back to Ohlendorf, who was still serving the SD in his “volunteer” capacity. As head
of AMT III (German-settled areas), Ohlendorf conducted all public opinion research
in Germany. Ohlendorf held this position from September 1939-June 1941, and then
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again from June 1942-May 1945. The gap from June 1941-June 1942 represents the
time in which Ohlendorf was transferred and assigned to the Russian front. He
became commander of Einsatzgruppe D, and under his leadership, 91,678 victims
were murdered.199
The nature of the duties of the RSHA is peculiar. Wildt argues that it was an
improvised agency that was not solely a police institution, fusing together the SS and
Gestapo, but more importantly, was a tangible representation of the
Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s community. Combining the ideology of the Volk, the
state, and racial supremacy made the RSHA into an administrative representation of
the people. Every aspect of the RSHA was designed to be one component of the
greater Nazi “worldview expressed in the ‘will of the Führer.’”200 In this worldview,
Adolf Eichmann was employed as a specialist in Jewish deportation in the RSHA.201
This shows increased Nazi urgency in systematically dealing with the Jews as a
whole. It is also clear how the Einsatzgruppen grew out of the administration, and
how effortlessly one branch of the RSHA could be expanded or adapted. This is
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most evident in the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen and, in particular, how in
1941 Ohlendorf was transferred to the front while under the umbrella of the RSHA
and SS, i.e. Heydrich and Himmler.
The RSHA was a flexible institution grounded in, first and foremost, National
Socialist ideology. For Wildt, the organization and its leaders had to adapt to
expanding tasks and changing political situations, so as to be able to enforce the
“greatest possible influence” in Germany.202 The war provided the opportunity for
the RSHA to implement any policy it wished, initially demonstrated with the
invasion of Poland. Here the RSHA was more than an intelligence-gathering and
assessment organization, as Nazi racial ideology became government policy. In
Poland, the Einsatzgruppen, a new division controlled by the RSHA, eliminated
political opponents and instituted racial policy on a large scale.203 This aspect will
be revisited in a later section on the inception of the Einsatzgruppen and Ohlendorf’s
transfer to the Russian war in 1941. Most importantly, the flexibility of the RSHA
was demonstrated in how its leaders were allowed to independently enact policies.
Regarding the persecution of the Jews, Wildt argues that the National
Socialist regime wanted “politically dedicated men like Ohlendorf,” not subordinate
bureaucrats, to implement extermination policies.204 The Reich believed that Nazi
ideologues were vital; men such as Ohlendorf who would implement and defend not
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only the so-called Final Solution, but who could also perfectly align it with other
Nazi rhetoric. This ability is likely what drove and sustained Ohlendorf’s career.
Wildt fights against Goldhagen’s argument for “eliminationist anti-Semitism”
inherent in these particular leaders, saying that there is no evidence in the early
lives of these men to support this claim.205 Wildt instead emphasizes that the RSHA
leaders were bred in specific economic and political conditions in the interwar
period. They grew up resenting the treatment of Germany, and thus made careers
out of trying to make their country thrive again.
Why was Ohlendorf chosen for the RSHA if he and Heydrich had already
disagreed on a number of issues, leading to Ohlendorf’s suspension from the SD?
Heinz Höhne put it simply; Himmler “clung to Ohlendorf,” fearing backlash from the
party, and Heydrich held onto him for his “expertise.”206 While employed as a
lecturer with the universities and with the National Trade union, Ohlendorf had won
the favor of trade unions and those opposed to large corporate wealth in Germany.
Hanno Sowade argued that one particular reason for keeping Ohlendorf involved in
the unions was the “lack of economic experts in the SS.”207 This is a recurring theme
in the historiography: the Nazi quest for building a legitimate government through
the hiring of “experts” in their respective fields. By this time, Ohlendorf had made
himself an expert in economics, and his work experience overrode the lack of an
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official degree in the field of economics. His resumé included working with Jessen
on political science and economics, and in the National Trade Group. Thus, he
became a practicing economist with practical National Socialist economic theories.
Although he never actually attained a degree in economics, the RSHA viewed
Ohlendorf as an expert in economics and trade, based on his advanced degree in
jurisprudence and experience teaching economics. Sowade argued that Ohlendorf
was significant in trade groups and unions and among the middle class because of
his broad-based economic theories, saying “it was remarkable” that he held three
offices concurrently: RSHA, Reichsgruppe Handel, and the economics
administration.208 Even for an Alter Kämpfer, this was extraordinary.
Despite what Heydrich and other party members thought of Ohlendorf’s
demeanor and persona, he brought a much-needed expertise to the newly
established and ideologically driven RSHA. As the larger picture unfolded, Ohlendorf
was the ideal candidate for leader of AMT III, especially since the new division was
derived from his office, SD Hauptamt Zentralableitung II.209 His ruthless honesty
and careerist drive proved extremely beneficial to the Reich: He provided reports
that were highly objective by his standards, gathered intelligence, and ensured the
accuracy of his data to the point of being hyper-critical of all things related to the
Reich. About this transition, Ohlendorf said “as the Reichsführer-SS [Himmler] did
not intend to develop the…[SD] intelligence service…the solution of an external

208

Sowade, “Otto Ohlendorf,” 157.

209

Höhne, Death’s Head, 256.

104

façade was sufficient.”210 While this statement was made in retrospect, at the time,
Ohlendorf really believed he was making a difference, and helping the German
people with the reports and thus, helping the Nazi party prosper.
The Reports: Meldungen aus dem Reich
RSHA, AMT III (SD-Inland) was designed to produce honest and nonbiased
accounts of opinions in the Reich. The conundrum Ohlendorf had was that Himmler
forbade him from investigating the Party itself, while at the same time, expecting
him to cover all “spheres of life.”211 Ohlendorf sent agents out to conduct secret
polls, accruing data from all realms and areas of society. He assured Himmler and
other Reich officials that his “greatest worry” would be to have the German people
believe the Party was something “negative or hostile,” or to portray Hitler and the SS
as anything other than a helpful extension of the Volk.212
The reports themselves were quite simple in format, such as statistical data
based on material collected on life in wartime Germany. Each report began with a
summary of the event, and stated basic public reactions to it. The writing style was
factual and “humorless,” providing figures and individual examples of how things
like transportation issues affected someone’s everyday life.213 At the conclusion of a
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particular report, there were recommendations provided, such as “therefore, it is
suggested…;” “the matter is still under consideration;” and “Police have been
informed.”214 Each report contained a summary of the problem or issue, an
assessment of its importance, and why it should be addressed by the Reich. The
process of data collection was explained to Felix Kersten; “of course we have our
confidential agents everywhere…but they’re not employees who denounce the head
of their firm…they report to us how the situation stands in every field and don’t get
a penny for doing it.”215 Ohlendorf made sure to note these ‘volunteers’ were
properly screened, and any statistical data that seemed unreliable was dismissed
along with the agent.216 Specific instructions were given to the secret agents, that
they were to report on public reaction to particular policies and events such as the
invasion of the USSR, food rationing, fall of France, etc.217
Arthur L. Smith’s “Life in Wartime Germany: Colonel Ohlendorf’s Opinion
Service” described the scenario of hands-on information collection. According to
Smith, in certain areas of Germany, a number of volunteers were sent to gather data
(questions and topics chosen by Ohlendorf and his team of experts) by “listening in
his own circle of friends, family, and business associates.” The agents were glorified
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eaves-droppers who went to public places and gathered information from schools,
churches, clubs and the Hitlerjugend.218 Ohlendorf gave “special attention” to rumor
control, such as those surrounding the 1939 assassination attempt on Hitler’s life,
but Smith argued that the Goebbels propaganda machine often planted rumors
preceding a new Reich policy, to test public reaction before it was implemented.219
This made Ohlendorf’s opinion service and data collection all the more important, as
his reports showed how the propaganda machine was failing to appropriately
convey messages. For instance, public reaction to newspaper articles planted by
Goebbels often led to having to those papers having to issue apologies for offending
certain groups in the population. Since newspapers were forbidden to publish
crime statistics, Ohlendorf’s reports served as the only means for gathering
statistical data on criminal acts.220 The reports were successful in that they
exhaustively documented dissent and public opinion in Nazi Germany. However, for
Ohlendorf, as the war drew near and began, the material became increasingly
depressing, showing the lack of public support for the Nazi Party.
Ohlendorf’s steadfast devotion to true National Socialism made him appear
to his colleagues and superiors as “the archetype of the schizophrenic SS
intellectual,” an obedient Nazi careerist who, as Gralshüter of National Socialism,
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unabashedly hoped the Party would fail.221 Much like Ohlendorf’s dream of having a
true opinion service in the SD, his RSHA reports on the Reich were met with hostile
criticism. As he delved deeper, investigating the so-called “spheres of life,”
Ohlendorf, “the puritan”, discovered so many problems and mutilations in the Nazi
system that his utopian faith and belief in National Socialism was destroyed. He
even went so far as to say the Party was dying from cancer.222
Naturally, Ohlendorf’s enthusiasm for the National Socialist cause began to
dwindle, not without notice from Himmler. Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal
physician, recalled a conversation about Ohlendorf with Himmler saying “I hope
you’ll be able to help him; he has trouble with his liver and gall-bladder. His reports
are always gloomy; he has the pessimistic outlook which goes with physical
suffering…I don’t care for the man…he has no sense of humor…”223 Himmler was
oblivious to the fact that perhaps the results from the polling and reports made
Ohlendorf feel hopeless and grim. He saw Ohlendorf as a “school master watching
over me,” rather than a devoted Reich official who gathered intelligence that
revealed that the people were turning against his Party. As the war intensified and
victory was no longer assured, the reports increasingly began to focus on criticizing
the Goebbels propaganda machine. The German people suffered from the usual
wartime problems like depreciated currency, scarcity of food items and fuel, and
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shortages of all types of products, which created a depressed Volk.224 A report
dated 20 April 1944 stated “…desire for a rapid end to the war is everywhere very
great.”225
Disagreements with specific Party officials like Himmler escalated as the war
continued. In his testimony at Nuremberg, Ohlendorf recalled Himmler referring to
him as a “humorless Prussian,” and by 1942, Goebbels, Bormann, and Hans Frank all
questioned the accuracy, viability, and need for the reports in the Reich.226
However, none of Ohlendorf’s personal Party feuds or open criticism of the SD
reports ever led to his dismissal from the SS, although according to Höhne, Himmler
threatened to have Ohlendorf arrested several times.227 This is probably because
Ohlendorf was a valuable asset to the Reich, a respected Alter Kämpfer who
conducted public opinion reports concerning what the German people thought
about each topic. It was in the best interest of the Reich to address these concerns.
Additionally, Ohlendorf’s work with the National Trade Union and Reichsgruppe
Handel won him the favor of his peers. However, Himmler refused to show Hitler
the reports, saying “they would only impair the Führer’s capacity for action,” and
often, they were returned to Ohlendorf edited and virtually useless.228 Despite Party
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conflict, criticism of the reports, and remarks about Ohlendorf’s character, his career
flourished, and he rose ever higher, earning choice promotions and decorations.
Again, the fact that Himmler clearly disliked him had no great bearing on his career.
Although this is a contradiction, it must be included to better understand why
Ohlendorf’s professional success was so extensive. First and foremost, he was a
committed, dedicated Alter Kämpfer of Nazi ideology, which bound him to his career,
the Party, and to Germany. It is also likely what contributed most to his unexpected
transfer to the Einsatzgruppen.
By the summer of 1943, and a year removed from his service in the
Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf’s SD reports were finally restricted, and by 1944,
completely banned, with the exception of a special report on the 20 July
assassination attempt.229 Ohlendorf was enraged and told Kersten that Himmler
“wants to know the names of the men who drew up the report of those who made
unpleasant remarks, so that he can hold them responsible.”230 Ohlendorf went on to
say “I don’t think there’s another intelligence service in the world which has such a
hard time as we have, constantly at loggerheads with our own chief and
endangering our own existence simply because we insist on making objective
reports.”231 Ohlendorf’s reaction was true to his character and temperament:
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insisting his beliefs superseded everyone else’s, trying to prove himself to anyone
who would listen. In this case, Ohlendorf’s outrage at Himmler’s termination of the
opinion service is justified. Himmler believed that since the reports became
increasingly grim and depressing, there was no need to bother to show them to
Hitler. He personally could not understand the point of the reports anyway.232 In a
conversation with Felix Kersten, Himmler said of Ohlendorf and the reports:
His pet idea is that I should let the Führer see his reports. But they’re usually so pessimistic
that this is quite out of the question; they would only impair the Führer’s capacity for
action…Details which are unhelpful must be kept from the Führer, however important they
may appear. His task is to lead us to victory; I must keep him from anything which might
interfere with this task, even if Herr Ohlendorf does not share this view. But if you’ll only
restore Ohlendorf to health and strengthen his nervous system, he’ll soon be looking at the
world through different eyes.233

Himmler’s approval of the reports was completely dependent on whether or not
Ohlendorf, and his spies, were reporting progress within the Reich. As the duration
of the war increased and Germany’s chance to win diminished, dissent heightened in
the Reich, as seen in the reports. Himmler’s personal differences with Ohlendorf
could not allow the reporting to continue, to the point where he suggested that
Ohlendorf needed medical treatment. To Himmler’s conversation above, Ohlendorf
responded in kind to Kersten saying “…tell the Reichsführer that your treatment is
having its effect, my nerves are improving and my pessimism vanishing. Then
perhaps he will take my reports more seriously.”234 He and his staff not only
recorded reactions to current events, but tried to “chart significant trends” which
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are evident in the Meldungen.235 Unfortunately, Himmler no longer wanted the
reports to continue because, in his mind, they were useless; the reporting was
stopped in 1944.
In retrospect, the reports demonstrate general German discontent with the
war, a lack of belief in victory, and after the failed invasion of the Soviet Union, a
push to make peace.236 Despite this, and to combat the pessimism of the reports,
Ohlendorf said “…I’m always trying to make the consequences of…” not running a
proper dictatorship …”clear to the Reichsführer, especially to point out to him its
devastating effects in war-time…What I’m trying to do is to foresee…future
consequences.”237 He wholeheartedly believed the opinion reports could change
Germany for the better, and could not understand why Himmler cast them aside.
Ohlendorf’s frustration was justified, as the reports were not significant to the Reich
leaders during the Second World War. Despite regular SD reports continuing to
brief the leadership on general topics until the end of the war, such as “Stimmung
und Haltung der Arbeiterschaft” (Mood and Attitude of the Workforce), on July 13,
1944, the last official public opinion report was issued.238
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The End of the Reich
After Ohlendorf returned from his transfer to the Soviet front as leader of
Einsatzgruppe D, he resumed his administrative duties as head of RSHA AMT III. He
continued with the SD reports, but the unfavorable light cast on the Reich through
public opinion polling was too much for Himmler to face. However, Ohlendorf did
not exclusively focus his careerist ambitions on the RSHA. Following his
Einsatzgruppen duties, representatives from the Ministry of Economics attempted to
“win Ohlendorf for the ministry” because his economic policies opposed Speer’s, and
favored the small business community.239 This initially failed, but in 1943,
Ohlendorf became director of the Ministry and deputy to Secretary of State, Dr.
Franz Hayler. Hayler’s health had been failing, and the Ministry was faltering under
the leadership of Walther Funk. Ohlendorf provided a beneficial solution to the
stress the war had placed on the economy by creating a “think tank” to try and solve
problems of rationing, and attempting to restore economic order.
While working for the Ministry of Economics, Ohlendorf began to think about
the post-war economic state of Germany. He assumed the role of “mediator and
coordinator” in industrial sectors, and sought to negotiate a transition plan from
war-time production to post-war recovery. He utilized his RSHA position to draft
plans under which individual corporations amassing conspicuous wealth would
cease to exist, and state control over the economy would be decreased. He hoped
these changes would lead to more equitable distribution of wealth in Germany.
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Hanno Sowade further argued that Ohlendorf’s post-Einsatzgruppen economic
policies were so significant that they carried over into the work of future Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of West Germany, Ludwig Erhard, whose initial ideas were
brought to Ohlendorf in 1944.240 Ohlendorf’s efforts to create a sound economic
future for Germany were hastened, yet failed to become a reality because of the
impending end to the war. Needless to say, post-war plans and the possibility of the
Reich losing the war could not be mentioned in public.
Looking back on Ohlendorf’s career, his rise in the Nazi Party was nothing
short of meteoric, despite personal conflict with high-ranking officials like Himmler
and Heydrich. This is extraordinary, even in the context of his Alter Kämpfer status.
Käthe Ohlendorf said of her husband in the last years of his career, he “worked with
an ardent dedication... [and achieved] growing recognition.241 Here is the list of
promotions Ohlendorf received throughout his career and the western military
equivalent:
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Date

Rank

1936 (9 Nov)

SS-Hauptsturmführer

American Military
Equivalent
Captain

1937 (20 Apr)

SS-Sturmbannführer

Major

1938 (9 Nov)

SS-Obersturmbannführer

Lieutenant Colonel

1940 (1 Jan)

SS-Standartenführer

Colonel

1941 (5 Oct)

SS-Oberführer

Senior Colonel

1942 (16 Jun)

SS-Brigadeführer

Brigadier General

1944 (9 Nov)

SS-Gruppenführer

Major General242

He began his career as a Captain and ended as a Major General, an impressive and
somewhat unusual series of promotions received in a relatively short period of time.
During WWII, German officials were subjected to yearly work assessments,
in much the same way as the modern American military. Looking at Ohlendorf’s
promotions, there are consistencies in praise and evaluation of his work ethic,
despite personal issues with Himmler.243 In October 1941, he was promoted by
Heydrich from SS-Standartenführer to Oberführer, and it specifically states “Der
Reichsführer hat mundlich zugestimmt,” meaning Himmler has “orally agreed.”
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Because of his service in the east, as the leader of Einsatzgruppe D, Ohlendorf
received the service cross first class with distinction with swords, the Ostmedaille,
and other awards from the Wehrmacht including a Romanian decoration.244 For the
work he did in the Reich, he was promoted yearly, and in the one particular
recommendation for his promotion to SS-Gruppenführer, it reads congratulations for
the “exceptional work with the SS economic policy.”245 He was also given the title
“Generalleutenant der Polizei” in December, specifically for his service in Russia and
as the head of RSHA AMT III.246 Without detailing each of Ohlendorf’s evaluations
here, it is clear that his transfer to the Einsatzgruppen tremendously assisted his
career, securing him a promotion to the SS equivalent of General.
In late April 1945, as the Allies and Soviets closed in on Germany, Ohlendorf,
devoted Nazi to the end, was prepared for Germany’s surrender. Ohlendorf had
been planning for post-war economic recovery for several years, and at the time of
the surrender, he was in the elite group of Nazi officials who, for a short period of
time, were governed by Admiral Karl Dönitz. In light of the news of Hitler’s and
Goebbels’ suicides, and the disappearance of Bormann and Eichmann, along with
many other Reich officials, Ohlendorf stayed with Himmler as they fled to Flensburg,
on the Danish border. On May 7th, 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally.247
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He now had to strategize his own surrender because the possibility of capture by
the Soviets was unthinkable to the Germans. At the time of the surrender, Ohlendorf
was planning a new “public opinion service” for a new occupied Germany.248 Hilary
Earl describes the circumstances of his surrender as completely “delusional.” He
actually thought he could get a job in occupied Germany in exchange for helping the
Allies. She does point out that he knew he would be extremely useful as a highranking Nazi official who ran an intelligence department. However, his arrogance
clouded his judgment, obscuring from consciousness the significance of his
association with a criminal organization. He seriously believed the Allies would
implement his post-war plans.249
In Himmler’s attempted flight to Bavaria, he shaved off his signature
moustache, donned an eye patch, and with the appropriately forged documents,
smuggled himself into a refugee/POW camp. Yet, he identified himself properly at
the interrogation center in Lüneberg, and while in British custody, Himmler
ingested cyanide and died shortly thereafter; he was buried in an unmarked
grave.250 Ohlendorf alleged that he was asked to accompany Himmler on his flight
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from Flensburg but refused, staying true to the Nazi Party until the end. According
to Käthe Ohlendorf, her husband saw Himmler’s flight as an act of cowardice, and
said he asked Himmler to take responsibility for his actions and stay in Flensburg
“as he had always assumed he would,” but instead he committed suicide.251
Ohlendorf and the rest of the Dönitz government housed in Flensberg were each
given cyanide, in case of capture by the Soviets.
The most interesting part of analyzing Ohlendorf’s motivations for surrender
is that it never appears to have crossed his mind that his Einsatzgruppen activities
were of any interest whatsoever to the Allies. This was his most fatal mistake. Had
he objectively viewed his career, as a captor or lawyer would have, Ohlendorf
should have seen that the Einsatzgruppen years would be viewed as a form of
criminal activity. Instead, his overconfident demeanor, clouded by careerist zeal,
created a problem in Ohlendorf’s master plan of surrender to the Allies. It had not
occurred to him that the future would bring a war crimes trial whereby he was the
chief defendant.
Conclusion
Piecing together, analyzing, and reflecting upon Otto Ohlendorf’s career in a
complete form shows that although the Third Reich is usually portrayed as a
totalitarian dictatorship, there was room for criticism. There is no question that
National Socialist ideology, practice, and philosophy were intertwined and ingrained
in the German people with the creation of the Volksgemeinschaft, and Ohlendorf was
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no exception to this. Although he was a proud proponent of Nazi ideology, he
diverged from Nazi party belief in the practical application of National Socialist
ideology in realms of the economy and public opinion. He believed more strongly in
the Nazi utopia than anyone, which led to consistent disappointment when his ideas
were cast aside in favor of bureaucracy, big industry, and the war.
Another issue raised in this document is that of academic legitimacy in the
Reich, and the high value the Nazi party placed on their government hiring
individuals with advanced degrees. The interchangeability of Ohlendorf’s degree in
law with economics offers an interesting look into how the Nazi party incorporated
these particular fields of study together in their ideology. The Reich wanted people
who could and would implement their policies. Some knowledge of the subject area
was needed, but they did not require conventional experts. Above all, they valued
loyalty, and whatever Ohlendorf’s level of expertise was, it was overridden by his
status as an Alter Kämpfer. Despite learning and analyzing how Ohlendorf so easily
moved from law to economics, it is still staggering to see how he rose through the
ranks in the Reich, and was recognized as an expert on a variety of subjects. Calling
Ohlendorf’s intelligence into question is not useful, unless tied into the entire
portrayal of his personality and character. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that
Ohlendorf represented a devoted National Socialist ideologue, which is visibly
demonstrated in his promotions and ranks. His success was defined in terms of his
identity as an Alter Kämpfer, his personality, and his level of education.
Historians have focused much effort on exploring the strained relationship
between Ohlendorf and leaders like Himmler and Heydrich. Their analyses provide
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insight into professional and personal relationships among Nazi officials. Unlike
some of what was said, especially from the trial, about Ohlendorf merely being
stubborn and egomaniacal, this dissertation aims to incorporate Ohlendorf’s
dedication to National Socialism and Alter Kämpfer loyalty into the discussion.
Ohlendorf’s devotion to a variation of Nazism centered on the common man not only
drove his career. He used it to justify his actions in the Holocaust to himself, the Nazi
party, and when on trial.
Why did Ohlendorf fail to maintain a career in academia, something he
openly strove to achieve? The explanation may lie in his personality. He was
described as a know-it-all whose frank, deliberate, and abrupt nature may have
steered him into trouble, evidenced by the unclear conditions under which he
moved from Kiel to Berlin with Jessen. However, there may be a simpler
explanation. Ohlendorf wanted to be an agent of change of National Socialism, and
the place he could affect the most change, he believed, was in the SD first, and then
the RSHA. When he came to work with the SD, he was unable to leave for two
reasons: The Nazi party valued Ohlendorf’s ability to provide expertise and the
implementation of policy, and secondly, he believed he could best serve the aims of
National Socialism as a public servant. Despite his effort to decline his transfer to the
Einsatzgruppen, ultimately this drew him into the mass murder of more than 90,000
people. For Ohlendorf, reconciling right from wrong was not an issue; to question
any alleged order to kill would have been to question his dedication to and belief in
National Socialist philosophy. Although this part of his career, that of front line
perpetrator, was one he certainly did not enjoy, he believed the Nazi propaganda
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that the Jews and partisans of Europe must be eliminated in order to have a thriving
Aryan race.
Upon his return from the Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf devoted immense effort
to help the Nazis retain control of Germany, despite his open pessimism about the
potential for a German victory. He was correct, and more importantly, prepared.
After six years in captivity and being found guilty on three counts of war crimes,
Ohlendorf was executed, still fully devoted to his belief in National Socialism.
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Chapter 4:
The Einsatzgruppen: Otto Ohlendorf’s “Unexpected” Career Path
In June 1941, Otto Ohlendorf was appointed commander of Einsatzgruppe D,
a mobile killing unit attached to the 11th Army (Wehrmacht) assigned to the Ukraine
and Crimean territory. Under the leadership of Reinhard Heydrich, Ohlendorf
assumed this new leadership role and held the title “Commissioner of the Chief of
the Security Police and the SD attached to the 11th Army”.252 Here, for ten months,
Ohlendorf commanded and enforced the murder of 91,000 Jews and partisans.
There are differing opinions as to why Ohlendorf received this particular
assignment, as he was one of the educated, high-ranking Nazi officials in charge of
AMT III- SD Inland, or national intelligence service. The unpopularity of the
previously mentioned public opinion reports, his affiliation with the
Anthroposophical society, general brutal honesty, steadfast opinionated character,
and personal criticism of Nazi colleagues are all reasons that contributed to the
transfer. Each of these motives alone seem more than sufficient to warrant the
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reassignment. Although Ohlendorf appealed the transfer process, he assumed
responsibility of Einsatzgruppe D, embarked on a six-week military training process,
and performed his leadership role in much the same way as every other
governmental and academic position he held previously: with dynamism and
excellence.253 However, in this case, the major difference was that the job entailed
being directly responsible for enacting military and governmental commands to
perform massive population liquidations.
This dissertation not only outlines the genocidal actions of Otto Ohlendorf as
leader of Einsatzgruppe D, but attempts to create a narrative of how and why he was
reassigned, as well as exploring from whom directives were initiated, how murder
was enacted, how his Einsatzgruppen were affected (according to testimony), and
how his leadership ended. This discussion raises questions about several curious
circumstances of Ohlendorf’s involvement in the Einsatzgruppen, as well as his
career motivations. Previous points in this paper point to significant factors of
motivation, including Ohlendorf’s zealous careerism, his anti-Semitic beliefs, and his
dedicated utopian radicalism. This chapter focuses on underlying issues addressing
how and why Ohlendorf was transferred, how his commitment to National Socialism
shaped his leadership of Einsatzgruppe D, and how his status as an Alter Kämpfer
influenced his career path.
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The Transfer
The difficulty Ohlendorf posed for the Reich with his public opinion reports
(Meldungen aus Dem Reich), is well known, as they displayed to the highest Nazi
officials an unwanted, unflattering, and unfavorable review of their performance,
rated by the German populace.254Popular criticism was expressed regarding
leadership styles, war-mongering, economic issues, policies in the east, and
character evaluations. According to his testimony, Ohlendorf claimed he was
repeatedly reprimanded (for continuing with the fault-finding reports), and felt he
was sent to the Einsatzgruppen as a punishment. However, because he was an Alter
Kämpfer, Himmler and Heydrich needed a devout loyalist they could trust to
perform the duties of leading the Einsatzgruppen. But, Ohlendorf and other
Einsatzgruppen leaders claimed Blutkitt (the bond of blood) in defense of their
collective responsibility in committing genocide. According to Michael Dudley and
Fran Gale, Blutkitt is the “collective commission of crimes contrary to one’s personal
values, confirmed extraordinary service in the greater cause, or sacred mission,
proving and reinforcing party allegiance and loyalty.”255 In other words, Blutkitt
was the sacrifice a Nazi careerist like Ohlendorf was expected to make. Since he was
an “old fighter” in the Party, he was most likely expected to willingly assume this
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role. Yet because he was an Alter Kämpfer, he probably could have refused the
transfer and been reprimanded only slightly. Although Ohlendorf’s career had not
prepared him to be a mass murderer per se, he claimed that Party allegiance
overrode his ability to decline his transfer. At the same time, Ohlendorf’s antiSemitic beliefs should not be discounted, as he was a true believer in National
Socialism. However, his careerist motivation was the most significant driving force
in taking the leadership role of the Einsatzgruppen. Psychiatrist and scholar Leo
Alexander described Blutkitt as “an age-old method used by criminal gangs
everywhere: that by making suspects of disloyalty clear themselves by participating
in a crime that would definitely and irrevocably tie them to the organization.”256
Essentially, this suggests that the Nazis demanded that Germans implicate
themselves in crimes so that they could not escape association with those crimes.
In the Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial 1945-1958: Atrocity, Law and
History, Hilary Earl delves deeply into the issues surrounding Ohlendorf’s transfer
from RSHA, AMT III (Hauptstrumführer) to the Einsatzgruppen forces.257 From age
18 and prior with his youth group in Hoheneggelsen, Ohlendorf was the
quintessential Nazi and National Socialism’s most fervent member and supporter.
This made him an ideal candidate to rise through the ranks, although he claimed
reluctance to directly participate in genocide, nor was he obedient to the leaders of
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the Party. In fact, Hilary Earl argues that his transfer to the Einsatzgruppen is not
surprising at all, especially as an Alter Kämpfer.258 She states that his transition
from Nazi economics to the Einsatzgruppen is a “good example of how the Nazis
were able to involve even the most free-thinking members of the Party into mass
murder.”259 To Earl, it is likely he was recruited because of his career ambition and
Alter Kämpfer loyalty, despite his continual open criticism of many aspects of
operation of the Nazi regime. Ohlendorf lived as an advocate for National Socialism,
and was constantly disappointed by how Party politics interfered with the will of
the people. Although there is no record of recruitment techniques, there is direct
evidence that Himmler personally selected his Einsatzgruppen leaders.260
To lead the Einsatzgruppen, Himmler and Heydrich sought out men who
were “excellent” and could carry out independent decision-making in the face of
mass murder. Their resumés were expected to include an ability to negotiate
between the Wehrmacht and the RSHA, to implement Reich directives, and to
“improvise in the face of unforeseeable difficulties and problems.”261 Ohlendorf was
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an ideal Nazi, whose resume demonstrated all of the traits Himmler and Heydrich
expected in an Einsatzgruppen leader, and an Alter Kämpfer.
According to Ohlendorf’s wife, he went to the front to redeem his reputation
with Himmler.262 That he desired to restore his standing (and further his career) by
going to the front is absolutely correct. The dynamics of the feud between Himmler
and Ohlendorf is certainly questionable, given that most of what is known of the
alleged feud came to light under the pressures of the trial. In An Uncompromising
Generation, Michael Wildt argues that our perception of what kind of person a killer
should be is in contrast to the view of Ohlendorf, the careerist, who probably saw
reassignment to an Einsatzgruppen as a positive professional move.263 Wildt adds
that anything Ohlendorf and others stated at their trials that indicates that this
transfer to the front was a punitive measure is, in his mind, a complete fabrication.
Like Wildt, George Browder asserts that Ohlendorf pushed the Blutkitt too far,
because he was rationalizing himself as a “brutalized executioner trying to explain
his own failure” and fear to decline the position.264 Although the careerist drive of
Ohlendorf and his colleagues certainly steered them toward the war front, they
were academically groomed, and probably believed that putting in their time

262

Höhne, Death’s Head, 356-357.

263

Wildt, Uncompromising Generation, 274.

264

George Browder, Hitler’s Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the
Nazi Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 157.

127

enacting genocide was the only way to impress their superiors and uphold their
Alter Kämpfer reputations.
Contrary to what historians like Earl have argued about Ohlendorf’s
reluctance in being transferred to the front, Ohlendorf and his wife Käthe were
particularly adamant that he was compelled by Himmler and Heydrich to assume
Einsatzgruppe D’s command. At different times, Ohlendorf dismissed his
involvement with the Einsatzgruppen as something that was not part of his career.
In her letter to David Irving, she refers to this period as the “10 months in service”
and is unconcerned with his actions. Rather, in writing a sort of résumé of her
husband’s career, she showcased the “good” he created “before” and “after” the ten
months.265 Likewise, when Ohlendorf was first interrogated by the British, he
initially did not offer any information about the Einsatzgruppen. After two separate
interrogation sessions, his infamous forthrightness about the Einsatzgruppen was
put forward only when the British interrogators found out that he was more than
simply a high-ranking Nazi official.266
Perhaps this was because Ohlendorf viewed his role in the murder of 90,000
people as normal, right, or dutiful Blutkitt. More likely is that he viewed these ten
months as an interruption in his RSHA career. Thus, in his mind, the Holocaust was
not part of his career, not a portion which propelled him into the elite and involved
intellectually challenging and fulfilling work. In his testimony, statements, and
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affidavits, Ohlendorf denied willingness to be transferred. However, it is unlikely
his post-Einsatzgruppen career would have thrived through various promotions (all
the way to Gruppenführer) had he truly displayed any significant objection to being
transferred to the front. Ohlendorf and his wife’s post-war claims of vengeance and
mistreatment by Himmler and Heydrich were most likely made to distance himself
from responsibility.
Although it is clear that Ohlendorf’s career benefitted from his transfer to the
east, there are aspects of his employment record that corroborate some of
Ohlendorf’s claims of unfairness from Nazi leaders. Hanno Sowade notes that
during Ohlendorf’s time with the SD (while he was simultaneously working at the
Kiel Institute for World Economics and Maritime Trade), in 1938 he was reduced to
volunteer or “honorary” duties for speaking out in favor of economic policies that
would benefit the middle class.267 This evidence demonstrates that although he held
the privileged status of an Alter Kämpfer, he was not completely immune to
reprimand. While on leave from his normal employment in the SD in 1934,
Ohlendorf was recruited to a lectureship at Kiel by Jens Jessen. Here he acquired
letters of recommendation to renew his leave of absence in order to commence his
lectures and research. However, he was told that he had exceeded the maximum
time away, and had to reapply to be a member of the SD, and for his license to
practice law.268 He was forced to leave the university prematurely, and once he
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returned to the SD, Ohlendorf was, according to Hanno Sowade, “left out in the
cold.”269 There was certainly tension, perhaps even resentment from Ohlendorf
when he resumed his position in the RSHA. According to Goldensohn’s interview
with Walther Funk, he said “I always had the feeling that Ohlendorf was spiritually
depressed…Ohlendorf must have been depressed on account of that experience…I
thought he had something in his soul which bothered him.”270 It is unclear whether
Funk was referring to before or after Ohlendorf’s time in the Einsatzgruppen. If
after, this statement could reflect a degree of unhappiness about overseeing the
horrific killings. However, Ohlendorf was most comfortable being transferred back
to the RSHA, and continued to promote middle-class economics while developing a
secret post-war economic plan.271 Ohlendorf’s work with middle-class economic
stimulation gained him popularity with union workers, however he became less
overtly critical of Reich leaders after being transferred to the front.
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In addition to feeling slighted by being forced to curtail his tenure at the
university, and to return to the Nazi political economy, Ohlendorf delved more
deeply into the public opinion reports. In September 1939, Ohlendorf was made
head of the RSHA AMT III (SD-Inland) in charge of all research and public opinion in
Germany. Sowade argued that Ohlendorf was an anomalous character in the Reich:
a National Socialist ideologue that was targeted for being critical of the Nazi party.
Ohlendorf was “troublesome in many respects” to this position.272 The problem
with this representation of Ohlendorf is that it does not include his Alter Kämpfer
status. Regardless of the criticism he gave or received, he was protected by his
membership. He just happened to have an arrogant, self-righteous personality,
serving the Reich while being critical of Himmler, Speer, and others who did not
adhere to what he deemed to be pure National Socialism. The public opinion reports
were designed to operate as an “early warning system” to demonstrate weaknesses
in the Reich, and their policies, through polling the public. The researchers were
members of the secret police and conducted the surveys in a way that Himmler
disliked. Ohlendorf said of Himmler’s opinion of him, “[to him] I was the
unbearable, humorless Prussian, an unsoldierly type, a defeatist, and damned
intellectual…Himmler disliked order…273 Of course this alleged description of
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Ohlendorf from Himmler was only given during Nuremberg testimony. Certainly,
there was bias inherent, but Sowade, Earl, and many other historians call on this
segment of testimony (and Ohlendorf’s description of Himmler’s character) to
demonstrate the possible feud. Sowade did argue that Himmler’s disdain for
Ohlendorf never resulted in his being forced to leave the SS.274 An example is the
testimony of Felix Kersten, Himmler’s private doctor, who also spoke of strife
between Ohlendorf and Himmler.
In addition to Nazi concepts of Blutkitt, Ohlendorf’s connection to the
Anthroposophical Society was another part of his self-defense, but only appears as
an afterthought. Established by Rudolf Steiner in 1922, Anthroposophy is a
Christian-based, humanistic belief system popular in Nazi Germany as an alternative
religion with ideas compatible with National Socialism.275 In 1933, the
Anthroposophical Society was banned, along with numerous other religious and
new-age societies, as part of the consolidation of the Volksgemeinschaft.276

274

Sowade, “Otto Ohlendorf,” 158.

275

Staudenmaier, Between Occultism, 105. For more information on aspects of the
Anthroposophical Society see also, Uwe Werner, Anthroposophen in der Zeit des
Nationalsozialismus: 1933-1945 (München: Oldenbourg, 1999). For the purposes of this essay, I
have kept an analysis of this particular society brief. The reader should be aware that interwar
Germany was a place where a great eruption of alternative belief systems occurred.
276

The Volksgemeinschaft was more than a “people’s community”. It was a Hitlerian
utopia; Germany would be racially unified in a single community of the people and the nation
superseded individual interests. This was all driven by massive propaganda techniques and
Hitler’s utopian vision was, in many aspects, indeed realized. For more information on the
Volksgemeinschaft, see George Mosse, Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the
Third Reich (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), Claudia Koonz, The Nazi
Conscience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), and Michael Wildt, Hitler’s
‘Volksgemeinschaft’ and the Dynamics of Racial Exclusion: Violence Against Jews in Provincial
Germany, 1919-1939 (Hamburg: Berghahn Books, 2007).

132

However, Interior Minister Frick temporarily reinstated the Anthroposophical
Society due to their belief in organic biodynamic farming, only to have the
organization banned again because of its threat to the successful chemical
industry.277 Although the association of the Nazis and the occult is well-known and
has been written about extensively, the Nazi Party was suspicious of other
alternative belief systems gaining strength in Germany. Anthroposophy posed a
greater problem for the Nazi party because lead party officials like Hess and
Ohlendorf advocated lenient treatment of this particular society, against the wishes
of Himmler and Heydrich.
Ohlendorf’s ties to Anthroposophy can be traced back to his childhood. His
older brother, Heinrich, joined the society in 1929.278 Throughout his adult life, he
was associated with the society, having chosen an anthroposophical doctor, Dr.
Werner Haverbeck, as his personal physician, personal and religious consultant in
Landsberg prison, confidant, and family consoler. In 1951, Dr. Haverbeck
performed the last rights and burial of Ohlendorf. According to his wife, Käthe,
Haverbeck even helped comfort her mother-in-law after Ohlendorf’s execution.279
In Käthe’s letter to David Irving, she refers to her husband as having “fought” for
Anthroposophy and that with his death, the society “had lost their protection.” She
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said this despite the end of the Nazi era, in order to point out how significant his
devotion to the society was, as well as to criticize the new system.
A high-ranking official being associated with Anthroposophism is significant
for two reasons. Not only was a group banned by the government as subversive and
at odds with Nazi beliefs, but additionally, the movement was also associated with
the Jews. In the beginning, Steiner’s vision of the society was much more utopian,
displaying a wide diversity. As more criticism amassed against Anthroposophy,
Steiner was forced to denounce Jewish membership and beliefs.280 Naturally, as the
Nazis slowly instituted Jewish bans and exclusions, this society was targeted.
Whatever were the ties to the Jewish faith and membership in the 1930s, Ohlendorf
was still a proponent of the society. This would definitely have incurred criticism
from Himmler and Heydrich as well. In a desperate attempt to clear her husband’s
name and reputation, Käthe Ohlendorf wrote to David Irving “he still fought for
them…both the Jews and the Anthroposophists.”281 This statement seems
exaggerated to make Ohlendorf appear as if he were a martyr for a cause. Käthe
goes on to write how it was a “good opportunity” for Bormann, Ley, and Heydrich to
make trouble for her husband. It is also noteworthy that in modern
Anthroposophical literature, Ohlendorf was named as a proponent of the belief
system, whereas in other Ohlendorf biographies, his association is downplayed.
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Reich leaders, like Heydrich, certainly took note of Ohlendorf’s Anthroposophical
ties, especially since the Reich banned their practice. If Himmler and Heydrich were
looking for motives to transfer Ohlendorf to the front, his questionable ties to the
Anthroposophical society did him no favors.
Was Ohlendorf’s reassignment to Einsatzgruppe D a disciplinary transfer?
The preceding discussion was constructed to point out the lack of a simple answer
to the question. Hanno Sowade discussed Ohlendorf’s steadfast, bullheaded
character, and problems with Himmler and Heydrich, but also points out that when
he was assigned to the Einsatzgruppen, he voluntarily stayed longer than any
Einsatzgruppen colleagues who took up their duties at the same time as he did.282 In
fact Sowade says he “emphatically refused” to leave Russia early, when offered an
opportunity.283 According to Sowade’s sources (letters from Ohlendorf to his wife
from the front), Ohlendorf felt “accomplished...” with a “feeling of being right”
concerning his transfer and actions there.284 Yet in the next paragraph, Sowade
argues that “the attempt to make him [Ohlendorf] more docile by involving him in
mass murder in the USSR had failed.”285 If the plan to transfer Ohlendorf was to
make him more submissive by sending him to the front, Himmler and Heydrich’s
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efforts were futile.286 Ohlendorf did not want to be transferred (or was bullied into
it), but the careerist complied, and excelled at it. He finally returned home a
decorated war hero who would be promoted to Lieutenant General (Gruppenführer)
by the end of the war. His career continued to flourish until his surrender on May
23, 1945.
Certainly, taking into account the public opinion reports, the alleged hostility
with Himmler and Heydrich, Blutkitt, the Anthroposophical society, and his
vocational trajectory, it is clear that there were complex circumstances surrounding
Ohlendorf’s transfer. Like Wildt, Earl and other historians have said that (on trial)
Ohlendorf was probably desperately trying to find any method to expunge guilt in
his Einsatzgruppen activities. However, downplaying his willingness to assume the
leadership of the Einsatzgruppen does not make career sense, especially for an Alter
Kämpfer. He knew this assignment would help his career; being transferred showed
he was able to improvise, demonstrate superior critical thinking, and implement
central directives.287 That is what Himmler and Heydrich wanted. Without
question, to an academic like Ohlendorf, inexperienced in participating in warfare or
genocide, the activities of the Einsatzgruppen weighed heavily on his psyche.
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Einsatzgruppen: Inception and Directives
The Einsatzgruppen arguably performed some of the most violent, heinous,
and horrific crimes of the entire Holocaust. Men, women, and children, Jews and
partisans alike were slaughtered in pogroms involving being shot and thrown into
ditches, en masse, or being loaded into gas vans where women and children were
slowly murdered over the course of ten to fifteen minutes. This section covers a
basic history of the Einsatzgruppen and details how Otto Ohlendorf’s position in the
Nazi party led him from being a desk-job intellectual to the leader of a mobile killing
squad that murdered 91,678 people. There are two main questions to be resolved
regarding the Einsatzgruppen. First, was there an execution order prior to
Operation Barbarossa? Second, why did the Reich pass on unclear directives to
minimally trained leaders like Ohlendorf, to brutally murder nearly two million
people?
Prior to September 1, 1939, the Einsatzgruppen, created by Reinhard
Heydrich (SS- Obergruppenführer), were specialized military units who operated
under control of the SS (Schutzstaffel).288 With the smaller subgroups,
Einsatzkommandos¸ the Einsatzgruppen were a paramilitary group designed to take
control of buildings, confiscate important documents, and question suspicious
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activities of people and groups.289 It was not until the preparation for Operation
Barbarossa that the nature of Einsatzgruppen morphed into the infamous killing
units who enacted mass murder in Soviet occupied territory. In “The
Einsatzgruppen,” Joseph Tenenbaum argued that prior to Barbarossa, partisan
opposition in areas where the Einsatzgruppen were assigned was directed by the
Wehrmacht, which had its own field police, and were constantly at odds with
Himmler’s “ambition to play general.”290 By 1941, the Einsatzgruppen were under
the direction of the RSHA (Reich Security Main Office), and Ohlendorf was AMT III,
SD-Inland, leader.291 Therefore, transferring Ohlendorf to Einsatzgruppe leadership
was not a complicated task.292
On September 27, 1939, the heads of the RSHA and Einsatzgruppen met to
discuss measures for engaging these units after the Wehrmacht swept through
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Poland. Heydrich, Eichmann, Ohlendorf and a dozen other officials discussed the
Führer’s approval to, among other things, relocate Jews and Gypsies, ghettoize the
Jews, and make itinerant laborers of the Poles. From this meeting, the minutes
prove there were set goals, but how they were to be achieved and what the specific
tasks were remained unclear.293 However, the Einsatzgruppen acted on them and
did so with the unsaid approval of the Reich leadership. What changes dramatically
with the invasion of the Soviet Union is that there are clear orders to kill: the
Commissar Order and the Barbarossa Order. The Wannsee Conference also made it
clear that the orders were coming from on high. Despite understanding these
directives, the act of genocide remained largely improvisational, and the
Einsatzgruppen leaders were given little guidance regarding technique and logistics.
Having already discussed the conditions of Ohlendorf’s transfer, he and the
other Barbarossa Einsatzgruppen leaders were sent to the police academy in the
town of Pretzsch for training prior to their full transfer to the front. Käthe
Ohlendorf wrote that her husband “…who was not a soldier…” went through a sixweek training.294 Richard Rhodes pieced together training accounts, describing the
period as three weeks during which novices fired a weapon, listened to lectures, and
not much more.295 He points out that since the men had to be inoculated and were
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weak from fever, rigorous training could not occur at this time. Near the end of the
“training”, the assignments were given and the men, including the Einsatzgruppen
leaders, found out where they would be deployed. Ohlendorf received notice he
would command Einsatzgruppe D, attached to the Eleventh Army in Bessarabia
(southwestern Soviet Union, including Crimea, Simferopol, and Sevastopol). After
June 1942, he was succeeded by SS Colonel Walther Bierkamp.296
By 1941, there were four Einsatzgruppen (A, B, C, D) that were in charge of
following the Wehrmacht, as Operation Barbarossa spread the Germans eastward.
They were ordered to clear the German-occupied Soviet territory of Jews, partisans,
Commissars, and other subversive groups. Each Einsatzgruppe was assigned to
clear territory, north to south (A-D), and liquidate the inhabitants. With assistance
from local police, paramilitary groups, anti-Semitic citizens, etc.… the
Einsatzgruppen rounded up the wanted persons, and transported them to another
location. Here, men were shot, military execution style, and thrown into preexcavated mass graves. As Operation Barbarossa expanded, so did mass murder by
the Einsatzgruppen. Within six months of the invasion, the killing included women
and children, employing gas vans to disastrous effect. Pogroms like Babi Yar messily
and chaotically annihilated more than 33,000 people in two days.297
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After the Wannsee Conference, the “Final Solution” became official Reich
policy, and the Einsatzgruppen forces were increased to accompany Operation
Barbarossa. Although historians had previously given much importance to the
January 20, 1942 meeting at Wannsee, there is little evidence to support its
uniqueness. The Einsatzgruppen had already been active for nearly eight months.
The realization of this fact has generated new questions concerning the actual
purpose of the conference. For Mark Roseman, Wannsee changed little regarding
the Einsatzgruppen or the Holocaust. It did outline numbers, and documented the
systemization of killing and procedures at camps and on the eastern front. For
Heydrich and Eichmann, both present at the meeting, which they initiated and
controlled, it also provided confirmation that the fifteen leaders from different
offices and divisions supported the transition from mass murder to genocide.298
Already in place were directives for the Einsatzgruppen. Unfortunately,
documenting the directives has become a contentious matter, prompting historians
to take sides.
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The debate over intent and function had dominated the historiography for
nearly two decades. As Michael Wildt points out, Goldhagen revisited the question
of whether the men murdered “because they had to or because they were allowed
to”.299 In the case of Ohlendorf, Goldhagen argues that Ohlendorf killed Jews
because he was an eager, violent anti-Semite.300 While there is no question he was
anti-Semitic, it is doubtful his desire was to commit the atrocities themselves; at
least until he was transferred to the Einsatzgruppen, and he implemented orders to
enact murder. The crux of the intentional/functional debate is the question of
whether Hitler was at the center of genocide or whether it was improvised as it
unfolded. This debate has already been previously addressed and analyzed in the
historiographical section. Without reexamining the entire debate, in brief, it is
centered on orders and historians grouped into two extremes. One camp argues
that there was a Führer order from the beginning. The other maintains that “the
Holocaust was the result of chaos and improvisation.” Although today there is a
historical center at which both extremes meet, agreeing that there probably was a
Führer order (or at least intent), but escalating the Holocaust was a result of
improvisation. Among those who improvised by enforcing and interpreting these
orders were people like Ohlendorf.
The Einsatzgruppen’s activities are well-known and researched, thanks in
great part to the very detailed records the Nazis kept. This did not inhibit Ohlendorf
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and other defendants from contesting validity of the numbers at the Nuremberg
Trials.301 Calling statistics into question was a tactic used by Ohlendorf to try and
argue that the reports were not as accurate as they seemed. When questioned, he
argued that the number of casualties had been exaggerated, but was able to come up
with a figure of 90,000, which is startlingly close to the figures in the reports. He
stated “the figures which I saw of other Einsatzgruppen are considerably larger…I
believe that to a large extent the figures submitted by the other Einsatzgruppen
were exaggerated.”302 While on trial, he deduced that because his figures were
lower than those presented by the other three Einsatzgruppen, they must have
inflated their casualty numbers. The accuracy of Ohlendorf’s numbers was
corroborated in the Operational Situational Reports, U.S.S.R.303 These reports were
sent to the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, where the compiled
numbers were checked by each Einsatzgruppen commander from information
gathered by each Einsatzkommando and Sonderkommando. Meticulous at
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recordkeeping, each commando reported to their Einsatz division, and reports were
delivered by radio, teletype, and in written summaries to Berlin.304 In Berlin, they
were evaluated by RSHA AMT IV Office for Communism. According to Ronald
Headland, Ohlendorf’s estimate of 90,000 was remarkably close to the 91,678, noted
in OSR 190 and submitted as evidence at Nuremberg.305 Where he was trying to
show exaggeration, his object was to demonstrate how other Einsatzgruppen were
not as meticulous as his division. He also clarified that he, himself, did not keep a
tally, but recalled the number 90,000 from reading the reports compiled from his
Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos. His purpose may have been to steer
responsibility downward, instead of demonstrating trust in his section leaders to
report with accuracy. In this Operational Situational Report, number 190 dated
April 8, 1942, it reads:
Location: Simferopol…there are no more Jews, Krimchaks, or Gypsies” in Crimea. It gives
statistics from the second half of March with a breakdown of those killed by category and
says “to date, 91,678 have been shot.306

OSR 190 is the report that stated the total number killed under Ohlendorf’s
command; other trial evidence aside, this is the document that officially condemned
him to death. The Einsatzgruppen were responsible for an estimated 1,400,000 of
all Holocaust casualties, although this figure varies from one million to two million,
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depending on what groupings and regions are included in the death toll.307In The
Destruction of the European Jews, Raul Hilberg points out that at particular times
“these formations [Einsatzgruppen and local police forces] seemed to justify their
existence with numbers.”308 By Hilberg’s calculation, Ohlendorf’s command of
Einsatzgruppe D killed approximately 6.4% of all Einsatzgruppen casualties. While
other defendants may have tried to deny their statistics, at the trial, Ohlendorf
casually mentioned what he thought were the number killed in his command with
relative ease and accuracy.309 More on Ohlendorf’s behavior and testimony during
the trial will be discussed in a later chapter; however, the way in which he
nonchalantly conveyed that he was responsible for murdering 90,000 Jews and
partisans astounded the courtroom. According to Otto Ohlendorf, and all except for
one Einsatzgruppen Trial defendant, there was a clear order that the job of the task
forces was to eliminate Jews and partisans on the eastern front, following the
Wehrmacht’s advance through Operation Barbarossa. In “The Tasks of the SS
Einsatzgruppen,” historian Alfred Streim analyzed testimony of defendants
concerning directives. He concludes that there was no order in the beginning, but
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there was some procedure in place for enacting murder.310 Evolving policies began
with the call to eliminate draft-aged men, and quickly escalated to orders to kill any
man, woman, and child of particular ethnic and religious identities, as well as any
person deemed to be a Reich enemy. Fear of revenge for those killed was the
defense’s way to justify murdering women and children after Barbarossa.311
Specifics on murdering women and children will be addressed later in this
dissertation.
Ohlendorf’s affidavits, pre-trial, and trial testimonies indicate that from the
beginning, there was a standing order for “liquidation.”312 Ohlendorf, an
experienced lawyer himself, possibly had two goals in adopting the “we were
following a clear military directive” defense. Firstly, Ohlendorf’s defense strategy
was to distance himself from Reich orders. He did this by testifying that soldiers do
not question orders. Secondly, he assumed he would be given a military trial, or at
least treated as a soldier carrying out orders. To his mortification and chagrin, this
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In the British Intelligence Reports of POW interrogations (CSDIC), there is the first
documented case of Ohlendorf claiming there was a standing order, preceding his assignment to
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was not the case.313 Thanks to the testimony of Erich von Manstein, commander of
the 11th Army, and the myth of the “Clean Wehrmacht”, paramilitary groups like the
SS or Einsatzgruppen were tried much more hastily and severely punished.314 If the
Wehrmacht were aware of the activities and directives of the paramilitary groups,
their leaders and soldiers pretended they had no knowledge.315 Presumably there
was knowledge of particular objectives or directives given that, in the case of
Einsatzgruppe D, they were attached to the 11th Army. The Army would have to
know why, if not how and by whom, Einsatzgruppen orders were implemented.
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The goal of examining the disputed relationship between the Wehrmacht and
the Einsatzgruppen is to demonstrate not only how Ohlendorf and the
Einsatzgruppen believed they were essentially military personnel acting on orders,
but to point out how the Reich’s inability to accurately define roles in the war and
the Holocaust created the need for frequent improvisation. In this case, how the
Einsatzgruppen were defined by Himmler and Heydrich, either to the groups
themselves or to the Army, was done so poorly that it caused Ohlendorf a great deal
of confusion. He was given military rank and commendation; however, he was tried
as a civilian perpetrator. This demonstrates how ill-defined the Einsatzgruppen
were, even to its own leaders. Unfortunately for Ohlendorf, his defense strategy
backfired, and he was not granted the military trial he hoped for. But the
relationship between the Einsatzgruppen and the Wehrmacht was, indeed,
cooperative. In at least one documented case (Kamianets-Podilskyi, Ukraine) the
Wehrmacht “systematically cooperated” with the Einsatzgruppen to destroy Jewish
communities.316
Process and Procedure
Conducting mass murder was similar throughout each of the Einsatzgruppen
divisions. There were improvised aspects involving the killing of women and
children that Ohlendorf testified to utilizing, such as employing gas vans
(Gaswagen), ordered by Himmler in 1942.317However, in towns that were to be
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cleared out, the methods were similar throughout Einsatzgruppen territory. Under
the pretext of resettlement, notices were posted for the Jewish population to meet at
a certain point with a day and time to be registered, to have stock taken of their
valuables, and to await relocation. On January 3, 1946, Ohlendorf described how the
killings were carried out to American prosecutor Colonel J. H. Amen. Although he
testified only to have been present at two of Einsatzgruppe D’s mass liquidations, he
said for “purposes of inspection,” he relayed details of other round-ups:
COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal in detail how an individual mass execution was
carried out?
OHLENDORF: A local Einsatzkommando attempted to collect all the Jews in its area by
registering them. This registration was performed by the Jews themselves.
COL. AMEN: On what pretext, if any, were they rounded up?
OHLENDORF: On the pretext that they were to be resettled. After the registration the Jews
were collected at one place; and from there they were later transported to the place of
execution, which was, as a rule, an antitank ditch or a natural excavation. The executions
were carried out in a military manner, by firing squads under command. They were
transported to the place of execution in trucks, always only as many as could be executed
immediately. In this way it was attempted to keep the span of time from the moment in
which the victims knew what was about to happen to them until the time of their actual
execution as short as possible. They were obliged to take off their outer garments
immediately before the execution. The bodies were buried in the antitank ditch or
excavation. The unit leaders or the firing-squad commanders had orders to see to this and, if
need be, finish them off themselves. All valuables were confiscated at the time of the
registration or the rounding up and handed over to the Finance Ministry, either through the
RSHA or directly.318

As told by Ohlendorf, this part of the process was similar for all the
Einsatzgruppen. Prior to entire communities being eliminated following Barbarossa,
the earlier directives were still valid and used, but expanded to a level with little
room for survival. Ohlendorf’s description of an Einsatzgruppen mass extermination
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incident is aligned with survivor testimony. Dina Pronicheva, a Babi Yar victim,
testified to the process occurring in a similar fashion to Ohlendorf ’s version. Other
accounts describe Einsatzgruppen perpetration in full gruesome detail. “The
execution area was a terrible sight. The ground round the well was covered in
blood; there were also bits of brain on the ground which the victims had to step
in…but it wasn’t at that point that they first realized what lay ahead for them. They
could already hear the shooting and screaming from the place where they were kept
waiting.”319 A member of Einsatzgruppe C, instructed to perform his first killing
session said “…I only managed to shoot about five times. I began to feel unwell, I felt
as though I was in a dream. Afterwards I was laughed at because I couldn’t shoot
anymore.”320 An account from Anton Heidborn (Sonderkommando 4a) said after a
mass execution “the next few days were spent smoothing out banknotes belonging
to the Jews that had been shot…totaled millions…It was packed up in sacks and sent
off somewhere.”321 Having eyewitness accounts proves significant to studying the
Einsatzgruppen for figuring out systemization, directives, and mechanization of the
Holocaust on the eastern front. More importantly is the insight it provides into the
psychology of killers.
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The mission of the Einsatzgruppen did evolve from its inception to the
invasion of the Soviet Union. What carried over from the Einsatzgruppen
procedures of 1939 in Poland was the shooting of civilians. In the beginning,
political groups were targeted in order to make the regime, town or village
collapse.322 The Einsatzgruppen of 1941 still singled out political functionaries,
intellectuals, and prisoners of war, but in a telegram from Heydrich, dated 2 July
1941, he listed the main targets of execution and mentioned the elimination of other
“dangerous elements.” What were dangerous elements? Snyder, in Bloodlands,
argues that the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando groups had difficulty
recognizing Soviet military insignia to eliminate the prisoners of war as directed.323
Snyder also analyzes how from the time of the successful invasion of the Soviet
Union, the task of the Einsatzgruppen had been to kill Soviet elites and quicken the
Soviet collapse, without specific directives to eliminate Jews.324 However,
Ohlendorf’s argument concerning the orders is incorrect because by August 1941,
Himmler endorsed the complete extermination of Jewish communities.
There was a pre-existing directive to eliminate large Jewish populations.
Likewise, many historians argue that there was an order from the beginning and
that it most likely evolved into the systematic mass extermination of all Jews and
partisans. If there had not been any order prior to Barbarossa, the Einsatzgruppen
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were sent to follow the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front for what reason? This
makes little sense. For men like Ohlendorf, present as RSHA AMT III leader at the
1939 Heydrich “protocol” meeting, this was already known. Ohlendorf testified, “on
the question of Jews and Communists, the Einsatzgruppen and the commanders of
the Einsatzkommandos were orally instructed before their mission.”325 Although
there was no written Einsatzgruppen order that said “eliminate all Jews from
German-occupied areas”, the anti-Semitic quest for Lebensraum was understood and
implemented, beginning in 1938. Götz Aly argues that Lebensraum, clearing out
German-occupied areas to make room for the ever-growing Aryan population, was
the precursor of mass murder. The ultimate goal was to eliminate social
competition and provide relief for the German people.326 The quest for Lebensraum
became focused against the Jews, escalating into the Holocaust.
There are numerous details about the Einsatzgruppen killings that are clear.
For instance, there are detailed reports of Einsatzgruppen movements, and
documents directing the groups to eliminate political threats and prisoners of war.
Also documented were the numbers of casualties by city, region, race and religion,
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and how each Einsatzgruppe followed as attachments to the Wehrmacht in
Operation Barbarossa. Despite what Ohlendorf and other defendants said of
number exaggerations, the Einsatzgruppen were extremely effective. However, it
remains unclear to what extent the actions of each Einsatzgruppe were improvised,
and how much of the murder was mandated by the Reich. Ohlendorf’s testimony
revealed that there was no real, set way to carry out the murder of Reich “enemies.”
In meetings, Heydrich gave logistical suggestions and the leaders were in contact
with each other throughout their assignments, so there is no doubt someone
developed a pattern for mass murder at some point prior to the Soviet invasion.
This included digging a large trench, lining up victims at the edge of the grave or
lying on the ground, and then shooting victims in the neck.
Einsatzgruppe D: Committing Genocide in the Holocaust
Between June 1941 and June 1942, Ohlendorf commanded Einsatzgruppe D
where he coordinated and implemented the murder of 91,678 Jews and partisans.
The following summary of Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppe D was given at the trial...
…During the first nine months of Ohlendorf's year in command of Einsatzgruppe D, this force
destroyed more than 90,000 human beings. These thousands, killed at an average rate of 340
per day, were variously denominated Jews, gypsies, Asiatics, and "undesirables". Between 16
November and 15 December 1941, this Einsatzgruppe killed an average of 700 human
beings per day for the whole 30-day period…327

Under Ohlendorf’s command, Einsatzgruppe D was assigned to the southern Ukraine
and attached to the Eleventh Army and, as such, conducted liquidations in major
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cities along the route eastward. From Piatra-Neamt, Romania, Einsatzgruppe D
launched a two-fronted assault going north through Černovitce Mogilev-Podalski,
meeting the EK and SK at Odessa and Nikolayev. There, they branched through
Ukraine to Stalino and cleared out Yalta and Simferopol in the Crimean Peninsula.
The most significant number of casualties occurred at the major cities, while the
smaller towns were likewise purged along the way. Although under Ohlendorf’s
command, Einsatzgruppe D killed 90,000 people, they killed fewer people than the
other Einsatzgruppen. This is likely because the invading Wehrmacht had cleared
the southern Ukraine before the Einsatzgruppen were deployed.
Historian Andrej Angrick has written the most comprehensive study of
Einsatzgruppe D in Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: die Einsatzgruppe D in der
sü dlichen Sowjetunion 1941 – 1943. He focuses on details of the 600 men in this task
force, which he calls “badly understaffed,” and discusses unit selection, ideology,
structure, and murder.328 Most importantly, Angrick shows that although their task
was murder, they were not given much direction as to how to execute the so-called
“Final Solution,” and the shootings were mostly improvised. Einsatzgruppe D
formed Sonderkommando (SK10a and 10b) and Einsatzkommando (EK11a, 11b, and
12) to spread out from the battlefront to the rear of the Army. The SK and EK
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groups also found the time to comb through asylums and hospitals to liquidate
handicapped or mentally ill men, women, and children.329
Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppe D also performed mass liquidations on scales as
large as Babi Yar, although not necessarily as quickly. While the total for
Ohlendorf’s command was 90,000, there were massive executions at Piatra-Neamt
(Romania), and Simferopol (Crimea); 35,782 were killed at Nikolayev (Ukraine),
military execution-style, between September 16th and 30th 1941. Ohlendorf faced
many challenges with his Einsatzgruppe division, namely the distinction between
Crimean Jewish communities.
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In Crimea, the Ashkenazis, Krimchaks and Karaites were, for the most part,
resettled groups which had origins in Southern Russia and Central Asia, and held
anti-Communist beliefs.331 There was so much confusion over how to appropriately
identify these Crimean Jewish groups that Ohlendorf wrote to Berlin to temporarily
exempt them until the Reich could determine how to deal with them.332 By
December 1941, Berlin had written back, particularly regarding the Karaites, who
“have nothing in common with the Jews except the confession.”333 This answer
arrived after an incredibly detailed investigation of the ethnic history and migration
of each group was compiled by the Reich.334 Warren Green argues that preferential
treatment was given to the Karaites, who were evacuated as a Soviet-Turkic group,
and notes that five to six hundred Karaites served in the Wehrmacht.335 The
Askenazis and Krimchaks were eliminated, but the Karaites received a dispensation
from the Nazis because the old tsarist system recognized them as non-Jewish.336
Both Ohlendorf’s issues with the Crimean Jews and how the Reich dealt with
identification was bizarre. The Reich expended tremendous effort in determining
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ethnic origins of the Crimean Jews, and although the Karaites had converted to
Judaism centuries earlier, they were given a free pass because some of the
population enlisted in volunteer units with the Tatars.337 Even so, Green notes that
despite records of Crimea being judenrein (clean of Jews), German reports show
some Askenazis and Krimchaks survived the pogroms and lived in hiding. He views
contradictions in data as indicative of the need for further research. One solution to
the question of why particular time was spent sparing the Karaites is that, among
other counter-examples, the Germans took extra consideration for “negative
repercussions” of murdering ethnic groups who held allegiance to Germany.338
In the three years after Ohlendorf’s tenure with Einsatzgruppe D was
finished, the Red Army slowly advanced into Crimea, and the Karaites had to face
the wrath of the Soviets for collusion with the Germans.339 Uncertainty over the
ethnic origins of these particular groups troubled Ohlendorf, the efficient careerist;
the Germans were “baffled” as to how to deal with the “Islamized” population of
Jews in Crimea.340 For instance, the Tatars practically welcomed the Germans as
liberators. Crimean Muslim groups fought alongside Ohlendorf and Einsatzgruppe D
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against the Soviets.341 Their language was not Yiddish, Hebrew, or Russian, nor did
they appear to the Einsatzgruppe to dress like Jews or practice the Jewish religion.
Additionally, none of the other Einsatzgruppen had to deal with this particular
problem, so Ohlendorf was left to initially improvise on unclear Reich orders.342
Aside from Ohlendorf’s problems distinguishing between ethnic groups in Crimea,
there were instances of exemptions given to particular individuals. In an extensive
part of his testimony, Ohlendorf was questioned about working through the city of
Nikolaev where there were numerous Jewish farmers. He had made a
determination that these particular farmers need not be liquidated, as they proved
specifically valuable, saying in his defense:
I considered it more correct not to kill these Jews because the contrary would be achieved by
this, namely, in the economic system of this country everything would be upset, which would
have its effect on the operation of the Wehrmacht as well.343

As the prosecution pushed Ohlendorf to further explain himself, Judge Michael
Musmanno tried to point out a contradiction in Ohlendorf’s leadership and
character. He was in charge of Jewish mass murder, but made the choice to exempt
a group of farmers. The economic expert had justified to himself that these
producers were essential to the survival of the Army in Crimea. Perhaps it was
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because Ohlendorf was raised in a peasant farm family, and his upbringing made
him more aware of their necessity. Either way, the court rightfully asserted a
paradox in Ohlendorf’s leadership, eventually leading to Judge Musmanno calling
Ohlendorf “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.”344
Women and Children
Some of the most heinous Einsatzgruppen activities concerned the treatment
of women and children. When Ohlendorf was questioned about the necessity of
killing women and children, he clearly stated that he found it reasonable and selfevident that German forces had to murder the dependents of enemies of the Reich
so as to protect the German nation. Ohlendorf, husband and father of five children,
tried to explain how he justified murdering women and children:
I believe that it is very simple to explain if one starts from the fact that this order [of Hitler]
did not try and achieve security [temporarily] but also permanent security, because the
children would grow up, and surely being the children of parents who had been killed, they
would constitute a danger no smaller than that of the parents.345

Angrick adds that the Freikorps of WWI expressed the same sentiment, and to them,
murdering Jewish Bolshevik offspring was “a prophylactic act of national selfdefense in the face of future menace.”346 This was not a novel way of thinking by the
time Ohlendorf and the Einsatzgruppen had to deal with the prospect of murdering
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children. However, the emotional strain felt by Einsatzgruppen soldiers was
something Ohlendorf considered when he said “…I never sanctioned shootings by
individuals…I always gave orders for several people to shoot simultaneously, in
order to avoid any individual having to take direct, personal responsibility.”347 The
Reich dealt with this problem by employing Gaswagen, gas vans.
Ohlendorf’s testimony revealed that gas vans were sent to the
Einsatzgruppen in early 1942, on Himmler’s orders. They were “just like a box car”
with no windows, heavy doors, and able to hold fifteen to thirty people.348
According to Ohlendorf, this method was utilized to ease the burden of soldiers
personally having to kill women and children execution-style. This is significant, as
it reveals that white-collar Nazi officials like Himmler seemed completely out of
touch with the actual psychological effects troops experienced when committing
genocide, let alone recognizing any effect on the people being murdered. Likewise,
if Ohlendorf had not been transferred to the front, he would have undoubtedly
thought the same way as Himmler. Ohlendorf claimed that Himmler issued the
order for killing in gas vans to lessen the trauma for victims and soldiers alike,
where “women and children were not to be exposed to the mental strain of the
executions; and thus, the men of the Kommandos, mostly married men, should not
be compelled to aim at women and children.”349 He described the details as such:
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The actual purpose of these vans could not be seen from the outside. They looked like closed
trucks, and were so constructed that at the start of the motor, gas was conducted into the
van causing death in 10 to 15 minutes. The vans were loaded with the victims and driven to
the place of burial, which was usually the same as that used for the mass executions. The
time needed for transportation was sufficient to insure the death of the victims. They were
told that they were to be transported to another locality. [It took] about 10 to 15 minutes [to
be killed]; the victims were not conscious of what was happening to them. [They held] about
15 to 25 persons. The vans varied in size.350

Ohlendorf later argued in affidavits and testimony that the gas vans were not
reliable, and would often malfunction. To avoid the stress of his soldiers having to
see the deceased victims before burial, the clean-up was left to local police groups
and volunteers.
Therefore, the Reich transferred “specialists in extermination by gassing”
like August Becker, Ph.D., a chemist in the RSHA, to inspect the use of gas in largescale operations.351 He said that in 1941 and after, the Einsatzgruppen were
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“complaining” about the stress of employing firing squad shootings. “I know that a
number of members of these squads were themselves committed to mental asylums
and for this reason a new and better method of killing had to be found.” He flew to
Einsatzgruppe D to meet with Ohlendorf in January 1942, staying for three months
to observe the use of the gas vans in Nikolaev and Simferopol. At that meeting,
Becker said “I gave orders that all men should stand as far away as possible from the
van during the gassings, so that their health would not be damaged by any escaping
gases.” Understandably, the vans emitted lethal toxins to the outside, and anyone
within a certain range could be harmed and suffer permanent damage. Dr. Becker
reported that the men operating the vans suffered from headaches and trauma
(post-traumatic stress) when they unloaded the vans themselves. After his
inspection, he reported back to Berlin and “voiced criticism about the fact that the
offenders had not been gassed but had been suffocated because the operators had
set the engine incorrectly. I told him that people had vomited and defecated.”352
Ohlendorf was critical about the apparently complicated use of gas vans, and
showed resentment for the Reich deploying them to his division as a “fix” for
emotional stress and trauma for not only his soldiers, but the victims. He stated that
the gas vans would produce too much mental strain, for “the picture presented by
the corpses and probably because certain functions of the body had taken place
leaving the corpses lying in filth,” his men would be traumatized.353 He much
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preferred military-style executions in which individual soldiers had no contact with
the victim; they fired together and thus, followed orders and were freed of feeling
guilt. Heinz Höhne argued that the worst possible scenario would have been an
uproar by the victims, with soldiers forced into “firing wildly” into the crowd with
chaos ensuing.354 Ohlendorf’s job was to control the conditions of execution to
maintain calm for victim and executioner alike. This did not include having to
perform maintenance on faulty gas vans or unloading them, which revealed the
“moment of truth from which Ohlendorf wished to save them.”355
What Ohlendorf’s experience with the gas vans reveals is twofold. The way
he enacted genocide demonstrates the typical efficiency with which he conducted
himself in other, more ordinary, government and academic jobs. He preferred the
execution-style tactic of killing as a way to get the job done as quickly and
mechanically as possible. The second issue exposed here is a sense of responsibility
toward his troops, rarely seen elsewhere. He appeared to care for the well-being of
his troops, not only to make sure they killed Jews and partisans, but also to ensure
that they were spared from experiencing more emotionally traumatizing events,
such as cleaning up the bodies of dead women and children murdered in the back of
gas vans. To preserve order, and perhaps his own sanity, Ohlendorf oversaw a
system designed to create the calmest possible scenario for victim and soldier alike.
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Granted, corralling innocent people, requiring them to undress, forcing them to lie
on top of the already piled up corpses, and then executing them created no calm
whatsoever. But for Ohlendorf, keeping the victims unaware of their fate until the
very last moment was essential for him to establish and sustain efficiency.
Himmler did not concern himself with how the executions were carried out,
even if there was no tangible way to control them. Einsatzgruppen soldiers were
merely told that there were orders, and they were to be obeyed. It was in
Ohlendorf’s best interest to instill in his men how necessary it was to their own
survival to conduct genocide. Thinking about how a person could participate in
mass murder, not to mention kill women and children, historian Andrej Angrick
asserts, “…to ask such people to understand their own doubts about the legality and
appropriateness of the executions was beyond the mental horizons of many lower
ranks.”356 Ohlendorf was well aware of this and, in his mind, made the welfare of his
soldiers of high importance when conducting genocide.
Conclusion
During Ohlendorf’s leadership of Einsatzgruppe D, he demonstrated similar
form and function as with his other efficient work in the Nazi government; in other
words, the Dr. Jekyll persona. But the Mr. Hyde persona is shown by the fact that
mass murder is not typical for a careerist. The conditions under which he was
transferred, similar to those of the other Einsatzgruppen leaders, provide insight
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into Ohlendorf’s motivations and mentality. He claimed to have twice refused this
transfer, but in the end, benefitted greatly from it with all of the promotions an Alter
Kämpfer should receive. Ohlendorf’s case proves there was a communication
breakdown seen in ill-defined directives leading to improvised killing tactics. It
seems the SS was far more interested in numbers reported, than in how precisely
and in which ways their unclear orders were enacted. However, Ohlendorf’s
association with the Anthroposophical society, personal and professional problems
with Himmler and Heydrich, and the ill will created by his public opinion reports,
despite being potentially legitimate reasons for the Reich wanting to send Ohlendorf
away, are all based on circumstantial evidence. Ohlendorf’s testimony and affidavits
follow a distinct line of argument concerning his alleged disdain for being sent to the
east. It is unclear to what degree he did not want the transfer, and which actual
steps he took to avoid it. This information concerning his transfer was addressed at
the Trial, and knowing that, it is imperative to look at a broader context, beyond his
testimony. Examining the circumstances under which Ohlendorf was transferred
shows that he was needed in the east, he was efficient, and was the ultimate
careerist, willing to do anything for a promotion. His loyalty, particularly as an Alter
Kämpfer, meant he was committed to the cause; this devotion overrode any other
priorities.
Significantly, this study reveals another level of allowing the Einsatzgruppen
(and military commanders) a fair amount of initiative in trying to attain overarching
goals. The directives communicated to the Einsatzgruppen were ambiguous, and
often unclear, leaving much room for improvisation. While the Wannsee Conference
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provided a justification for perpetuating the so-called Final Solution, the way in
which it unfolded for the Einsatzgruppen was much more problematic for its
leaders. For example, Ohlendorf and other Nazis on trial claimed there were
unwritten orders to which they were bound, and enacting mass murder was
definitely improvised and evolved over a period of time. Looking at Ohlendorf’s
time in the Einsatzgruppen, it is clear that he, like the other leaders, was
inexperienced with regard to military training and tactics, despite their six-week
training at Pretzsch.357 Ohlendorf claimed that “in the presence of all the assembled
Einsatzgruppe and Sonderkommando commanders [he] protested loud and clear
against the order for mass execution” at Pretzsch.358 Although this is doubtful, on
trial Ohlendorf tried to capitalize on the persona created by the adjutants, that of the
cantankerous, oppositional, stubborn Ohlendorf. Yet, the Reich saw his transfer and
that of his colleagues in the RSHA as an essential part of their careers, especially
someone like Ohlendorf who already enjoyed a position of great privilege as an Alter
Kämpfer. This fact indicates the contrary to his alleged protesting “loud and clear”
against mass murder. So, true to his character, Ohlendorf reluctantly ascended to
Einsatzgruppe D where, like his careerist objectives in the Nazi government, he
excelled and successfully performed his “duties,” clearing the southern Ukraine for
the Reich. He was so successful, upon his return to the RSHA, the Alter Kämpfer
ascended through promotions all the way to SS Gruppenführer (Major General).
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Chapter 5:
‘Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde’ on Trial
In 1946, Otto Ohlendorf first officially took the stand as the key defendant in
a set of subsequent Nuremberg Trials bearing his name, Case 9, The United States of
America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al; also known as the “Einsatzgruppen Trials.”359 To
Ohlendorf’s surprise, the British Allied forces who accepted his surrender on May
23, 1945, were very interested in investigating his position in the Reich. These trials
were instrumental in unveiling his leadership in Einsatzgruppe D. Initially,
Ohlendorf did not offer any information on his career with the Einsatzgruppen,
although eventually his affidavits revealed that he was responsible for the death of
91,678 people. The trial has been extensively analyzed, most recently by Hilary
Earl. This chapter will not focus on procedure, but rather on issues central to
understanding Nazi Germany and its war crimes, such as how racial policy became a
means to defend enacting the Holocaust. The trial showcased Ohlendorf’s deep
ideological commitment to National Socialism. In his own mind, he died a martyr for
the cause.
Chief Justice Michael A. Musmanno’s characterization of Ohlendorf as “Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” reflects important aspects of Ohlendorf’s character. His life as
an intellectual academic led him to a privileged career with the Reich. However, the
fact that he was on trial, composed, clear, and never faltering in the face of being
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condemned to death for war crimes and crimes against humanity forever changed
his legacy. Dr. Jekyll was the National Socialist ideologue who believed in reform
and success for Germany. Mr. Hyde was the murderous role he assumed when he
commanded the Einsatzgruppen and led 90,000 innocent people to be slaughtered.
However, Ohlendorf’s ideological commitment and participation in the Holocaust
were closely connected, and intertwined with his loyalty to the party. On June 7,
1951, after nearly six years in Allied captivity, he was sentenced to death by hanging
for directing the mass murders committed by Einsatzgruppe D.360
It is important to highlight that Ohlendorf is well-known as a trial defendant
and perpetrator of the Holocaust because legal proceedings and the trial itself have
been extensively analyzed. Indeed, this is the aspect of Ohlendorf’s life that is most
widely referenced, in part because of how easily accessible his affidavits and
testimony are. Transcripts have been digitized by the National Archives and
institutions like the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Yad
Vashem, and the Jewish Virtual Library. Each have website sections where digitized
copies of original documents exist for anyone to peruse. In the present digital age, a
simple internet search of Ohlendorf’s name will yield real trial footage on YouTube,
as well as other resources in questionable forums. Ohlendorf at Nuremberg has
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been repeatedly studied by lawyers, historians, psychologists, and experts of a
variety of different fields. This analysis relies on each of the aforementioned
transcripts and documents particularly War Crimes Trials Records of Case 9 (WCT),
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals (TWC), and NARA
Record Groups 238, M895, and M1019 (microfilm).361
This study attempts to avoid referring to Ohlendorf’s testimony and
affidavits as “confessions.” It is incorrect to designate his statements a confession,
because he certainly did not believe he was confessing to anything. Most of what is
written about Ohlendorf and the trial states in some fashion that he confessed to
murdering more than 90,000 Jews and partisans. This is misleading because not
only did he believe in the moral right of what his Einsatzgruppe did, he never
perceived these actions as criminal, and therefore never actually made a confession.
The chief prosecutor Telford Taylor said of Ohlendorf’s testimony that it was “in his
mind not a confession but an avowal.”362 Trying to define Ohlendorf’s
acknowledgment of war crimes should be done bearing in mind that he did not
believe enacting mass murder was a criminal act. To him, it was a governmental
policy, albeit unpleasant, necessary and instrumental to the survival of the German
race. However, he said “…there was certainly no logic in the leadership for raising
this nonsense of the master race. The office for racial politics dealing with such
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racial problems never represented this theory.”363 The perpetuation of the Aryan
race was at the core of National Socialist ideology and practice, but Ohlendorf saw
the Holocaust as an act of self-defense, free of any notions of “master race.”
Ohlendorf was part of the policy-making, meetings, and conversations about the
survival of the Aryan race, but was frustrated when questioned by the prosecution.
His frustration reflects his desire to escape condemnation for genocide.
Ohlendorf’s entire trial experience was, plainly, peculiar. The arguably
handsome, intelligent, composed “Gralshüter” (keeper of the Holy Grail) of National
Socialism always made an impression on the judges, lawyers, and observers.364
Judge Michael Musmanno noted peculiarities, such as whenever Ohlendorf was
called to the stand, he drew a crowd of visitors including “women…some even
sought to pass him notes offering encouragement.”365 He said this of Ohlendorf’s
presence at the trial:
One of the most remarkable persons ever to appear before the public gaze…Handsome,
poised, suave and polite, he carried himself with the bearing of a person endowed with
natural dignity and intellect…forty years of age, slender and with delicate features and neatly
combed dark brown hair, he looked out at the world through penetrating blue-grey eyes. His
voice was excellently modulated…and he moved gracefully and self-confidently...the electric
sensation of absolute authority…never deserted the young major-general… The only blemish
in the perfection of his personality was that he had killed ninety thousand people. 366
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But not everyone was as impressed with Ohlendorf’s appearance and how he
carried himself. Tania Long, of the New York Times, reported Ohlendorf as such: “in
appearance he is not particularly brutal or inhuman, looking more like a somewhat
humorless shoe salesman one might meet anywhere.”367 Telford Taylor called him
“small in stature, young-looking, and rather comely... [who] spoke with dispassion,
and apparent intelligence.”368
At first glance, elements of Ohlendorf’s testimony, including attempts at
justifying the Holocaust, and the mentality behind his surrender, really do make him
seem, as Hilary Earl put it, “delusional.”369 Yet this analysis attempts to consider a
more complete picture of Ohlendorf’s character and thought-process seen in
particular segments of testimony. He believed everything he did was moral, right,
and completely justifiable in light of National Socialist ideology. Of course, his belief
in the value of this philosophy must be viewed within the context of the 91,678 Jews
and partisans murdered under his command. They were therefore his
responsibility, as the leader, along with the officers and soldiers under his
command. The crimes were his, no matter how he tried to justify them, and he was
rightfully sentenced to death. However, whatever wrong he had done, he genuinely
seemed to believe it was right.370
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Background
Upon his surrender, Ohlendorf assumed he could leverage his role as
intelligence-gatherer in the Reich in a way that would gain him clemency. He also
believed that he would assist the Allies in determining the new direction of
Germany’s government, having drafted a plan for economic recovery in the post-war
era. Instead of focusing on elements of Ohlendorf’s distinguished career in the Nazi
upper echelons, his British captors flushed out his activities with the
Einsatzgruppen. As the Einsatzgruppen reports surfaced, dispatches of the mobile
killing squads detailing the numbers and ethnicities of persons who were deemed
enemies of the Reich were discovered by a team of investigators, led by Benjamin
Ferencz. Coupled with Ohlendorf’s forthrightness in providing any information his
captors wished, enough evidence was found to bring him and other surviving
Einsatzgruppen personnel to trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
When the infamous Göring, Höss, and Speer Nuremberg Trial began,
conducted by the International Military Tribunal, Ohlendorf was in American
custody. He was brought in by the prosecution from that trial to testify against
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, former head of the RSHA, who in turn claimed Ohlendorf was
“one of my chief collaborators.”371 Ohlendorf’s tidy appearance and ability to speak
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precisely contrasted starkly with Kaltenbrunner’s harsh, “ominous-looking”
appearance. It was a sound strategy to have Ohlendorf testify against
Kaltenbrunner’s initial denial of the existence of the Einsatzgruppen. Ohlendorf
stated they operated under his authority.372 He supposed his cooperation as a
prosecution witness was winning him favor from his American captors, and at this
point, it was not certain he would even be prosecuted for anything. He saw himself
as more of an “expert witness” than a prisoner.373 That is, until the discovery of the
Einsatzgruppen Reports, daily correspondences sent from the front detailing
killings.374
As Ohlendorf was interrogated on multiple occasions over the course of
nearly two years, sometimes for hours at a time, his memory of particular things
became increasingly clear. When first debriefed by his British captors, he was
slightly vague with details, names, and events. With the passing of months, and
observing how the Nuremberg Trial was playing out, Ohlendorf merely added to
what he had already sworn to in affidavits. Specifically, the more time he had to
think about answering questions on the Führerbefehl, the more confidently he spoke
about it, and the more the Americans accepted whatever Ohlendorf said as
truthful.375 This is part of the Ohlendorf mystique. He was so honest and willing to
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discuss answers to pointed questions under interrogation, and to give extra
pertinent information, that the American tribunal appeared to blindly believe
whatever he said. His defense lawyer, Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer, would have to adapt a
defense strategy of having each defendant covered with the same tactic. In other
words, the other defendants had to amend their testimony to corroborate anything
Ohlendorf had already said. This would align the entire defense with one solid
explanation of their crimes. Aschenauer and Ohlendorf knew this and thought he, as
key defendant, would escape punishment.
Two sides of Ohlendorf’s personality manifested themselves: the practical
lawyer, soldier, and devoted servant of the Reich vs. the intellectual lawyer, adept at
courtroom manipulation. Unfortunately for Ohlendorf, his arrogant, know-it-all,
truth-teller, and utopian National Socialist outlook were inescapable elements of his
character that cost him his life. Regardless, he could not and would not possibly
deny his deeply rooted belief in National Socialism, and in his mind, he died a martyr
for the cause.
Ohlendorf’s testimony showcased his careerist nature, idiosyncratic
personality, and lack of remorse, while also revealing perplexing aspects of the Nazi
system and National Socialism under Hitler. The Reich had become a complex and
paradoxical entity, one that gave promotions for committing atrocities, censored
public opinion, and murdered the Jews of Europe. Part of the enigma is in the
reasoning of those who believed that there was a so-called Führer Order for the
Holocaust, allegedly handed down to the Einsatzgruppen, who then committed mass
murder through improvisational techniques. If such a specific order existed as Reich
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policy, how was it that ordinary Germans were allowed to exterminate Jews and
partisans without much of a standard of accountability? There was a loose chain-ofcommand and some top-down oversight. For example, Ohlendorf was present at
two mass executions for the purposes of inspection. What his role in the inspection
actually entailed is unclear. What is certain, however, is that as long as the
Einsatzgruppen reported that they were clearing out populations of Jews and
partisans, the SS was satisfied.
No paper trail survived that actually implicated Adolf Hitler with the
Holocaust. Ohlendorf and most other defendants on trial for war crimes named a
specific order under which they were supposedly instructed to perform mass
killings. They claimed they did it because they were ordered to, but no such specific
order was ever found.376 In fact, the question as to whether or not there was any
order at all unleashed the intentionalist/functionalist debate in historiography. It is
doubtful such an order ever existed directly from Hitler. If in fact there was an
order, it was probably given verbally so as to avoid any written proof. AntiSemitism was ingrained as part of National Socialist ideology; policy-makers,
logisticians, desk managers, and certainly the shooters and their commanders were
all directly involved in the Holocaust.
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Reliable Testimony: An Oxymoron
Wading into the testimony of a condemned man is problematic. There are
numerous reliable accounts contemporary to Ohlendorf and the trial that
corroborate his continual forthrightness and honesty; Chief prosecutor Benjamin
Ferencz said “…he was one of the very few men tried at Nuremberg who appeared to
be telling the truth.”377 Both under interrogation and with the prosecution,
Ohlendorf’s accounts of events and assessment of the Nazi regime never changed,
even when he was interviewed while awaiting his execution. Although the facts
provided in Ohlendorf’s testimony were little challenged at the time, analyzing what
he said at the trial and in captivity must be done carefully. Ohlendorf was educated
in the law, and thus knew how to best manipulate the system, and how to portray
his role in particular events in a certain light.
Other defendants, like Paul Blobel, leader of Einsatzgruppe C, cracked under
the pressure of the trial, while Ohlendorf remained calm throughout the entire
ordeal. Ever correct in his behavior, he even commended the tribunal in his final
statement saying “…I will not conclude this final statement without expressing my
gratitude for the very generous way in which you have treated the problems that we
have considered important in these debates.”378 Always a polite and courteous
gentleman to his equals, at this point, Ohlendorf certainly knew he was going to be
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condemned to death, and yet still thanked the court. Looking only at this particular
statement, without understanding the context of his character and personality, one
could simply assume that he was just another “willing executioner.” This is why
investigating parts of his testimony, bearing in mind Ohlendorf’s belief system and
Alter Kämpfer dedication, provides important insights into studying Nazi Germany
and the Holocaust.
Ohlendorf’s goal was simple and fairly successful: to make himself
indispensable. Whether it was simply his character and nature do to so, or as Ingrao
more critically argues, that every word of his testimony was part of a master plan to
create a fictional account, the goal was clear.379 Ohlendorf’s testimony was
perceived as truth in the trial, and was used to measure the level of culpability of
each other defendant in the Einsatzgruppen Trial, as well the trial of the original
Nuremberg defendants. On every subject he was questioned about, Ohlendorf held
information “of the highest importance in the eyes of his American interrogators”
and this allowed for him to “at his leisure devise defense strategies to face down the
accusations.”380 Ohlendorf really did put himself in the best possible position to
gain leverage, if he were put on trial. Perhaps he was indeed delusional in
collaborating so earnestly with his captors to offer information. There are both
elements of calculation and honesty in Ohlendorf’s testimony, but the most probable
explanation of his performance at the trial is that his ego was the ultimate victor. He
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never betrayed his loyalty to National Socialism, and said he would commit the same
atrocities all over again, without regret. This is what makes him the ultimate Alter
Kämpfer.
Defense Strategy and Motivation
Ohlendorf held a degree in jurisprudence and was experienced in courtroom
dynamics, on both the local and regional levels. Although he chose to testify on his
own behalf, and represent himself in court, his official lawyer was Rudolf
Aschenauer. Among many different themes present in Ohlendorf’s affidavits,
testimony, and interviews, the one which most stands out is consistency. In The
Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, Hilary Earl argues that during the trial, Judge
Musmanno strove to delve deeper into the religious and moral beliefs of the
defendants in order to better figure out perpetrator motivations.381 Whenever
Ohlendorf was asked about his family or personal life, he answered curtly, as if
irritated by the questions, and doubting their relevancy to the trial. How could this
husband and father of five children justify murdering innocent women and
children? The answer he provided is simple: first, he never personally killed anyone
and second, the very existence of those he ordered to be liquidated endangered the
survival of his own family and country. A key aspect of National Socialist ideology
was that the Reich was dependent on the destruction of the Jews.
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A general analysis of defense strategies used by those on trial at Nuremberg
have been divided into three categories by Earl: ideological soldiers, deniers, and
conflicted murderers. The ideological soldiers justified their actions through
National Socialist racial policy and by arguing that they were following military
orders. The deniers devised a strategy of admitting to nothing. Finally, conflicted
murderers either showed remorse for their actions, or demonstrated signs of moral
conflict during the killing process.382 Parts of Ohlendorf’s testimony reveal that
during the killings, he showed empathy for his soldiers, keeping them in a constant
rotation, and providing them a sense of collective responsibility so that they would
not carry the burden of murder alone.
Ohlendorf’s defense strategy does not easily fit into one of Earl’s three
categories. His testimony, and those of his fellow defendants, heavily rode on his
notions of “self-defense.” This is how Aschenauer devised the tactic of
acknowledging the mass executions, arguing that they were necessary to protect the
survival of Germany against the threat of Bolshevism. Aschenauer declared the
activities of the Einsatzgruppen to be “in presumed self-defense on behalf of a third
party…under conditions of presumed necessity to act for the rescue of a third party
from immediate, otherwise unavoidable danger.”383 In other words, the third party
was Germany, and the Einsatzgruppen leaders were simply trying to preserve the
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survival of the Reich, and were in compliance with Soviet law.384 The problem with
this line of defense is that it was never proven that Jews are sympathetic to the
Bolshevik cause. This argument was similar to the one used to justify Operation
Barbarossa: It was a preemptive attack in self-defense of Germany. Therefore,
killing Jews and their children was an attempt to thwart an inevitable attack against
Germany and prevent any future revenge killings. Following this logic, every citizen
of the Soviet Union should have been subjected to murder, regardless of race, with
the exception of those who were not members of the Communist Party.385 Clearly,
this was not the case, and non-Communists were not spared.
Another aspect of his trial strategy was that Ohlendorf thought Field Marshall
Erich von Manstein’s testimony would absolve him from the indictment of crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and membership in a criminal organization.
Einsatzgruppe D was attached to the 11th Army, and although their directives were
different in strategy and policy, Ohlendorf thought because of the association
between the SS and Wehrmacht, that they would be tried in the same manner. He
expected to be able to invoke the “Saubere Wehrmacht,” or clean Army, defense just
like Manstein did.386 He was wrong.
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Although Ohlendorf was unable to fight for a military-type trial like Manstein,
he argued the military defense throughout the trial. After all, he was given the title
“Commissioner of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD attached to the 11th
Army.” He was awarded military decorations, rank, and commendations, so it is not
difficult to understand why he thought he would be tried as the military were. This
is the most convincing part of Ohlendorf’s entire defense. If he could prove the
Wehrmacht were aware of and assisted the Einsatzgruppen in their activities, he
could have served a lighter sentence, or have his sentence altogether commuted,
again like Manstein did.
On trial, Ohlendorf said he received his own “march and command orders”
from the Army.387 In his testimony, Manstein denied ever having heard of the
Einsatzgruppen, denied knowing Ohlendorf except for a fleeting moment, and
refused to admit he was aware of the death of 90,000 Jews. When asked how he
could not know, he aloofly claimed that all of this occurred outside of his
jurisdiction. This is not entirely true, and surely broke Ohlendorf’s hope of having a
military-type trial. However, as time has passed since the trial, there is much
evidence, apparently inaccessible to Ohlendorf or the trial officials, that the
Einsatzgruppen had received most of their equipment from the Army. On the other

For more information on “clean Wehrmacht, “see Wolfram Wette’s The Wehrmacht: History,
Myth, Reality. Of note, the Americans really helped perpetuate the concept of the “clean
Wehrmacht” in the 1950s, the war effort of the German military was all but mythologized. See
Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in
American Popular Culture (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 78-79.
The Einsatzgruppen section of this essay first speaks of the clean Wehrmacht concept.
387

Käthe Ohlendorf, Letter to David Irving.

181

hand, there was an order issued on Himmler’s authority, which discussed “special
tasks.” Dictated by Hitler to Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, “Instructions on Special
Matters Attached to Directive No. 21” made sure that “SS-Reichsführer” Himmler
assumed responsibility for the “special tasks,” and that he act “independently and on
his own responsibility.”388 Despite various connections between the Army and the
special tasks of the Einsatzgruppen, one could argue that Himmler’s authority
absolves the Army of complicity. This may be true, but for the Army to be tried
completely separately from the Einsatzgruppen is problematic. There are too many
connections between the operations of both groups.
Richard Rhodes cites several specific meetings between SS leaders that shed
light on this question. For example, Walter Schellenberg, Wehrmacht
Quartermaster General Wagner, and Heydrich all met and decided that the
Einsatzgruppen were to operate under the supervision of the Wehrmacht on the
front, although behind the lines they were completely independent.389 The
Wehrmacht was also to provide fuel, rations, and other supplies to these task forces.
Nonetheless, despite Ohlendorf and Aschenauer’s best efforts to move for a military
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trial, and regardless of the evidence supporting their claim, it was a failure. The
cloud of Ohlendorf’s war crimes trumped anything else.
Lastly, as previously discussed in the Einsatzgruppen section, the
circumstances of Ohlendorf’s transfer served his own personal defense well. He
very aptly played the role of the intellectual who twice refused being transferred,
and was finally transferred against his wishes. For Ohlendorf, being an Alter
Kämpfer helped determine his career path, but at the trial, he stated numerous times
that he did not want to go to the Eastern Front. He had fallen into disfavor with
Himmler and ended up complying “only to avoid the reproach of cowardice.”390 He
portrayed himself, to an extent, as the victim of circumstance whose ideological
fanaticism did not give him any desire to murder anyone, yet he was coerced into
joining the Einsatzgruppen.
Ingrao argues that Ohlendorf portrayed himself as a party activist who was
unfairly “marginalized” and his transfer was a means to “destroy him
psychologically.”391 In direct cross-examination, Ohlendorf insisted that his
assignment was “involuntary” and ardently stated that disobeying the Führer
“would have met immediate death.”392 Throughout the trial, the defense was unable
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to prove this statement either true or false. Yet, the most pressing issue for the
prosecution was about the nature of how the number 90,000 came about.
The Number: 90,000
Ohlendorf himself admitted that under his nine-month command in the
Soviet Union, Einsatzgruppe D exterminated 90,000 people. In affidavits, testimony,
and every other time he was questioned, he gave 90,000 as the total figure. Given
that, according to the Einsatzgruppen Reports, also known as Operational
Situational Reports, U.S.S.R., 91,678 was the total number cited to date by
Einsatzgruppe D, the accuracy of Ohlendorf’s original 90,000 went
uncontested.393Ohlendorf was asked to verify the figure of 90,000 during crossexamination by James Heath, who said, “I understood you to suggest to the Court
that this figure is exaggerated although it appears in an affidavit which you have
given.”394 Ohlendorf replied:
In my direct examination I have already said that I cannot give any definite figure, and that
even the testimony in my affidavit shows that in reality I could not name any figure.
393
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Therefore, I have named a figure which has been reported ‘approximately.’ The knowledge
which I have gained by this day through the documents and which I have gained through
conversations with my men, make me reserve the right to name any figure and strengthen
this reservation. Therefore, I am not in a position to give you a minimum figure, either. In
my direct examination I have said that the numbers which appear in the documents are at
least exaggerated by one-half, but I must repeat that I never knew any definite figure and,
therefore, cannot give you any such figure.395

Heath, unrelenting, asked again if he exaggerated the reports “which you sent to the
Reich Security Main Office,” to which Ohlendorf replied “I certainly did not on my
own initiative, but I had to rely on those things which were reported to me, and I
know that double countings could not be avoided, and I also know that wrong
numbers were reported to me.”396 He also explained that his Einsatzkommando
units reported on killings “carried out by other units.” Here the prosecution
attempted to tie Ohlendorf down to the number 90,000. Ohlendorf stated that his
units exaggerated the reports with “fifteen to twenty percent double countings,” and
added this from his previous affidavit on 3 January 1946: “the ‘approximately’ must
have meant that I was not certain,” referring to previous affidavits recording the
number 90,000 he cited. Also from the affidavit, Heath read Ohlendorf’s testimony
to him aloud;
It is evident that I mentioned this number of ninety thousand by adding a number of other
figures. I do not mention this in order to excuse myself, as I am perfectly convinced that it
does not matter from the actual fact whether it was forty thousand or ninety thousand. I
mention this for the reason that in the situation in which we are today, politically speaking,
figures are being dealt with in an irresponsible manner. 397
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The series of questions by the prosecution and responses by Ohlendorf
demonstrate how initially, while in custody, Ohlendorf’s story became increasingly
specific. In the beginning, he was vague, but still was able to rattle off the figure of
90,000 for the total killed under his command. However, in the previous dialogue,
Ohlendorf seems to attempt to extricate himself from being tied to the figure 90,000,
citing exaggerations and incorrect numbers from the Einsatzkommandos, and
generally trying to distance himself from the number. He was unsuccessful, and due
to OSR 190, Ohlendorf was eternally bound to the statistic 91,678. He was correct in
saying forty thousand of ninety did not matter; in fact, it did not. Because the court
researchers authenticated the Operational Situational Reports, the figures were
accepted as true, and no defendant could talk his way out of them. The introduction
to the published Einsatzgruppen Reports stated “during the first days of the
Einsatzgruppen Trial, the authenticity of the reports was established beyond doubt,
after which the German defendants did not challenge their validity” - except for
Ohlendorf’s claims of inflated numbers.398
Two items are of particular note regarding the number 90,000. Firstly,
Ohlendorf was probably correct that the Einsatzkommandos included numbers from
“other” units. In fact, the Einsatzgruppen were extremely successful in rounding up,
registering, and performing executions on a mass scale. Without the help of local
authorities, this task would have proven more challenging. The Einsatzgruppen
enlisted local help, sometimes through voluntarism or sheer brute force and
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coercion, to cooperate with mass killings. For instance, Ohlendorf worked closely
with the Tatars in Crimea, who assisted in mass murder and did so “freely” by
offering “their services to the Germans” and “where troops and armed Tatars were
available, actions were undertaken.”399 There are many other instances of local
cooperation in pogroms like Babi Yar throughout the documents associated with the
Einsatzgruppen. In sum, the killings reported were probably not all performed by
German SS-Einsatzgruppen draftees and volunteers.
The second issue deals more with Ohlendorf’s character. The quintessential
careerist had an unblemished record of excellence. While composing the Meldungen
aus dem Reich, public opinion reports, or as Reich economic functionary, or even
with his brief stint in academia, one thing is certain about Ohlendorf: his career was
founded and sustained on principles of honesty, accuracy, loyalty, and efficiency. It
was these qualities that he claimed resulted in having him transferred, as his
superiors disliked the blunt honesty and meticulousness with which he carried out
tasks. There is little doubt Ohlendorf would have taken every possible measure to
ensure the accuracy of each OSR. Even if he indeed relied upon his
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Einsatzkommandos to compile statistics, he would have made certain they knew he
wanted his reputation for expediency and accuracy to remain intact. Given that
Ohlendorf could not physically be present at every single execution, nor count each
individual corpse, he had to entrust his Einsatzkommando leaders with taking tallies.
But the fact of the matter is this: if Ohlendorf disagreed with memos and statistics
sent back to Berlin, with his name and Einsatzgruppe undersigned, his sense of
professionalism would have prevented him from signing off on such reports. He did
not object, and so, performed his tasks as leader of Einsatzgruppe D in accordance
with the rest of his professional life, with precision, and accuracy.
Führerbefehl and Conscience
There is a major flaw in Ohlendorf’s testimony. Regarding the presence of
the so-called Führerbefehl, Führer’s order, Ohlendorf lied. About the Führerbefehl,
Christian Ingrao argues that Ohlendorf, here, was “setting out a fiction that would
have a long series of consequences... [and] attributing the guilt to a dead man
relieved the survivors of their responsibilities.”400 When questioned about
Einsatzgruppen directives after Operation Barbarossa, he stated that there was a
prior order in place to murder the Jews, saying “Himmler told me that before the
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beginning of the Russian Campaign Hitler had spoken of this mission.”401 Also
mentioned here should be the existence of the Barbarossa Decree and the
Commissar Order, which prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, mandated that
the Wehrmacht kill all Soviet political prisoners and Bolshevik sympathizers.
According to Ohlendorf, the order said: “…the Security Police and SD, the
Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos had the mission to protect the rear of
the troops by killing the Jews, gypsies, Communist functionaries, active Communists,
and all persons who would endanger the security.”402 Ohlendorf lied, and this was a
major part of his defense strategy. After all, he was thought to be fairly honest, and
because the Americans believed him, they took his definition of Führerbefehl as fact.
The difficulty here is that Ohlendorf dictated the “facts” of the trial. In “Scales
of Justice,” Earl argues that because Ohlendorf was relatively honest and
forthcoming in giving testimony, the prosecution and judges cared less about when
he said the order was issued. For Earl, the issue concerns the willingness of the
tribunal to accept what Ohlendorf said as fact because “perjury appeared to be
beneath him.” This made him a credible witness, and historians have traditionally
accepted his testimony as correct and factual, sometimes including the
Führerbefehl.403 No one at the trial disputed Ohlendorf’s definition of the
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Führerbefehl, because his testimony was not subjected to much scrutiny. Therefore,
what Ohlendorf said during the trial and his captivity has determined what is known
about the activities of the Einsatzgruppen and the destruction of the Eastern
European Jewry from 1941. However, historians now overwhelmingly reject the
notion that there ever was a Führerbefehl.
A significant issue addressed at the trial was that of the conscience and
morals of Ohlendorf and the other defendants. Yet Ohlendorf repeatedly dodged
any question concerning the morality of the orders to kill. Analyzing instances of
the prosecution, together with Musmanno, attempting to draw out Ohlendorf’s
opinions of the so-called Führerbefehl demonstrate his skill in avoiding emotive
testimony. The most significant display of the prosecution’s attempt to gauge
Ohlendorf’s morality leads back to the line of questioning about the murder of
women and children.
The prosecution repeatedly attempted to force Ohlendorf to make a moral
judgment concerning the murder of 90,000 innocent civilians. Regarding the order
to kill women and children, Ohlendorf constantly avoided making a moral claim
about it. Instead, he pointed to the fact that in the war itself, countless children
were killed by air strikes. In fact, he tried to distance himself from this aspect of
Einsatzgruppen activity saying, “I myself never saw children being shot,” but
acknowledged he knew that women and children were indeed killed when he said
“the reports also revealed the execution of children.”404 Goldhagen asserts that
when questioned about judging his own behavior and participation in mass murder,
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had he “disregarded the Führer Order, Ohlendorf would have transgressed the law
as well as his own moral code.”405 As an Alter Kämpfer, Ohlendorf would never have
compromised his devotion to National Socialism. Inherent in this ideology was the
inevitability that Germany could not thrive unless “other” inferior groups of people
no longer threatened the survival and expansion of the Aryan race.
Nevertheless, in the quest to understand the mentality of Nazi perpetration,
the prosecution was unrelenting, and again posed the issue of morality of orders.
This time, it was regarding the murder of women. Prosecutor James Heath
suggested to Ohlendorf “let’s suppose the order had been that you should kill your
sister.” After Aschenauer’s objection, and Ohlendorf also trying his best to throw the
question out as irrelevant, eventually he responded in the positive: “If the demand
would have been made to me under the same prerequisites that is within the
framework of an order, which is absolutely necessary militarily, then I would have
executed that order.”406
Goldhagen argues that Ohlendorf’s “conscience” dictated how he dealt with
his own troops.407 At the trial, Ohlendorf reiterated a conversation with Himmler,
from Nikolaev, Ukraine, saying he directly opposed the killing of civilians. “…I
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pointed out the inhumane burden which was being imposed on the men in killing all
these civilians. I didn’t even get an answer.”408 When Ohlendorf could not mitigate
the orders, he found other ways to lighten the burden for his soldiers. This is
demonstrated in ideas of collective responsibility, demanding they shoot in tandem,
and in the use of gas vans.409 Ohlendorf portrayed himself as a sincere and caring
leader, “a man of conscience and integrity,” who genuinely affirmed the well-being
of his troops.410 Ohlendorf’s moral conscience was a predicament for him, as
revealed in an exchange between himself and James Heath:
Ohlendorf: Well, I believe there is no doubt that there is nothing worse for people spiritually
than to have to shoot defenseless populations.
Heath: If I may be a little facetious in a grim manner, there is nothing worse than to be shot
either, when you are defenseless?
Ohlendorf: Since this is meant ironically by you, I can imagine worse things, for example, to
starve.
Heath: It is not meant entirely ironically. I have read the whole of your testimony, and I am
impressed by the fact that not once did you express any sympathy or regret. 411

Although Musmanno reprimanded Heath for commenting on Ohlendorf himself, this
excerpt from the trial perfectly demonstrates two points: First, Ohlendorf was
consistent and unwavering in his testimony throughout the entire process. Second,
it clearly shows how Ohlendorf committed his careerist nature to the method of
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murder. In this process, he cared not for those being murdered, but more for the
way in which they were killed and the well-being of his troops, their killers.
In Ohlendorf’s mind, during his assignment with the Einsatzgruppen, he was
a soldier, and a leader of soldiers. In the trial, he wholeheartedly accepted
responsibility for the actions of his Einsatzgruppe, although he made sure to
comment that he never personally actually killed anyone. For Ohlendorf, if the trial
were to tarnish his reputation, as someone who did much good work for the Reich,
at least he wanted to be remembered as a devoted leader, one who was sympathetic
to the needs of his men. Knowing he followed superior orders, excelling and
performing as best he could, and believing he served his troops “humanely” and
with care, by paying for their crimes, “he went down with the ship,” to use the
Victorian maritime idiom.
Sentencing
The longest closing statement from any witness in any of the Nurembergrelated trials was Ohlendorf’s, on 13 February 1948. Like his opening statement, he
gave a long-winded, carefully constructed speech that touched upon historical
concepts, Christianity, enemies, and the history and legacy of Germany. However,
unlike his opening statement, there is an element of emotion in parts of his speech
saying:
…I have said time and again that I was tormented by the fear of punishment which those in
Germany who were responsible for the historic development seemed to invite by their
words and deeds. Their frank ignoring of human lives, and of the basic ideas of their own
religious and moral conceptions of the people made this fear grow in me, but today my fear
of future punishment invited by present day events is greater still…
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This passage reveals something in Ohlendorf unseen anywhere else: fear. When he
is taking about human lives, torment, morals and punishment, he is reflecting on
what was wrong with embarking on the Holocaust, although he never calls it that.
But here he is also maintaining his innocence, and separating himself from “those”
who ignored “human lives.” At the same time, he uses the word fear twice. This is
credible because although he was a devoted believer in National Socialist ideology,
he was probably affected by becoming a perpetrator, and this haunted him. He goes
on to say…
…They [the defendants] entered on their task convinced that they were backed by a genuine
and justified moral force. They felt that their work was necessary even if it opposed their
own inner tendencies and interest, because the existence of their people was in deadly peril.
They were the same good average citizens as you find them by the millions in all countries.
They never thought of criminal activities or criminal aims…They were in no position to judge
the methods and necessity of this war…But the passion of their moral existence included the
metaphysical stipulation that the existence of their people must be preserved…412

Although Ohlendorf is clearly trying to preserve what little he can of himself and his
deeds, one can at least better understand how he justified his crimes. He almost
seems to admit that the perpetration of murder weighed heavily on him--enough to
speak of conscience and morals. These passages have a different tone, more like
that of a condemned man, than any other part of his testimony in the trial. One has
to wonder when it actually became apparent to Ohlendorf that he was not going to
come away from this trial without being sentenced, perhaps even to death. There is
a human element to this final statement worth further discussion. He repeatedly
referred to “they.” The “they” here are his fellow defendants, and possibly the
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German people as a whole. Perhaps observing their actions and attitude in court
convinced Ohlendorf he should speak on behalf of everyone in the dock. Ingrao
argues that, by this time, Ohlendorf was clearly aware that he was in “grave
danger.”413 He knew the possibility of being found guilty at the beginning of the
trial, but his closing statement reveals he understood this was likely going to be the
decision of the court.
For Musmanno, it was clear that he would have to impose death sentences.
He noted how his entire career as a defense lawyer he had fought against the death
penalty: “the thought of ending their [the defendant’s] lives filled him with dread. 414
On April 10, 1948, Ohlendorf was brought in for sentencing. At this point, he may
have hoped for some leniency in sentencing, but knew he would surely face
punishment. He was indeed found guilty on all three charges, and was sentenced to
death by hanging. He did not react outwardly, seemed indifferent, and then bowed
to show his respect for the court proceedings before he left the courtroom.415 He
did not know that he would have to wait for more than three years for the sentence
to be carried out.
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On Death Row
In the three years between the delivery of Ohlendorf’s death sentence and his
execution, he had ample time to settle his affairs, give interviews, appeal the
decision, compile evidence of his alleged innocence and write a testimonial. He kept
quite busy for a man on death row. With the help of Aschenauer, Ohlendorf
appealed for clemency based on the argument that the number, at the time one
million, of atrocities the court compiled for the whole Einsatzgruppen were inflated
by more than 50%.416 For Ohlendorf and Aschenauer, if one of the goals of this trial
had been to gain truth and create an “historical record,” he should be pardoned.417
This is because the precise numbers were called into question. The defense claimed
that if the numbers were not correct, this could have a tremendous bearing on the
validity of evidence submitted by the prosecution, and attested to by other members
of the Einsatzgruppen trial defendants. Likewise, the defense argued that not taking
into account the other tasks of the Einsatzgruppen besides killing was a “distortion
of the truth.”418 In Earl’s view, the goal of attaining the “truth” was an impossible
task. Certainly, there were documents and reports that revealed truths about the
actions of the Einsatzgruppen. But Musmanno and the organizers of the trial made it
paramount that they gain an understanding of the mentality of murder. In
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retrospect, Ohlendorf did not tell the complete truth. Not that he should ever have
been acquitted from committing heinous, deliberate genocide, but it is important to
realize the evidence behind the prosecution, in the case of using Ohlendorf’s
testimony as “truth” was compromised from the very beginning.
Not surprisingly, there were people and organizations which came out
against the Nuremberg judgments, especially the German Catholic Church.419 In fact,
by 1958, most of the sentences of those tried and jailed in all of the Nuremberg war
crimes trials were commuted. Through Aschenauer, Ohlendorf, along with other
convicted defendants, continued the appeals process over the course of three years.
John J. McCloy became head of the High Commission in Germany to re-evaluate the
prisoners, like Ohlendorf, still on death row.420 He established the Advisory Board
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on Clemency, which was tasked with reviewing and, if warranted, amending the
Nuremberg prisoner sentences. McCloy was pressured by German officials and the
United States government to maintain a good relationship with Germany so as to
promote German recovery. He and the board reassessed the defense of the
Nuremberg prisoners, and in their deliberations, took into consideration their
physical condition and family situations.421
This began in 1950, after Aschenauer’s many failed attempts at appeal, but
McCloy himself did not review the cases until January 31, 1951.422 The lag in time
was most likely because of the outbreak of the Korean conflict and increased
pressure on McCloy to hasten the process of rebuilding Germany as a Cold War ally.
A New York Times article from 1950 reveals precisely how giving Ohlendorf
clemency would invoke political repercussions. Granting “clemency would be oil to
the Kremlin’s propaganda machine; also, [that] it would have a reassuring effect on
Nazi front organizations, while weakening the hand of our democratic friends, not
the least of all Germany.”423 With the recommendations from the Advisory Board,
McCloy ruled to commute all but five prison sentences from the Einsatzgruppen trial.
Neither the board members, nor McCloy, were lenient on Ohlendorf. He was one of
the five whose sentences remained untouched. Ohlendorf was furious and said this
decision would, indeed, make him a “martyr,” since so many other perpetrators
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were either not tried, not punished, or given clemency.424 Telford Taylor said of this
decision: “The result of these and related developments was a rapid decrease of
political interest in war crimes matters and eventually a desire to put an end to
trials and liberate war criminals still in captivity.”425 That is, except for Otto
Ohlendorf.
After receiving the devastating news that most of his fellow defendants had
their sentences commuted or reduced, Ohlendorf wrote to Princess Helene Elisabeth
von Isenburg, and Cardinal Aloisius Muench, two powerful people who were known
for their sympathy toward the Landsberg prisoners. Muench was hesitant to
support Ohlendorf’s claims of being tried unjustly because of the massive amount of
evidence that he was responsible for killing 90,000 Jews and partisans. However,
“Mother Elisabeth” wrote numerous letters back to Ohlendorf and determined that
“as I got to know him, I was shocked to discover the false picture created by
propaganda in this case.”426 She also wrote to Aschenauer, had meetings on
Ohlendorf’s behalf, and was a founding member of the Association for Truth and
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Justice. However, the United States thought of this group as an organization of Nazi
sympathizers. The fact that Cardinal Muench decided not to help Ohlendorf’s cause
is indicative of the difficulty for the Catholic Church in being associated with the
death penalty, the Holocaust, and war crimes.427 Muench acknowledged Ohlendorf’s
guilt, but the Catholic Church as a whole took a stance against the death penalty
from the very beginning of the trial process.
Ohlendorf’s best attempts to have his sentence commuted failed. From
February to June 1951, his appeals for clemency stopped, and he presumably
focused on settling any unfinished affairs. He wrote a testament in which he asked
that the following passage be read at his funeral: “And my last wish: Let no one
invoke my life or my death for any purpose other than to do good.”428 Leading up to
his funeral, Ohlendorf wrote this testament, and was visited by clerics, including the
Anthroposophist minister Dr. Werner Haverbeck, who would perform the burial of
Ohlendorf in Hoheneggelsen.429 Ohlendorf was executed by hanging. He never
wavered in his devotion to National Socialism, and believed until the end that
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everything he did was just, right, and for the greater good of Germany. In the end,
he never showed any repentance for the actions of Einsatzgruppe D.
Conclusion
Chief Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz stated that of the 3,000 members of the
Einsatzgruppen who should be brought to trial, only twenty-four, two of whom
dropped out, were tried because that was precisely how many seats they had in the
block.430 Ferencz made every effort not to have any outside contact with the
defendants during the trial, most likely because he was Jewish and did not want to
seem vengeful or biased against them. However, he went to see Ohlendorf, after he
was sentenced and read the verdict, to inquire if there were anything Ferencz could
do, personally, for Ohlendorf. Ohlendorf replied to Ferencz “the Jews in America
will suffer for this,” and according to Ferencz, Ohlendorf “died convinced that he
was right and I was wrong.”431 Given the character and personality of Ohlendorf,
together with his self-righteous belief in National Socialism, there is little doubt he
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either whole-heartedly believed his crimes were justified or, if he had any doubts,
that he would never admit to wrongdoing.
The defense argument would have been quite strong, if the defendants had
all aligned and planned their testimonies to perfection. This was not the case.
Ohlendorf’s pre-trial testimony, in which he outlined the mass murder committed
by the Einsatzgruppen, was basically accepted. This left Aschenauer with little choice
but to adopt an unusual line of defense, which was also called for because this was
an unprecedented trial with uniquely devised charges.432 The defense conceded
that Ohlendorf had committed and led mass murder, but argued that Ohlendorf and
other defendants were following orders. These alleged orders superseded the
ability of the Einsatzgruppen leaders to call them into question. This argument was
repeatedly discussed with Ohlendorf, even to the point of admitting he would kill his
own sister. The defense thought the “orders” argument was quite sound, at least as
was uniformly argued by the defendants, until Willy Seibert was questioned as to
whether he would kill his parents in the name of Führer Orders. He said he could
not answer, and as Musmanno recalled: “The faces of the other defendants in the
dock dropped. ‘Why, you idiot,’ they seemed to say, ‘that is our whole case.’"433
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Seibert answered in the negative, saying “I would not do so.”434 He had just
demonstrated to the court that he was not a mindless soldier, that he enacted mass
murder through decision-making.
The testament written by Ohlendorf requires examination. It is referred to
by his widow, Käthe, in her “Letter to David Irving.” According to Mrs. Ohlendorf, he
compiled a great deal of evidence as to his direct relationship with the Army,
Manstein, and the Tatars, including photos, written affidavits, and other information
that point to an alleged unity of purpose in carrying out the Holocaust. Referring
back to the fact that Ohlendorf thought the Americans would try him as a member of
the military, and not as head of the “special” Einsatzgruppen forces, Käthe Ohlendorf
made it her personal quest to have her husband exonerated. Perhaps they were
both correct in thinking the trials were biased against him, given that in comparison
to other cases, he received the harshest punishment. Also, in her letter to David
Irving, a known Holocaust denier, Mrs. Ohlendorf’s motive is to enlist the help of
Irving by writing to him and providing him with this so-called evidence.
When Judge Musmanno referred to Ohlendorf as “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,” it
is simple to understand how he came to that characterization. Regarding his
attitude in captivity, arrogance in the courts, and his position as a top-level Nazi, it
seems he was this dualistic character. Looking more closely at how he performed
his job, at every level and every step along the way, Ohlendorf was a careerist,
driven by his absolutely faithful and untarnished belief in National Socialism. There
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is an apparent contradiction between careerism and ideological commitment, but in
the case of Ohlendorf, these opposing forces were compatible.
Hanno Sowade perfectly summarized Ohlendorf in life, character, and in the
trial this way: “the court could not fully make up its mind about this ‘Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde’ as the chairman of the Military Tribunal called him – the correct
economist and civil servant, who had fought selflessly for the interests of the middle
classes, and the mass murderer all in the person of Ohlendorf.”435 But this
characterization is only superficially correct. Taking into account the fact that he
was an Alter Kämpfer, the Jekyll and Hyde sides of Ohlendorf were not that easily
separable. From the trial, there are many lessons learned. Most significantly, the
amount of weight put on the validity and “truth” of Ohlendorf’s testimony, despite
the fact that the prosecution had numerous documents as evidence, is staggering.
Granted, he was well known for his severe honesty, self-righteousness, and fervent
(or violent in the Einsatzgruppen) dedication to National Socialism. However, why
would he not lie, even a little? Taking the word of a perpetrator unabashedly and
using it to wield the power of life and death in a trial is careless; the process should
be further scrutinized.
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Chapter 6:
Conclusion

Otto Ohlendorf was an economist, lawyer, Nazi party functionary, National
Socialist ideologue, and perpetrator of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
purpose of researching the life of Ohlendorf is to understand and appreciate, in the
greater picture of motivation, the patterns in his life and personality that lead to the
greatest crime of his career: his leadership of the Einsatzgruppen. In composing an
analysis comprised of different aspects of his life, much is gained in learning about
what his criminal motivations may have been. His crimes were heinous and so
significant that he was executed for them. Central to this study is examining
perpetration on an individual level, considering biographical and psychological
characteristics of the Ohlendorf. This is more significant than simply stating that
Ohlendorf was a typical German, who like all others, wanted to kill Jews; this is an
irresponsible claim.
Despite Ohlendorf’s criticism of Nazi policies, ultimately, he was responsible
for the deaths of 90,000 people. Like most Nuremberg defendants, he asserted that
they had an inability to act otherwise, a statement cited numerous times. Goldhagen
views this as a perpetrator speaking for all others, “what else could we have done?”
Instead, it should be treated as an individual viewpoint, rather than a collective ‘one
size fits all’ explanation.436 In the end, it is less significant from whom the orders
came, and when. Ohlendorf’s guilt is absolutely undeniable, but placing him into a
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general category of perpetrators is misleading. He was an Alter Kämpfer, elitist and
privileged in Nazi Germany. This entire dissertation focuses on how the conditions
of his life, career, and personality together led to his role in the perpetration of the
Holocaust. The one theme present in all of these conditions is Ohlendorf’s identity
as an Alter Kämpfer. In order to better study perpetrator motives, Browning’s
approach leads to clearer understandings of how, why and under what conditions
the Holocaust unfolded, especially in the Soviet Union. Case studies are extremely
important in comprehending the greater picture of not only the enactment of the
Final Solution, but also in showing how Nazi Germany, the supposedly well-oiled
machine, was in fact deeply dysfunctional. How can anyone begin to understand
how a particular person enacted mass murder without first trying to comprehend
the motivations, their career, and life conditions of the accused? This case study
featuring Otto Ohlendorf has been fruitful.
The motivations of Ohlendorf have become more clearly defined. Although
anti-Semitism was a major aspect of National Socialist ideology, Ohlendorf enacted
mass murder because he was a careerist and wanted to thrive at each job he was to
undertake. Likewise, he claimed the Jews and partisans posed a direct threat to the
progress and survival of Germany. He succeeded so much that he received the
highest of promotions throughout his career, from lieutenant to major general.
Despite his alleged reluctance to be transferred to the front, Ohlendorf’s career
greatly benefited from the experience. Although he attributed the transfer orders to
some sort of grudge with Himmler and Heydrich, once Ohlendorf accepted the fact,
he met this new assignment with the same efficiency as any other task he was given.
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He was an Alter Kämpfer and careerist. If he had not gone to the Eastern Front, his
career might have faltered. Worse yet, his loyalty could have been called into
question, a completely unthinkable scenario for Ohlendorf.
How could someone so apparently intelligent become a mass murderer and
think his job was morally justified? Ohlendorf’s motivations were rooted in
personal and professional opportunism and a purist interpretation of National
Socialism. He truly believed that the murder of 90,000 innocent people was an
acceptable act necessary to support the Nazi’s ideological war in the name of
expanding and preserving Germany. His ideology was centered around devotion to
the Reich and National Socialism, inseparable from his careerism. The connecting
factor was his elitist status as an Alter Kämpfer. He could not really be reprimanded
for insubordination, but at the same time, his dedication to the early values of the
Nazi party made him an unwavering supporter of the ideological cause. This led
him to be a perpetrator, a task he most likely did not enjoy as he oversaw the
murder of tens of thousands of men, women, and children. Nevertheless, he
justified it (perhaps only to himself and his soldiers) and deduced that committing
genocide was absolutely essential to the survival of Germany, National Socialism,
and his own life.
Despite Ohlendorf’s military experience and lack of desire to take up arms, he
morphed from National Socialism’s ideological soldier to a perpetrator of mass
murder. The Alter Kämpfer in him transitioned from academic policy-maker to
genocidal killer. Analyzing perpetrator motivation is problematic because general
statements and generic characterizations are not appropriate. The goal of this
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dissertation is not to explain why Ohlendorf commanded the execution of 90,000
Jews and partisans. It is clear why; he was anti-Semitic and a careerist, as were
most of his German contemporaries. Anti-Semitism was not confined only to
Ohlendorf, only to perpetrators, only to Nazis, or only to Germans. If that had been
the case, the Einsatzgruppen in particular would have had much more difficulty
enlisting the help of local paramilitary groups and citizens of the Soviet Union to
assist in their gruesome task. The Einsatzgruppen all used local help in their mission
to clear the land, persecute, document, and round up the local unwanted persons
(gypsies, Ashkenazis, Jews, Roma, the disabled, criminals, or other groups), dig the
mass graves if a ravine did not already exist, escort the victims to their gravesite,
and execute them. Without the support of locals in pogroms like Babi Yar, the
murders at Majdanek and Lublin, etc., the Nazis would most likely have had to
amass larger forces to support the extensive liquidation activities of the
Einsatzgruppen.
Although perpetrators deserve blame, there is risk in how and to what
degree blame is placed. Yes, Ohlendorf should certainly have been tried and
sentenced for the magnitude of his horrific crimes. This issue extends into a debate
over whether Nazis like Ohlendorf were punished enough. Yet of all the
Einsatzgruppen perpetrators, only twenty-four were tried. The Allies felt they did
not have the evidence, or resources, to manage the conviction of the 3,000
Einsatzgruppen killers.
Concerning future studies related to Ohlendorf, this thesis has exposed gaps
in the scholarship that, even in this conclusion, remain unanswered. For instance,
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more exploration and research is necessary regarding the Nazis and Ohlendorf’s
relationship with the Anthroposophical Society. Argued here is that the society was
influential in Ohlendorf’s life, and his involvement with its defense may have
possibly played a small role in Himmler’s transfer order that placed Ohlendorf in
command of Einsatzgruppe D. More plausibly, a deeper analysis could reveal an
intricate interconnectedness between particular members of the Nazi party and the
Anthroposophical Society.
In addition to Ohlendorf’s ties to the Anthroposophical Society, his link to
academic radicalism could prove to be interesting. He was connected with Jessen
and other members of the universities of Kiel and Berlin who spoke out against Nazi
policy to the point of anarchy, as Jessen and many other academics were involved in
the 20 July plot. Precisely what were Ohlendorf and Jessen lecturing and writing
about while at the universities, building new departments of economics together?
Exactly why were they both asked to leave under suspicious circumstances not
once, but twice? Was there any backlash against Ohlendorf when Jessen was
arrested for involvement in the 20 July plot? Was Ohlendorf questioned about it?
Why or why not, considering his ties to Jessen? Why did these two men have an
apparent falling out after Jessen encouraged Ohlendorf to join the SD?
Looking further at the Trial, Hilary Earl has certainly led the way for the most
recent writing on the Einsatzgruppen Trial. Where this topic can lead is analyzing
Ohlendorf’s claims for being tried under the Saubere Wehrmacht defense, and how
he specifically handled his three years in prison, after sentencing. As the
commanding officer of Einsatzgruppe D, Ohlendorf was sentenced to death on all
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three counts. Other Einsatzgruppen leaders who made it through the trial process
were all dealt the same sentence.
Questions about accountability still arise, albeit more infrequently than after
the war, and with occurrences like Darfur, Rwanda, Bosnia and other genocidal
incidences of today’s world, they are still relevant. Because mass murders, pogroms,
and terrible acts of violence dominate particular areas of the world, scholars and
legal experts continually look back to the Nazi Holocaust for precedents to set just
standards of order of the world. Unfortunately, most often governing bodies such as
the United Nations are unsuccessful at preventing genocide, despite the continuous
amount of analyses of the Holocaust.
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the life and career of Holocaust
perpetrator Otto Ohlendorf in a way that demonstrates particular, relevant themes
in Nazi Germany and Holocaust studies. Focusing on careerism and National
Socialist ideology, Ohlendorf’s life and career reveal how he was allowed to flourish
in the Nazi party and government through the privileges of being an Alter Kämpfer.
It is difficult to say whether his meteoric rise to the top of the Nazi careerist echelon
was solely dependent on the Alter Kämpfer status. But along with the status came
the responsibility of Ohlendorf to substantiate his commitment to National
Socialism and the party. Although Ohlendorf argued against wanting to assume the
role of mass murderer with Einsatzgruppe During the trial at Nuremberg, there was
little doubt that his command of the group became a significant determinant of his
future promotions. He may not have liked leading genocide, but his commitment to
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the ideology made him the ideal candidate to have a thriving career in Nazi
Germany.
In conclusion, this dissertation concludes with the future in mind. Why is the
Holocaust and its perpetrators still a relevant and significant area of study? If
genocide still occurs, why bother to analyze perpetrator motivation? If the world
cannot appropriately legislate racist acts, violence, and war, then it is the job of
scholars, researchers, and historians to write more, analyze more, and to make more
people aware of genocide and hate as criminal acts. Deciding what is moral and
what just punishment may be is not for me to decide. Instead, my job is to attempt
to make sense of perpetration and bring a better understanding of how and why it
occurs. The study of Otto Ohlendorf is one more step toward comprehending the
past, with the hope that the future can prevent ideological horrors like the
Holocaust.
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